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In 1921, when William Howard Taft became Chief Justice,
the Supreme Court did not occupy the serene and imposing
marble building that has since become its contemporary icon.1
Its courtroom was instead located in the old Senate Chamber,
whose intimate, elegant surroundings echoed with the debates
of Webster, Clay, and Calhoun.2 Its administrative staff and
offices were scattered haphazardly and inefficiently throughout
the Capitol.3 It was Taft who, with great skill and patience,
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independent research of the author or annual reports of the Attorney General
of the United States.
1. Writing in 1984, Margaret P. Lord noted that to the Justices who first
moved into the contemporary Supreme Court building in 1935, "the spaces
were too huge, the corridors were too long and cold, the rooms too formal."
Margaret P. Lord, Supreme Courthouse, CONNOISSEUR, July 1984, at 61. But,
she added, "[tioday, the grandeur seems exactly appropriate." Id. Contempo-
rary representations of the Court nearly always include images of its building.
2. CHARLES MOORE, WASHINGTON PAST AND PRESENT 126 (1929).
3. See GREGORY HANKIN & CHARLOTrE A. HANKIN, PROGRESS OF THE
LAW IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, 1929-1930, at 5 (1930); Letter
from William Howard Taft to Senator Reed Smoot (July 3, 1925) (Taft Papers,
Reel 275). In remarks at the laying of the cornerstone for the present Su-
preme Court building, Charles Evans Hughes referred to the administrative
facilities of the old Court as "shockingly insufficient.... I doubt if any high
court has performed its tasks with so slender a physical equipment." Charles
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seized the occasion to extract from Congress the resources to
construct and design the present structure,4 which, in the
words of its architect Cass Gilbert, was intended to combine
"all the beauty, charm and dignity of the Lincoln Memorial"
with "the practical qualities of a first-rate office building."5 Al-
though Taft never lived to see the building constructed, a plas-
ter model of it was placed beside his casket as he lay in state at
the Capitol, in tribute to "one of [his] last contributions to the
nation."6
In part, Tats success was due to what Charles Evans
Hughes accurately characterized as "his intelligent persis-
tence."7 But in part it was also due to the mood of the nation in
the decade after World War I. Despite the notorious budgetary
astringency of Republican administrations, there was a re-
markable and widespread conviction that Washington, D.C.
should be rebuilt "to make the national capital as splendid as
our new status in the world."8 The spate of federal construction
Evans Hughes, Address at the Laying of the Cornerstone of the Supreme
Court Building (Oct. 13, 1932), in Corner Stone of New Home of Supreme
Court of United States is Laid, 18 A.B.. J. 723, 728 (1932).
4. Hughes was speaking simple truth when he later observed that "we
are indebted to the late Chief Justice William Howard Taft more than to any-
one else" for the construction of the contemporary Supreme Court building.
Hughes, supra note 3, at 728. For a brief synopsis of Tafts intense lobbying
campaign, see ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT: CHIEF
JUSTICE 133-37 (1965). To get a sense of how remarkably innovative were
Taft's lobbying efforts on behalf of the new Supreme Court building, consider
the 1917 remarks of Representative James R. Mann, when speaking to the
question of the housing of the Supreme Court: "The members of the Supreme
Court of the United States can not go lobbying. They can not permit one of
their employees to go lobbying. It is beneath their dignity, properly so, to even
make a representation in reference to the matter." 54 CONG. REC. 1660, 1716
(1917).
5. Letter from Cass Gilbert to William Howard Taft (Jan. 16, 1929) (Taft
Papers, Reel 307). Gilbert remarked that this was "a combination rather diffi-
cult to achieve, but nevertheless possible." Id. Although the classical ele-
ments of the Supreme Court are often remarked upon, it was equally impor-
tant to Taft and Gilbert that "[tihe practical, working elements of the building
are as simple and modest and as sanitary as a modern office should be." Let-
ter from Cass Gilbert to James M. Beck (Nov. 28, 1933) (Gilbert Papers).
6. Hundreds File Past Taft Bier in Capitol, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1930, at
15.
7. Hughes, supra note 3, at 728.
8. Anne O'Hare McCormick, Building the Greater Capital: A New Wash-
ington Rises As the Symbol of America's New Status, N.Y. TIMES, May 26,
1929 (Magazine), at 1.
The real pressure behind the new Washington is the new Amer-
ica. We have heard a good deal during the past few years of the
1268
HeinOnline -- 85 Minn. L. Rev. 1268 2000-2001
2001] OPINIONS AS INSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE 1269
in the 1920s9 reflected "the dawning consciousness that this
capital is an equivalent of the Rome of Augustus." 0 Writing at
the end of the decade, one commentator noted that "[tihe
proudest boast of the Emperor Augustus was that he found
Rome a city of brick and left it a city of marble. All Washingto-
nians seem bent upon following in his footsteps and making our
national capital, if not a marble city, at least a white city."1"
The new Supreme Court building self-consciously partici-
pated in this imperial metaphor. Gilbert, who had been per-
sonally selected by Taft, 12 designed the structure "to express
the serious beauty and quiet refined splendor of a Courtroom of
the classic period of Rome."13  The architectural reference to
United States as a great world power, perhaps the greatest. But that
conception of our place in the international scheme is new to Ameri-
cans, and in the country at large has been discounted as political hy-
perbole. Very slowly the legend has acquired the vitality of a fact,
predicated not upon a vague political pre-eminence but upon the clear
evidence of our mechanistic supremacy. We begin to see ourselves
first among the nations by the tangible standards the populace recog-
nizes-wages, motor power, plumbing. Gradually our primacy has
impressed ourselves. The capital, says Mr. Hoover, is "the symbol of
the nation."
Id.
9. See generally Emmet Dougherty, $50,000,000 To Add Beauty and
Dignity to Capital's Skyline: Stately Edifices of Classic Design to Accommodate
an Army of Clerks, N.Y. HERALD TRIB., Aug. 15, 1926, § 3, at 3.
10. McCormick, supra note 8, at 1.
11. Fitzhugh L. Minnigerode, Washington Doffs Its Brick for Marble:
White Masterpieces of Architecture Replace Old Red Buildings as Townsmen
Join the Government in Beautification Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 1930
(Magazine), at 18.
The most notable buildings either recently erected or soon to be
erected include the Departments of Commerce, Justice, Posts and La-
bor. Then we shall see arise in majesty a new building for the Su-
preme Court, another for the Interstate Commerce Commission, the
Archives Building, Independent Offices Building, House of Represen-
tatives Annex and a number of lesser ones ....
Id.
12. Taft, who had been Chair of the Lincoln Monument Commission, ini-
tially looked to Henry Bacon, who had designed the Monument. Bacon in fact
produced preliminary drawings of a Supreme Court building. See Carson C.
Hathaway, At Last a Home for the Supreme Court: Highest Tribunal of Nation
Never Had Its Own Building But After 136 Years Plans for One Are Now
Drawn, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1926 (Magazine), at 13; Letter from Taft to
Smoot, supra note 3. Bacon died in 1924. Hathaway, supra, at 13.
13. Letter from Cass Gilbert to Benito Mussolini (Aug. 11, 1932) (Gilbert
Papers). Gilbert admired Mussolini, and he actively sought the dictator's as-
sistance in acquiring the Italian marble that Gilbert insisted be used in the
courtroom. Gilbert met with Mussolini in June 1933 to discuss the situation:
I said that I had thought it would interest him to know of these
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Rome was complex and multi-dimensional. It evoked associa-
tions of Roman law,' 4 Roman power and virtue, and the stable
equipoise of secure authority. By the time the Court actually
moved into its new quarters in 1935, however, it had thrown
down the gauntlet to the New Deal, so that the abstract and
"pure" classicism 5 of the building acquired a hard and cold
edge. It became "a building symbolic of the Court's intransige-
ance," a "sepulchral temple of justice."16
matters at first hand & that I wanted him to know of them from me,
as I had the greatest admiration for him & for what he had done & is
doing for Italy. I moved to withdraw. He put out his hand across the
table & said very simply "Goodbye-Goodbye"! We shook hands & I
turned & walked rapidly to the door, reaching which I turned sharply
around and raised my hand in the Roman Salute-as he did the
same. And I shall always think of him as standing in the somewhat
dim light of that great room alone, with his hand up above his head in
the most impressive of gestures, the Roman Salute, which is so char-
acteristic of the great organization he has created-The Facisti-and
which he has led so successfully for nearly eleven years.
Gilbert Memorandum, "Mussolini" (June 6, 1933) (Gilbert Papers).
14. Taft's brother Henry, for example, wrote to Gilbert that the Courtroom
"will be very beautiful, and the selection of the Roman feeling particularly ap-
propriate, as the Romans were the first of the ancients who developed a sys-
tem of law which has lasted down through the centuries." Letter from Henry
Taft to Cass Gilbert (Feb. 15, 1932) (Gilbert Papers).
15. See Letter from Cass Gilbert to Sir Reginald Blomfield (Apr. 5, 1933)
(Gilbert Papers) ("The Supreme Court Building... is built of white marble
and it is as pure in style as I can make it. I hope it will cause some reaction
against the silly modernistic movement that has had such a hold here for the
last few years.").
16. DREw PEARSON & ROBERT S. ALLEN, THE NINE OLD MEN 3-4 (1937).
Pearson and Allen are quite inaccurate in their account of the building. For
example, they describe Stone as opposed to its construction: "Justice Stone
was not impressed by the boyish pride of Mr Taft in his blueprints. 'I am very
comfortable at home,' he said. 'I wouldn't move my library if you gave me the
whole building to myself.'" Id. at 3. Actually, however, Taft began earnestly
seeking funding for a new building only after the newly-appointed Justice
Stone was unable to find an office in the Capitol. See Letter from Harlan F.
Stone to William Howard Taft (May 5, 1925) (Stone Papers); Letter from Wil-
liam Howard Taft to Harlan F. Stone (May 26, 1925) (Taft Papers, Reel 274);
Harlan F. Stone to William Howard Taft (May 27, 1925) (Taft Papers, Reel
274); Letter from William Howard Taft to Harlan F. Stone (May 28, 1925)
(Tafi Papers, Reel 274); Letter from William Howard Taft to Senator Reed
Smoot (July 3, 1925) (Taft Papers, Reel 275). In the 1920s there was virtually
no room for Justices' chambers in the Capitol; all the Justices but Sutherland
and Sanford worked at home. But because Stone was in the process of con-
structing a house, he had no home office. Stone complained vociferously, writ-
ing to Taft that "I shall be about like a stray dog." Letter from Harlan F.
Stone to William Howard Taft (Aug. 30, 1925) (Taft Papers, Reel 276); see Let-
ter from William Howard Taft to Senator Charles Curtis (Sept. 4, 1925) (Taft
Papers, Reel 276); Letter from Harlan F. Stone to William Howard Taft (Oct.
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Although the building's classicism inevitably carried this
potential for turning cold, empty, and isolated, in its original
conception the Augustan composure of the building aspired to
the quite different status of "a national symbol," bespeaking
"the common cause, the unifying principle of our Nation."17 In
lobbying for congressional support, Taft repeatedly articulated
the need for a building that would embody the dignity of the
Court "as the head of the Federal Judiciary, and, in a constitu-
tional sense, the head of the Judiciary of the Nation." 8 It was
understood that "a monumental Supreme Court building"
would "establish the judiciary as the equal, architecturally at
least, of the legislative and executive branches of the govern-
ment."19
Today it is natural for us to conceptualize the Supreme
Court as overseeing a co-ordinate branch of the federal gov-
ernment. But in 1921 this was hardly a common vision. It was
Taft who, as a former chief magistrate of the Executive Branch,
transformed the role of Chief Justice into something analogous
to a chief executive for the judicial branch of government,
thereby for the first time imagining the federal judiciary as a
21, 1925) (Taft Papers, Reel 277); Letter from William Howard Taft to Harlan
F. Stone (Oct. 22, 1925) (Taft Papers, Reel 277); Letter from Harlan F. Stone
to William Howard Taft, (Oct. 23, 1925) (Taft Papers, Reel 277). Despite
Taft's best efforts, Stone could in the end manage to wrangle only an ill-
lighted basement room some "distance from the Law Library." Letter from
Harlan F. Stone to Senator Charles Curtis (Nov. 17, 1923) (Taft Papers, Reel
277); see Letter from William Howard Taft to Elihu Root (Nov. 22, 1925) (Taft
Papers, Reel 278). As a consequence Stone strongly supported Taft's proposal
for a new building. He was intimately involved with Gilbert's designs, and he
always expressed his approval of the plans. See, e.g., Letter from Harlan F.
Stone to Cass Gilbert (Mar. 24, 1927) (Stone Papers); Letter from Harlan F.
Stone to William Nelson Cromwell (Oct. 22, 1928) (Stone Papers); Letter from
Harlan F. Stone to Cass Gilbert (Oct. 7, 1929) (Stone Papers) ("It seems to me
you have designed a building which is, at the same time, unique and dignified,
and appropriate to its setting.")
17. Hughes, supra note 3, at 728-29. Laying the cornerstone of the build-
ing, Charles Evans Hughes declared that the structure "symbolizes the na-
tional ideal of justice in the highest sphere of activity, in maintaining the bal-
ance between the Nation and the States and in enforcing the primary
demands of individual liberty as safeguarded by the overriding guarantees of a
written Constitution." Id. at 728.
18. Letter from William Howard Taft to Senator Reed Smoot (July 3,
1925) (Taft Papers, Reel 275); see Letter from William Howard Taft to Senator
Charles Curtis (Sept. 4, 1925) (Taft Papers, Reel 276) ("We ought to have a
building by ourselves and one under our control, as the chief body at the head
of the judiciary branch of the Government.").
19. Herbert Little, The Omnipotent Nine, 15 AM. MERCURY 48, 50 (Sept.
1928).
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coherent branch of government to be managed. 20 And it was
Taft who conceived and pushed through Congress the Judiciary
Act of February 13, 1925,21 which "cut... to the bone"2 2 the
mandatory appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, substi-
tuting therefore discretionary review by writs of certiorari.23
The Act represented a fundamental transformation of the
role of the Supreme Court.24 Before the Act, the Court was
primarily a tribunal of ultimate resort; it was the highest and
the last source of appellate review, whose chief function was
correctly to discern and to protect the federal rights of liti-
gants.25 But the Act's sharp constriction of the Court's manda-
tory appellate jurisdiction "completely overrode" this "obstinate
conception that the Court was to be the vindicator of all federal
rights.2 6 And the Act's extraordinary enlargement of the
Court's discretionary appellate jurisdiction expressed a pro-
20. For a discussion, see Robert Post, Judicial Management and Judicial
Disinterest: The Achievements and Perils of Chief Justice William Howard
Taft, 1 SUP. CT. HIST. 50, 50-70 (1998).
21. 43 Stat. 936, 936-42 (1925). For an account of Taft's tireless efforts on
behalf of the Act, see MASON, supra note 4, at 107-14.
22. FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE
SUPREME COURT 299 (1928).
23. In essence, the Act restricted the Court's mandatory appellate juris-
diction to four classes of cases: (1) cases in which a state court has upheld a
state statute against claims that it is invalid under federal law, or in which a
state court has held invalid a federal statute or treaty; (2) cases in which a
Circuit Court of Appeals has held a state statute invalid under federal law; (3)
cases coming by way of direct appeal from specially constituted federal district
courts; and (4) cases certified by Circuit Courts of Appeals, the District of Co-
lumbia Court of Appeals, or the Court of Claims. 43 Stat. at 937-39. All other
appellate cases could come before the Court only through petitions for a writ of
certiorari, which it was within the discretion of the Court to grant or to deny.
Id. at 939-42. On the grounds for granting certiorari, see Magnum Import Co.
v. Coty, 262 U.S. 159, 163 (1923); Layne & Bowler Corp. v. Western Wells
Works, Inc., 261 U.S. 387, 392-93 (1923).
24. For an excellent summary of the origins and justifications of the Act,
see Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five
Years After the Judges'Bill, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1643, 1649-57 (2000).
25. As Judge Benjamin I. Salinger testified in opposition to the bill,
[Tihe great function of the Supreme Court is to protect rights given by
treaty, the Constitution, or other Federal law. On a proper plea set
up, the citizen should be able to obtain the protection of such rights-
not as a matter of grace or discretion, but as of right-as protection
from the court which is specially charged with insisting upon rever-
ence for Federal law.
Hearing on H.R. 10479 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong. 5
(1922) (statement of Honorable Benjamin I. Salinger).
26. FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 22, at 260-61 (footnotes omitted).
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found recharacterization of the Court's function. As Taft suc-
cinctly put it,
The real work the Supreme Court has to do is for the public at large,
as distinguished from the particular litigants before it.... Its main
purpose is to lay down important principles of law and thus to help
the public at large to a knowledge of their rights and duties and to
make the law clearer.27
By ceding to the Court significant authority to shape its own
docket, the Act essentially recognized the Court as the supervi-
sor of the system of federal law:28
The specific rights of particular parties are no longer the essence
of the controversies before the Supreme Court. They are mere vehi-
cles whereby the Constitution and the laws of the United States are
interpreted, the means whereby the general principles of law are de-
fined, and whereby the rules and conceptions of federal law are made
uniform throughout the country. In this respect one might well say
that the Supreme Court is abandoning its character as a court of last
resort, and is assuming the function of a ministry ofjustice .... 29
The Court's new building stands as the architectural
marker of this important historical transition in the nature of
the Court, from an institution focused on the rights of parties to
one responsible for the development of federal law.30 The clas-
sical serenity of the building, of course, tends to disguise such
moments of transition, and to project instead a seemingly inevi-
table narrative of institutional continuity and identity' But an
important thrust of the enterprise of institutional history is to
27. William Howard Taft, Address to the New York County Bar Associa-
tion 5 (Feb. 18, 1922) (Taft Papers, Reel 590); see Letter from William Howard
Taft to Senator A. Owsley Stanley (Dec. 5, 1924) (Taft Papers, Reel 269) ("[The
theory of the Act is] that the District Court and the Circuit Court of Appeals
shall furnish all the hearings that any litigant should have, and that the busi-
ness of the Supreme Court should be to consider and decide for the benefit of
the public and for the benefit of uniformity of decision only questions of impor-
tance. The appeal to us should not be based on the right of a litigant to have a
second appeal.")
28. Thus Taft lobbied Congress for the Act on the grounds that it was
"really quite essential to our playing the part we ought to play in the admini-
stration ofjustice in the country." Letter from Taft to Stanley, supra note 27.
29. Gregory Hanlin, U.S. Supreme Court Under New Act, 12 J. AM.
JUDICATURE SOC'Y 40, 40 (1928). In the words of Peter Fish, the Act "trans-
formed" the Supreme Court "from a forum that primarily corrected errors aris-
ing in ordinary private litigation to a constitutional tribunal that resolved
public policy issues of national importance." Peter G. Fish, Judiciary Act of
1925, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES 477 (Kermit L. Hall et al. eds., 1992). For a contemporary critique of
this transformation, see Hartnett, supra note 24, at 1713-37.
30. See DAVID M. O'BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN
AMERICAN POLITICS 156-57 (1993).
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pierce the marble exterior to uncover the myriad fundamental
and invisible ways in which institutions change. Although the
Supreme Court of the period 1921 to 1929, when Taft was Chief
Justice, feels familiar, feels like simply a prior manifestation of
the same Supreme Court that we now know, in fact it was in
many ways quite a different institution.
In this Lecture I shall attempt to make palpable some of
the more subtle and important of these differences. But I shall
not do so in the usual way, by comparing the Taft Court's juris-
prudence to our own, although such an approach would cer-
tainly reveal important sites of difference and discontinuity.31 I
shall instead focus on an institutional aspect of the Supreme
Court that seems, like the Supreme Court building itself, con-
stant and invulnerable to historical change: the practice of
opinion-writing. In law school textbooks and classes, Supreme
Court opinions from vastly different eras are typically set in
timeless juxtaposition to one another, as if liberated from the
historically specific settings in which they were produced. The
implicit assumption is that Supreme Court opinions are a con-
stant and invariable means by which the Court directs the de-
velopment of federal law.
Yet in fact the character of Supreme Court opinions has
changed over time, and these changes track shifting notions of
the role of the Supreme Court in the American legal system. In
shape and configuration, opinions of the contemporary Court
are demonstrably different from those of the Taft Court, in part
because opinions suitable for a "court of last resort" differ from
those appropriate for a "ministry of justice."32 But this trans-
formation has been accompanied by a deeper shift in the im-
plicit norms of Supreme Court decisionmaking. Justices of the
Taft Court felt presumptively obligated to join Court opinions,
even if they disagreed with their content, so as to preserve the
influence and prestige of the Court. No such norm is apparent
among modern Justices. This revolution in the practice of dis-
sent in part reflects a shift in the Court's jurisprudential un-
derstanding of the nature of law, from a grid of fixed and cer-
tain principles designed for the settlement of disputes, to the
site of ongoing processes of adjustment and statesmanship de-
signed to achieve social purposes. In part it also expresses an
31. See, e.g., Robert Post, Defending the Lifeworld: Substantive Due Proc-
ess in the Taft Court Era, 78 B.U. L. REV. 1489 (1998).
32. Hankin, supra note 29, at 40.
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evolving conception of the distinction between law and politics.
Norms concerning the citation of authority within Supreme
Court opinions have also altered radically since the days of the
Taft Court. Opinions of the modern Court routinely refer to
law review articles, whereas such citations were quite rare dur-
ing the 1920s. In this Lecture I shall argue that this shift sig-
nals an implicit alteration of the Court's understanding of its
own institutional authority.
Because opinions are the primary means by which the
Court intervenes to shape and affect its legal environment,
opinion writing practices not only reflect the intellectual per-
spectives of the Justices, but also are themselves an important
dimension of American law. The position of the Supreme Court
is differently constituted because Court opinions are now writ-
ten and designed "for the public at large, as distinguished from
the particular litigants before it."33 Our law is actually less
fixed and certain, in part because unanimous Supreme Court
opinions, routine during the Taft Court, are now so unusual.
We inhabit a different tension between law and politics than
did contemporaries of the Taft Court, in part because in our
time the very concept of a Supreme Court opinion has begun to
splinter.34 The authority of our Supreme Court is different
from that of the Taft Court because modern opinions now rou-
tinely engage in an ongoing dialogue with American legal aca-
demia. Supreme Court opinions both reflect and constitute the
role of the Supreme Court itself.
The practices by which members of the Taft Court created
their opinions were recognizably distinct from our own. Yet in
the 1920s these practices were also highly controversial, sub-
ject to the pressure of rapidly changing circumstances. By trac-
ing the contours and trajectories of these controversies and cir-
cumstances, I hope to make visible the origins and significance
of many of the norms of opinion writing that we now take for
granted and that form for us the seemingly inevitable fagade of
our own Supreme Court.
33. William Howard Taft, Address to the New York County Bar Associa-
tion 5 (Feb. 18, 1922) (Taft Papers, Reel 590).
34. See John F. Davis & William L. Reynolds, Juridical Cripples: Plural-
ity Opinions in the Supreme Court, 1974 DuKE L.J. 59 (1974).
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I.
To appreciate the historically changing nature of Supreme
Court opinions, we must first understand the institutional en-
vironment in which such opinions are produced. The Court
publishes a full opinion for only a small fraction of the cases on
its docket. So, for example, during the 1921 Term, which was
Taft's first complete Term as Chief Justice, 35 there were 669
new cases filed on the Court's appellate docket. Together with
343 cases that had been carried over from the 1920 Term, the
Court faced an appellate docket of some 1,012 cases. Of these
the Court disposed of 595 cases,36 in the process publishing 173
full opinions. The Court aspired to publish full opinions in
about 29% of all the appellate cases of which it disposed. The
remainder of docket was decided primarily through short, un-
signed "memorandum opinions" (almost all issued per curiam)
or orders denying certiorari.
In 1921, a large proportion of the cases on the Court's ap-
pellate docket had come to the Court by way of appeal, writ of
error, or certification. These comprised the Court's so-called
"mandatory" jurisdiction, because the Court was obligated to
decide such cases, either by full or memorandum opinion. At
the beginning of the 1920s, the strain of keeping up with its
mandatory jurisdiction was causing the Court to fall increas-
ingly behind in its docket. The Court's clogged docket was in
fact a major argument advanced by Taft to lobby Congress to
enact the Judiciary Act of 1925, which essentially shifted the
bulk of the Court's appellate jurisdiction to the discretionary
writ of certiorari. 37 The effect of the Act was "marvelous,"38
35. Taft was confirmed as Chief Justice on June 30, 1921.
36. Figures for the Supreme Court docket may be found in the annual re-
ports of the Attorney General of the United States.
37. See FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 22; Letter from Taft to
Stanley, supra note 27 ("The truth is that there is no other way by which the
docket in our Court can be reduced so that we can manage it."); Letter from
William Howard Taft to Major Edgar Bronson Tolman (Feb. 25, 1925) (Taft
Papers, Reel 272) ("I consider [the Act] a great step in the history of the Court,
and I sincerely hope it is going to enable us to catch up with our docket."). Af-
ter passage of what Taft called "[olur great Supreme Court bill," Letter from
William Howard Taft to Mrs. Frederick J. Manning (Feb. 15, 1925) (Taft Pa-
pers, Reel 271), he presciently remarked that "I shall be disappointed if we do
not catch up with our docket in two or three years," Letter from William How-
ard Taft to Horace Taft (Mar. 1, 1925) (Taft Papers, Reel 272); see also Letter
from William Howard Taft to William D. Mitchell (Aug. 12,1927) (Taft Papers,
Reel 293) ("[There is] basis for real hope that the new law of February 13th,
1276 [Vol. 85:1267
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enabling the Court sharply to diminish its backlog.39 Within a
very few years the Court reduced the delay between the filing
of a case and its argument from about a year and a half to less
than six months.40 Indeed, in a speech before the American
Law Institute, Taft joked that the 1925 Act had allowed the
Court to make "such progress ... that I think members of the
bar are beginning to be a little embarrassed by the proximity of
the Court to them. We are stepping on their heels."41
1925, will enable us, in the course of the next two years, to catch up and dis-
pose of business at the term at which it has been initiated in the court. This
would be a great achievement."). A second line of argument Taft advanced in
support of the bill was that augmenting discretionary jurisdiction would en-
able the Court to concentrate on cases of truly national importance. See Letter
from William Howard Taft to Robert A. Taft (Mar. 1, 1925) (Taft Papers, Reel
272) ("[The Act] will not reduce the work we have to do, but it will enable us to
catch up with the docket and to give more attention to important cases."); Let-
ter from William Howard Taft to Justice James Clark McReynolds (Jan. 29,
1924) (Taft Papers, Reel 260) (advising McReynolds, in his testimony before
the Senate in favor the of the Act, "to present a table... showing that we are
not catching up with the docket... I observe that the cases that we are now
hearing on the regular docket are about twelve months and a half behind-that
is, they were filed nearly thirteen months ago. I think emphasis might be put
upon the unimportant character of the cases we get from the Court of
Claims."); Colgate v. United States, 280 U.S. 43, 49 (1929); Sun Ship Bldg. Co.
v. United States, 271 U.S. 96, 99 (1926).
38. HANKIN & HANKIN, supra note 3, at 2.
39. The dramatic effect on the Court's backlog is visible in Figure A. (Fig-
ures identified by letter may be found in the Appendix.)
40. See, e.g., R.E.L. Saner, Governmental Review, 10 A.B.A. J. 537, 542
(1924) ("It now takes from fifteen to eighteen months after a case is docketed
before it can be heard... ."); Letter from Taft to Stanley, supra note 27 ("We
are now a year and three months behind."); Letter from William Howard Taft
to Honorable Marcus Kavanagh (Dec. 14, 1924) (Taft Papers, Reel 270) ("We
are a year and three months behind and likely to grow still further into ar-
rears unless this bill passes."); GREGORY HANKIN & CHARLOTTE A. HANKIN,
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 1928-1929, at 2, 3 n.2 (1929) ("Since the en-
actment of the Jurisdictional Act, the Court has made great strides in clearing
its docket.... During the [1928 Term] the average time which elapsed be-
tween the filing of the last ten cases and their arguments was about four and a
half months."); Willis Van Devanter, The Supreme Court of the United States,
5 IND. L.J. 553, 560 (1930) ("[The Court is now more nearly current [by reason
of the 1925 Act] than it has been at any time in many years. Without ad-
vancement cases are now reached for argument within about six months after
they are docketed"); Vinson Tells ABA. of Supreme Court Work; Opinion on
Dissents, 29 OKLA. ST. B.J. 1269, 1269 (1949) ("The days before passage of the
1925 Act, when it took eighteen to twenty-four months for the Court to reach a
case on its docket, are forgotten, and it is assumed by everyone, as it should
be, that the Supreme Court is current in its work. The Court will soon have
been operating under its basic jurisdictional statute for a quarter of a century,
and experience has eloquently proved the wisdom of its architects.").
41. Transcript of Speech of William Howard Taft before the ALI (May
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The shift of the Court's appellate jurisdiction toward the
discretionary writ of certiorari, however, produced additional
and more subtle effects, including a change in the underlying
significance of full court opinions. In 1912 the Court decided
about 47% of its appellate cases with a full Court opinion. In
1916, partly in response to a sharp increase in the number of
docketed cases42 and partly in response to the expansion of cer-
tiorari jurisdiction authorized by the Act of September 6,
1916, 43 this percentage shrank to 33%, where it remained more
or less constantly until the 1925 Act. The Act's reduction of the
Court's mandatory jurisdiction appears to have precipitated a
sharp drop in the percentage of the appellate docket that the
Court decided by full opinion." The historical average of dis-
posing of about 30% of its appellate docket by full opinion,
which had persisted from 1916, shrank by almost 50% in three
years. In the 1928 Term the Court wrote opinions in only 16%
of its appellate cases.45
1929) (Taft Papers, Reel 590). The transcript of the speech records that Taft's
remarks were met with "[a]pplause." Id.
42. See Figure A.
43. Act of Sept. 6, 1916, ch. 448, sec. 2, § 237, 39 Stat. 726, 726-27 (1916).
An important effect of the Act was to establish that the Court's appellate ju-
risdiction over cases arising under Federal Employers' Liability Act could be
invoked only by way of the discretionary writ of certiorari. See FRANKFURTER
& LANDIS, supra note 22, at 210-15. For a good discussion of the obscure pro-
visions of the 1916 Act, see Hartnett, supra note 24, at 1657-60.
44. Of the 1,554 full opinions decided by the Taft Court during the 1921-
1928 Terms, see infra note 51, only 33 came from cases that the Court decided
by virtue of its original jurisdiction, as distinct from its appellate jurisdiction.
In the 1921-1924 Terms, 71% of the Court's opinions were written in cases
that had come to the Court through its mandatory jurisdiction (24% of its
opinions were written in cases that had come to the Court through the discre-
tionary writ of certiorari). In the 1925-1928 Terms, 53% of the Court's opin-
ions were written in cases that had come to the Court through its mandatory
jurisdiction (44% of its opinions were written in cases that had come to the
Court through the discretionary writ of certiorari).
45. The exact progression can be seen in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Percentage of Cases on Appellate Docket
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The ultimate outcome of this trend is well known. In the
1998 Term, for example, the Court wrote full opinions in only
1% of the 7,043 appellate cases on its docket.46 It is clear, then,
that the Supreme Court during the 1920s was in the process of
transition from an institution that used full opinions to dispose
of a significant portion of its appellate docket, to an institution
that used full opinions to decide only an infinitesimal propor-
tion of that docket. This process was sharply accelerated by the
Act of 1925, which reduced the number of appellate cases that
the Court was obliged to decide.
Not only does the contemporary Court compose full opin-
ions in a smaller percentage of its total cases, but in absolute
terms it writes far fewer opinions than did the Court in the
1920s. In 1924, for example, the Court handed down 231 full
opinions, whereas seventy years later, in 1994, the Court
handed down only 89 full opinions. This contrast reflects a
relatively stable distinction between the eras, as can be seen in
Figure 2, which shows the number of full opinions that the
Court issued in each Term from the 1912 Term through the
1998 Term.47
46. For the relevant figures, see 68 U.S.L.W. 3069 (July 20, 1999). The
Court wrote full opinions in about 3.5% of the paid appellate cases on which it
acted.
47. The data for the 1930-1992 Terms are from LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE
SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS AND DEVELOPMENTS 84-85
(2d ed. 1996). Figure 2 strongly suggests that the 1925 Act was associated
with a slide in the absolute number of opinions written by the Court.
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Comparisons of contemporary Supreme Court opinions
with those of the past typically stress the current bureaucrati-
zation of the Court.48 Supreme Court Justices now can draw on
the assistance of four law clerks, selected from among the very
best recently graduated law students, so that, as Justice Lewis
Powell has remarked, "[W]e function as nine small, independ-
ent law firms."4 9 The resources of the Court were in fact quite
different in the 1920s, when each Justice had only one law
clerk, and clerks tended to be mature, professional lawyers who
provided largely technical forms of assistance.50 What is strik-
48. See, e.g., Charles W. Collier, The Use and Abuse of Humanistic Theory
in Law: Reexamining the Assumptions of Interdisciplinary Legal Scholarship,
41 DUKE L.J. 192, 228-32 (1991).
49. Lewis Powell, What the Justices are Saying... , Address Before the
American Bar Association (Nov. 1976), in 62 A.B.A. J. 1454, 1454 (1976).
50. For a history of Supreme Court law clerks, see Chester A. Newland,
Personal Assistants to Supreme Court Justices: The Law Clerks, 40 ORE. L.
REV. 299 (1961). During the Taft Court, only Justices Holmes, Brandeis, and
Stone consistently hired recently graduated law students as clerks. During
the 1924-1928 Terms, Taft also hired recently graduated law students as
clerks, but because of his failing health he reverted to a professional clerk dur-
ing the 1929 Term. (For the 1929 Term Taft hired Reynolds Robertson, author
of Practice and Procedure in the Supreme Court of the United States (1928),
who later continued on as a clerk for Charles Evans Hughes). For a descrip-
tion of how Taft used his law clerk, see John T. Suter, Taft Speaks of Roosevelt
Without Sign of Emotion, ALBANY EVENING NEWS (July 6, 1927) (Taft Papers,
Reel 293), which quotes Taft as saying,
HeinOnline -- 85 Minn. L. Rev. 1280 2000-2001
2001] OPINIONS AS INSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE 1281
ing about this difference, however, is that it might lead one to
expect that the Taft Court would produce fewer rather than
more opinions. But the contemporary Supreme Court actually
publishes a far smaller number of opinions than did the Taft
Court, in both absolute and proportional terms.
It is true, however, that opinions of the contemporary
Court are longer and more substantial than Taft Court opin-
ions. The average length of a full Court opinion during the
1921-1928 Terms5' was 6.7 pages, whereas the average length
of a Court opinion during the 1993-1998 Terms was 16.0 pages,
more than twice as long.
52
I have a law clerk who goes over the records and the briefs. He
makes a statement for me of what is in each, and then with that
statement before me I read the briefs and make such references to the
records as seem necessary. But I always read the briefs so as to know
what the claim on both sides is and then I read the opinions of the
courts below so I become familiar with the case, and know what the
issues are.
On selecting his first young recent graduate as a law clerk, Taft wrote Dean
Thomas W. Swan of the Yale Law School, "It isn't exactly mental brilliancy
that I need. What I need is plodding, thoroughness and somewhat meticulous
attention to details in the matter ofjurisdiction." Letter from William Howard
Taft to Thomas W. Swan (May 30, 1924) (Taft Papers, Reel 265). On Taft's
description of the work, see Letter from William Howard Taft to Thomas W.
Swan (May 17, 1924) (Taft Papers, Reel 264). Taft explained,
The work which I would expect him to do would be to prepare for me a
succinct statement of the briefs and record in every application for a
certiorari, and to prepare, under my direction of course, the per curi-
ams, which include nothing but references to authorities upon which
the case is disposed of. There will be of course other things I shall
need him for in the running down of a list of authorities and the find-
ing of authorities where the briefs are insufficient in this regard.
Then I would wish him to correct the proofs of my opinions and to
keep track of my docket and keep it up to date.
Id.
51. Taft suffered a stroke and essentially ceased to participate in the
workings of the Court in January 1930; he resigned on February 3, 1930. In
statistically analyzing the Taft Court, therefore, I have considered only the
1921-1928 Terms.
52. See Figure 3. This difference is statistically significant at the .01
level. Figure 3 suggests that the length of Taft Court opinions was not aber-
rant; during the 1912-1920 Terms full opinions averaged 6.89 pages. The con-
trast in opinion length between the Taft Court and the modem Court remains
striking, although slightly diminished, even if one considers only unanimous
opinions. See Figure B. For a study of historical changes in the page lengths
of court opinions, see Lawrence M. Friedman et al., State Supreme Courts: A
Century of Style and Citation, 33 STAN. L. REV. 773, 775-85 (1981), which
finds that the average length of state supreme court opinions increased from
3.99 pages in the decade of the 1870s to 6.02 in the decade of the 1960s. Id. at
780. The average length in the period from 1915-1925 was 4.73. Id.
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It is also worth observing that during the 1993-98 Terms
the contemporary Court waited an average of 91.1 days after
an argument before delivering a full opinion, whereas the Taft
Court took one third less time, averaging only 60 days between
argument and delivery of a full opinion.53
53. See Figure 4. This difference is statistically significant at the .01
level. During the 1912-1920 Terms, the Court averaged 63.7 days from the
argument of a case to the announcement of full opinion. On the one hand, this
distinction between the modern Court and its predecessors is surprising, be-
cause during the 1920s the Court would regularly hold over cases, not an-
nouncing a decision until one or more terms after argument. During the Taft
Court the most striking instance of this was McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S.
135 (1927), which was a Van Devanter opinion argued on December 5, 1924,
but not announced until January 17, 1927. On the other hand, Figure C indi-
cates that during the 1993-1998 Terms the contemporary Court decided
unanimous opinions almost as quickly as did the Taft Court. The contempo-
rary Court averaged 61.8 days between oral argument and the announcement
of an opinion, whereas the Taft Court averaged 55.1 days. Although this dif-
ference is statistically significant at the .02 level, the absence of unanimity
nevertheless explains a good deal about the relative delay in the modern
Court's announcement of opinions.
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HeinOnline -- 85 Minn. L. Rev. 1282 2000-2001
2001] OPINIONS AS INSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE
Figure 4: Average Number of Days from Argument to
Delivery of Full Opinions
1283
By far the most noteworthy distinction between full opin-
ions of the Taft Court and those of the contemporary Court,
however, concerns the relative rates of unanimity. Of the 1,554
full opinions announced by the Taft Court during the 1921-
1928 Terms, 84% were unanimous; of the 507 full opinions an-
nounced by the Court during the 1993-1998 Terms, only 27%













54. This difference is statistically significant at the .01 level. For pur-
poses of this Lecture, I define a unanimous opinion as one joined by all Jus-
tices participating in the decision, without any dissenting or concurring votes,
statements, or opinions.
1921-1928
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These distinctions between the Taft Court and its contem-
porary counterpart were sustained by complex webs of norma-
tive expectations. Norms against dissent, for example, were so
prominent in the 1920s that they were explicitly embraced in
Canon 19 of the American Bar Association's 1924 edition of the
Canons of Judicial Ethics: "It is of high importance that judges
constituting a court of last resort should use effort and self-
restraint to promote solidarity of conclusion and the consequent
influence of judicial decision." 55
There were also norms concerning the prompt dispatch of
judicial business. When Justice Sanford, who joined the Court
in February of 1923, began to find it increasingly hard to com-
pose his opinions in a timely way, as measured by the Court's
pace of production, he experienced his difficulty as a personal
55. ABA Canons of Judicial Ethics, Canon 19 (1924), in LISA L. MILORD,
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA JUDICIAL CODE 137 (1992). Taft was Chair of
the committee that drafted the 1924 Canons. Before his appointment to the
Court, Justice Sutherland was also a member of the committee. Canon 19 was
dropped from the ABA's revised Code of Judicial Conduct in 1972. See Walter
P. Armstrong, Jr., The Code of Judicial Conduct, 26 SW. L.J. 708, 713-14 &
n.44 (1972). The Reporter explained that "[tihe Committee rejected the de-
tailed discussion of judicial opinions, philosophy of law, and judicial idiosyn-
crasies and inconsistencies in old Canons 19, 20, and 21 as being neither help-
ful nor, for the most part, matters of ethical conduct." E. WAYNE THODE,
REPORTER'S NOTES TO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 50 (1973).
1284 [Vol. 85:1267
HeinOnline -- 85 Minn. L. Rev. 1284 2000-2001
2001] OPINIONS AS INSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE
failure to meet legitimate expectations. Figure 6 illustrates the
contrast between Sanford's pace of production and that of the
Court.
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In the 1924 Term the Court as a whole averaged 70 days
from the argument of a case to the announcement of a full opin-
ion; but in that same Term it took Sanford 121 days to produce
his opinions. At the beginning of the 1925 Term, Sanford wrote
Taft expressing his chagrin:
[I] hope I can do my full share of the labor. I believe I have gotten into
better methods of work, and can successfully lay aside some of my be-
setting meticulosity-But verily the writing of an opinion worthy of
perpetual type is a task of the highest difficulty that takes every
ounce of the best that one may have. 6
Even the length of opinions was governed by tacit norms.
When Harlan Stone joined the Taft Court in March 1925, for
example, he drew on his background in legal academia to draft
long and intricate opinions. These were sharply criticized by
the other Justices. McReynolds wrote to Stone about the lat-
ter's draft opinion in North Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman:57
I agree. But I think your opinion would be much better if only half as
long. There is really nothing new in the cause and simple statement
56. Letter from Edward Sanford to William Howard Taft (Sept. 8, 1925)
(Taft Papers, Reel 276).
57. 268 U.S. 276 (1925).
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of the issues with short reply to the points I think would better serve
posterity. Think of the 12,000 who should read what you say here."
In response to Stone's draft opinion in Second Russian Insur-
ance Co. v. Miller,59 McReynolds commented,
I think your conclusions are good. But I think you confuse the opin-
ion by too much detail. It would be easier to understand and to me
more satisfactory if you stated the substantive finding of fact below
and approved this. Then discuss the essential law point and no oth-
ers. My observation has been that unnecessary discussion returns to
plague 0
"Out of deference to the views of some of my associates,"61 Stone
was forced to revise and drastically to shorten his first attempt
at an opinion in May v. Henderson.6 2 This discipline altered
the way that Stone wrote opinions, as can be seen in Figure 7,
which demonstrates that Stone's opinions shrank 44% from an
average of 10.8 pages during the 1924 Term to 6.1 pages in the
1926 Term. The latter was actually shorter than the average
length for Taft Court opinions.










1924 1925 1926 1927 1928
58. Stone Papers.
59. 268 U.S. 552 (1925).
60. Stone Papers (emphasis in original).
61. Letter from Harlan Stone to William Howard Tafi (Apr. 8, 1925) (Taft
Papers, Reel 273).
62. 268 U.S. 111 (1925).
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These simple anecdotes indicate that we must view a Su-
preme Court opinion as a form of writing that in part takes its
significance from institutional conventions and contexts that
change over time. During the Taft Court, a full Supreme Court
opinion was a routine method of deciding a large proportion of
the Court's appellate docket. It was expeditiously produced,
predominantly unanimous, and relatively short and succinct.
This is one version of what one might expect from a "court of
last resort" whose function was to vindicate "[tihe specific
rights of particular parties."63 By the 1990s, however, a full
Supreme Court opinion had become the Court's way of address-
ing the very few cases on its docket of exceptional importance.
Each opinion accordingly received fuller and more extensive at-
tention, manifested both by its relative length and by the full
complement of concurring and dissenting opinions that was
likely to accompany it. Surely the influence of the Judiciary
Act of 1925, which envisioned the Supreme Court as something
akin to a "ministry of justice,"6 is visible in this transforma-
tion.65
To understand opinions of the Taft Court era, therefore, we
must put ourselves in the frame of mind described by Justice
John Hessin Clarke in his letter to Woodrow Wilson explaining
his own resignation from the Court in September 1922:
Unless you have much more intimate knowledge of the character
of work which a Supreme Court judge must do than I had before go-
ing to Washington you little realize the amount of grinding, uninter-
esting, bone labor there is in writing more than half the cases decided
by the Supreme Court. Much more than the cases are of no consid-
erable importance whether considered from the point of view of the
principles or of the property involved in them, but, nevertheless, a
conscientious judge writing them must master their details with the
utmost care. My theory of writing opinions has always been that if
clearly stated 9 cases out of 10 will decide themselves,-what the de-
cision should be will emerge from the statement of the facts as cer-
63. Hankin, supra note 29.
64. Id.
65. A study of state supreme courts found that "[b]etween 1940 and 1970,
the supreme courts with high discretion wrote fewer opinions than the other
courts. Their opinions tended to be longer and to cite more cases. They also
reversed lower court decisions more often. Their opinions contained more dis-
sents and concurrences." Robert Kagan et al., The Evolution of State Supreme
Courts, 76 MICH. L. REV. 961, 999 (1978). In the 1921-1928 Terms, 57% of all
opinions in cases reaching the Supreme Court by way of its mandatory juris-
diction affirmed the decision below (27% reversed), whereas only 37% of the
Court's opinions in cases reaching the Court by way of discretionary certiorari
jurisdiction affirmed the decision below (56% reversed).
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tainly as the issues will. In this spirit I wrote always .... I protested
often, but in vain, that too many trifling cases were being written,
that our strength should be conserved for better things ....
66. Letter from John Hessin Clarke to Woodrow Wilson (Sept. 9, 1922)
(Wilson Papers, Reel 122). See John H. Clarke, Carrying the Case to the
United States Supreme Court, 56 AM. L. REV. 283, 284 (1922). In 1924 Justice
Sutherland, testifying before the Senate in support of the 1925 Act, observed
that "a very large proportion of the cases that come" to the Supreme Court
.ought never to be there at all." Procedure in Federal Courts: Hearings on S.
2060 and S. 2061 Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
68th Cong. 47 (1924); see also Jurisdiction of Circuit Courts of Appeals and of
the Supreme Court of the United States, Hearings on H.R. 8206 Before the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 25 (1924) (Remarks of Justice
Sutherland, noting that the Court was burdened by "a large number of trifling
cases"). Nevertheless, Clarke's dark appraisal of the Court's work should be
taken within the context of the depression from which he was suffering at the
time of his retirement. His sister, to whom he had been very close, died in
March 1922, throwing Clarke into a deep gloom from which he found it impos-
sible to recover. See, e.g., Letter from John H. Clarke to William Howard Taft
(Mar. 7, 1922) (Taft Papers, Reel 239) ("I am passing through an experience so
crushing that it seems, for me, just now, the end of all earthly interests. My
sister was both a sister and a brother to me all through life."); Letter from
John H. Clarke to Willis Van Devanter (Mar. 7, 1922) (Van Devanter Papers);
Letter from John H. Clarke to Willis Van Devanter (July 13, 1922) (Van
Devanter Papers) ("The truth is, my dear friend, my situation is quite paralyz-
ing me. I mean I find myself without initiative or desire to go anywhere or to
do anything,-all interest in life has so gone out of me."); Letter from John H.
Clarke to Willis Van Devanter (Aug. 23, 1922) (Van Devanter Papers) ("I have
definitely decided to resign my office as of Sept 18 when I shall be 65 years
old.... In the confidence of your friendship I may add that the death of my
sisters has taken all interest out of life for me and I see no reason for going
forward doing work which for the most part has become irksome in the ex-
treme to me."). To his brother Horace, Taft summarized Clarke's retirement
this way:
Clarke's retirement is not altogether unexpected to me. He has
been talking about it for a year. He lost two sisters in two years and
he is now alone in the world so far as near relatives are concerned.
He has always been very much interested in arbitration and machin-
ery for peace between nations. He is much more of an orator than he
is a lawyer. He has certain set notions against corporations and in
favor of labor unions, which make him decide many cases before he
hears them. Although he and Clarke often agreed, Holmes often
commented to me on that feature of his judicial decisions. Clarke is a
good fellow and I like him. He is a manly, generous, courageous man.
The Court has not been a pleasant place for him because of the insult-
ing and overbearing and contemptuous attitude of McReynolds to-
ward him, because Clarke seemed to side rather with Brandeis than
with McReynolds, who was Attorney General when Clarke was ap-
pointed, and who seemed to think therefore that Clarke ought to fol-
low his leadership. Clarke is the wealthiest man on the Court and
quite able to retire. I think he has had something near melancholia
because of the death of his sister, who was a physician and a very
public-spirited woman in Youngstown. I think the work of the Court,
too, has not been agreeable to him, although he has done it promptly.
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No one today would think to characterize "more than " of the
Supreme Court's cases as "of no considerable importance."67 No
one today would think to assert that "9 cases out of 10" on the
Court's docket "will decide themselves."68 Every opinion pub-
lished by the contemporary Court is, in one way or another,
consequential; every opinion is, in one way or another, difficult.
This does not mean that difficult and consequential opin-
ions did not exist in the 1920s or before. Of course the Court
has since its origins confronted divisive and contentious issues,
writing long opinions that were sometimes accompanied by
sharp and unyielding dissents. My point is instead that the
norms which define and sustain institutional practices of deci-
sionmaking will likely be different in a Court whose docket con-
tains a large proportion of "trifling cases" than in a Court like
our own, where almost every opinion is momentous. And these
practices of decisionmaking in turn shape the environment in
which all opinions are formed and written, even those that de-
cide unambiguously important cases.
II.
A Supreme Court opinion is not merely a statement of the
law. It is a written intervention, addressed to particular audi-
ences, and designed to accomplish particular ends. The re-
sponse of Justices to a changing institutional environment, or
to evolving notions of law or of judicial authority, will be medi-
ated by their conception of the nature and functions of Supreme
Court opinions. During the Taft Court era, different Justices
held different views about these matters.
At one end of the spectrum was Oliver Wendell Holmes,
the oldest man on the Court 69 and the Justice most influenced
by English conceptions of the nature of opinion-writing.
Holmes's unique position on the Court can be seen in Figures 8
and 9.
He much prefers the platform, and it will be difficult for him to avoid
drifting into politics.
Letter from William Howard Taft to Horace Taft (Sept. 7, 1922) (Taft Papers,
Reel 245).
67. Letter from John H. Clarke to Woodrow Wilson, supra note 66.
68. Id.
69. Holmes was born in 1841.
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Figure 8: Average Number of Pages Per Opinion by
Justice
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Figure 9: Average Number of Days from Argument to
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During the 1921-1928 Terms, Oliver Wendell Holmes an-
nounced his opinions an average of only 26.8 days after they
were argued, 70 and they were an average of only 3.4 pages
long.71 In part this was a matter of personal temperament.
Holmes was a fluent 72 and quick73 writer, with a great "desire
70. If only unanimous opinions are considered, the average time between
argument and delivery for Holmes's opinions was 26.1 days.
71. If only unanimous opinions are considered, Holmes's opinions during
this period averaged 3.3 pages in length.
72. "Writing opinions is as easy as ever." Letter from Oliver Wendell
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for speed" that, as Brandeis observed, had become a "point of
pride with him" and "a vice": "He & McKenna run a race of
diligence of finishing an opinion assigned to either. Holmes
can't bear not to have [a] case done the same day it's given to
him." 74 Holmes prized concision, believing that "the art of writ-
ing legal decisions.., is to omit all but the essentials--'The
point of contact is the formula'-the place where the boy got his
fingers pinched. The rest of the machinery doesn't matter. 7 5
He once even complained to Stone about McCulloch v. Mary-
land that "I should not like to take so many pages to establish
the obvious.' 6 Holmes knew that his aesthetic troubled his col-
leagues; he confessed to being "apprehensive... that my opin-
ions were shorter than Brandeis inwardly approved.., but if,
as I meant to, I hit the nail on the head I am content. 77
Holmes's distinctive practice reflected his idiosyncratic un-
derstanding of the function and purpose of Supreme Court
73. Holmes wrote to Frankfurter that in composing opinions he did not
"search for epigrams," because "I write too rapidly to stop for phrases." Letter
from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Felix Frankfurter (Mar. 21, 1924), in HOLMES
AND FRANKFURTER: THEIR CORRESPONDENCE, 1912-1934, at 171 (Robert M.
Mennel & Christine L. Compston eds., 1996). (On the other hand, Holmes also
stressed to Frankfurter the power of "phrases-they put water under the boat
and float over dangerous obstacles." Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to
Felix Frankfiurter (May 26, 1928), in HOLMES AND FRANKFURTER, supra, at
228.) Taft once thanked Holmes "for the dispatch and the admirable quality"
of his opinions, adding plaintively, "When I read them, I marvel. They read so
well and so easily and I ask why can't I, but I can't." Letter from William
Howard Taft to Oliver Wendell Holmes (n.d.) (Holmes Papers, Reel 38, Frame
345).
74. The Brandeis-Frankfurter Conversations, 1985 SUP. CT. REv. 299, 311
(Melvin I. Urofsky ed., 1985) [hereinafter Brandeis-Frankfurter Conversa-
tions]. Holmes was a prolific author of opinions. Of the 1554 full opinions an-
nounced by the Taft Court in the 1921-1928 Terms, he wrote 205. He was the
second-most productive Justice of all those who served throughout these eight
Terms. Despite his onerous duties as Chief Justice, Taft wrote an astonishing
249 opinions. Brandeis authored 193 opinions, McReynolds 172, and Van
Devanter only 94.
75. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Felix Frankfurter (Dec. 19,
1915), in HOLMES AND FRANKFURTER, supra note 73, at 40.
76. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harlan Stone (Aug. 7, 1926)
(Stone Papers). Holmes remarked that "I should say generally... that I as-
sume that I am writing for those skilled in the art and that long-winded devel-
opments of the obvious seem to me as out of place in an opinion as elsewhere."
Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Felix Frankfurter (July 2, 1925), in
HOLMES AND FRANKFURTER, supra note 73, at 186.
77. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Felix Frankfurter (June 14,
1925), in HOLMES AND FRANKFURTER, supra note 73, at 184.
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opinions. To Holmes an opinion expressed the "exuberance"78
of "personality,"7 9 so that, for example, he could write of an
opinion that "[a]s originally written it had a tiny pair of testi-
cles-but the scruples of my brethren have caused their re-
moval and it sings in a very soft voice now."80 Holmes charac-
teristically referred to opinions in such metaphors of personal
artistic expression.81 He believed that "an opinion should" not
78. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Sir Frederick Pollock (Feb. 6,
1926), 2 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE
HOLMES AND SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK 1874-1932, at 175 (Mark DeWolfe
Howe ed., 1941).
79. Letter from Harold J. Laski to Oliver Wendell Holmes (Mar. 12, 1923)
in 1 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES
AND HAROLD J. LASKI 486 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1953) [hereinafter
HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS] ("The general function of committees is to take the
personality out of discourse. I dare say it has been just as well to have
McKenna, Day and others cut out some of my exuberances from opinions of
the Court.").
80. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Felix Frankfurter (Oct. 24,
1920), in HOLMES AND FRANKFURTER, supra note 73, at 95; see also Letter Ad-
dressed to "My Dear Friend" (Dec. 24, 1920) (Holmes Papers, Reel 26, Frame
625) ("[The opinions that would otherwise have gone last Monday were hung
up for others to write dissents and those that then fired have been more or less
castrated, though not, I hope, quite deprived of their powers. It is rather an
irritation to have pungent phrases cut out, but that makes for safety no doubt,
and what one cares for sooner or later one gets a chance to say.") Holmes said
that his "pleasure in writing" dissents was "that you can say just what you
think, and don't have to cut out phrases to suit the squeams of your brethren."
Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Mrs. John Chipman Gray (May 5, 1928)
(Holmes Papers, Reel 24, Frame 228). Taft complained that Holmes "has more
interest in, and gives more attention to, his dissents than he does to the opin-
ions he writes for the Court, which are very short and not very helpful." Let-
ter from William Howard Taft to Henry L. Stimson (May 18, 1928) (Taft Pa-
pers, Reel 302).
81. The image of "song," for example, frequently recurs. See Letter Ad-
dressed to "My Dear Friend" (Mar. 29, 1926) (Holmes Papers, Reel 27, Frame
47) ("As I said before I think style is largely a matter of the ear. The cadences,
and with some masters the undersong not always detected at first, get you
without much regard to the meaning."); Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to
Harold J. Laski (Dec. 6, 1921), in 1 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS, infra note 82, at
709 (I again realize that sound is the half of immortality. The song of Shake-
speare's words counts, I think, as much as their meaning to keep them re-
membered."); see also Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold J. Laski
(Jan. 13, 1923), in 1 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS, infra note 82, at 474; Letter
from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold J. Laski (Mar. 1, 1923), in 1 HOLMES-
LASKI LETTERS, infra note 82, at 486. Sometimes, however, Holmes used the
metaphor of the dance to describe his opinion writing process. See, e.g., Letter
from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Felix Frankfurter (Dec. 6, 1921), in HOLMES &
FRANKFURTER, supra note 73, at 132 ("Pouf-the sword dance is danced and I
think I have kept off the blades in a case just sent to the printer."). In contrast
to Holmes, Taft believed that he lacked "graceful literary style," so that "when
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"be like an essay with footnotes, but rather should be quasi an
oral utterance."82 Holmes commented to his colleague Sanford
that "[n]on obstat the effective and powerful example of
Brandeis to the contrary, I don't think opinions should be writ-
ten in the form of essays with notes. They are theoretically
spoken."8 3 For Holmes the point of an opinion was to solve the
I can write an opinion that is sound and convincing, I am happy, but beyond
that I feel as ffI were denied the gratification of authorship." Letter from Wil-
liam Howard Taft to Horace D. Taft (Dec. 14, 1926) (Taft Papers, Reel 287).
"I don't read what I have been obliged to put into print from time to time with
any degree of real satisfaction." Id.
82. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold J. Laski (Nov. 21, 1924),
in HOLMES-LASKI LETIERS, supra note 79, at 675. Holmes wrote to Brandeis
in response to the draft opinion of United States v. Abilene & Southern Rail-
way Co., 265 U.S. 274 (1924), "Another solid piece of work handsomely done.
Though I never shall believe in footnotes in an opinion." Brandeis Papers; see
also Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold J. Laski (June 16, 1928), in
2 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS at 1066 ("1 don't recognize the criticism on
McReynolds for notes-that is Brandeis's specialitd-which I criticised to him
at the beginning, but which he sticks to and which certainly enables him to
put in a lot of facts that no one but he could accumulate and which overawe
me, even if I doubt the form."). Brandeis himself said to Frankfurter that
Holmes "does not wholly reconcile himself to my footnotes." Brandeis-
Frankfurter Conversations, supra note 74, at 335. In the 205 opinions Holmes
authored in the 1921 through 1928 Terms, he himself used only a single foot-
note. See Heyer v. Duplicator Mfg. Co., 263 U.S. 100, 100 n.1 (1923). By con-
trast, in the 193 opinions that Brandeis authored during those eight Terms, he
averaged 2.99 footnotes per opinion. As whole, during its eight complete
Terms the Taft Court averaged one footnote for every majority opinion. Dur-
ing the 1998 Term, by contrast, the Court's use of footnotes had increased al-
most sevenfold, so that the Court averaged 6.91 footnotes per majority opinion.
See Figures D and E. Footnotes in modem opinions tend to be substantive
and argumentative; by contrast, footnotes during the Taft Court era tended to
consist of citations to authority.
83. Note from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Edward Sanford (Jan. 1, 1925)
(Holmes Papers, Reel 38, Frame 405). Surprisingly, Sanford used more foot-
notes in his majority opinions than any other Justice on the Taft Court, aver-
aging 3.41 footnotes per opinion. See Figure D. Holmes, however, was not the
only Justice who objected to the prolific use of footnotes in opinions. In the
case of Hudson v. United States, 272 U.S. 451 (1926), for example, Stone con-
ducted original research into the origins and effects of the plea of nolo conten-
dere, writing to Professors Joseph Beale (Harvard), Frederick Hicks (Colum-
bia), and G.E. Woodbine (Yale), asking for help in translating Yearbook
entries. He reproduced his research in the form of a long footnote. In a letter
to the Court accompanying his draft opinion, Stone wrote,
Owing to the unusual character of the case the result of related re-
searches on the subject was incorporated in a long note on page 4,
which I think has some utility, as the material cannot be found else-
where in convenient form. The opinion, however, could proceed to its
conclusion without the note and I have no objection to cutting it out if
the Brethren feel that that should be done in the interest of brevity.
Stone Papers. Butler responded that "I think I would prefer to have the note
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legal puzzle, the "speculative twister,"84 of a case by application
of "the fundamentals of legal theory."85
For Holmes's colleagues on the Court, however, opinions
were conceived very differently. Willis Van Devanter, for ex-
ample, did not conceptualize court opinions as the personal ex-
pression of a Justice, 86 but instead as the institutional response
eliminated." Sutherland replied that "I was disposed to think the note should
be omitted, but I leave it to you." Sanford observed that "I think the matter of
including the note in p 4 is a matter of your personal choice. My own personal
thought would be that as this note is not limited to question in hand-as the
provision of historical notes-but is rather a collection of authorities in a cog-
nate subject-although valuable it does not add to the opinion as an opinion."
Van Devanter stated that "[plersonally I would omit note but leave that to
you. Three out of four judges will think the court is adopting what is said in
notes." He then wrote an additional memorandum to Stone, commenting,
In your nolo contendere case please consider whether the long note
(possibly more than one) ought to be omitted-whether it encourages
an inadmissible use of notes. I thought of it when reading the opinion,
but preferred to make no suggestion. Since then two of our brothers
who were speaking of opinions in a general way referred to the use of
notes and mentioned that opinion as going beyond what they thought
proper in that regard. I merely suggest that you consider it and then
do as you think best. As I recall the opinion the long note adds noth-
ing to it.
Stone Papers. Stone eventually omitted the note from the published version of
his opinion. Throughout his time on the Taft Court, he remained cautious in
his use of footnotes, averaging only .58 footnotes per majority opinion. See
Figure D. But he no doubt carried the memory of this exchange with him
some twelve years later, when he wrote footnote four of his Carolene Products
decision. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4
(1938). For a discussion of that footnote, see J.M. Balkin, The Footnote, 83
Nw. U. L. REV. 275 (1989).
84. "I am conscious of shrinking from facts-which Brandeis devours-but
I shouldn't mind a speculative twister. Perhaps I will look one up-meantime I
have had keen intellectual pleasure in writing opinions. Each one has had a
kernel of interest. All cases do." Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Mrs.
John Chipman Gray (Dec. 12, 1925) (Holmes Papers, Reel 24, Frame 88); see
also Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Mrs. John Chipman Gray (Oct. 29,
1930) (Holmes Papers, Reel 24, Frame 391) ("I suffer as I think I always have,
when a case of any complication is presented, by being in a hopeless muddle
during at least the earlier part of the argument and sometimes clear through
it, but after a while in one way or another it clears up and becomes merely a
question of law like any other.").
85. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Felix Frankfurter (Mar. 21,
1924), in HOLMES & FRANKFURTER, supra note 73, at 170.
86. He certainly did not conceive opinions as "theoretically spoken." In
oral expression Van Devanter was said to be "fluent, precise and uninhibited."
Pearson & Allen, supra note 16, at 187 ("In the Court's secret deliberations
none of his colleagues excel him in clarity or succinctness of expression. Even
Justice Brandeis ... once remarked that if a stenographer could be present to
take down Van Devanter's words, the Court would get as able an opinion as
any he takes six months to write. But when Van Devanter sits down to put
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of a Court whose obligation it was clearly and decisively to pro-
vide guidance to parties and to the legal system. He thus criti-
cized Holmes's opinions because they "do not give an adequate
portrayal of the case in hand or of the grounds of the deci-
sion,"87 and he pointed with pride at the ability of his own opin-
ions to provide convincing and practical guidance to the parties
and to the public about disputed issues of law:
There are some who merely count the number of opinions regardless
of their substance or the direction in which they go. When one does
work on that line he can do what superficially seems a volume, and
then the other federal courts and the state courts may grope as best
they can in an effort to find out what was intended. My ideas and in-
clinations are not in that direction. It leads to uncertainty and confu-
sion, makes for instability and in the long run results in tremendous
waste. The number of petitions for rehearing during the term has
been unusually large, but in my cases only one was presented."
his thoughts on paper he goes through weeks of mental torture. He writes and
rewrites. In the end he turns out an able opinion, couched in readable literary
style-but the birth pangs are prolonged and prodigious."). See Harlan Fiske
Stone, Associate Justice Van Devanter: An Appraisal, 28 A.B.A. J. 458, 459
(1942) ("At the conference table he was a tower of strength. When his turn
came to present his views of the case in hand, no point was overlooked, no
promising possibility left unexplored. His statements were characteristically
lucid and complete, the manifest expression of a judgment exercised with un-
swerving independence. Often his expositions would have served worthily,
both in point of form and substance, as the Court's opinion in the case."); Let-
ter from William Howard Taft to Robert A. Taft (Mar. 17, 1929) (Taft Papers,
Reel 309) ("While at Conference [Van Devanter] can deliver a conclusion that
could be put by stenographic announcement right into an opinion."); THE
AUTOBIOGRAPIHICAL NOTES OF CHARIES EVANS HUGHES 171 (David J. Danel-
ski & Joseph S. Tulchin eds., 1973) ("[-]is careful and elaborate statements in
conference, with his accurate review of authorities, were of the greatest value.
If these statements had been taken down stenographically they would have
served with but little editing as excellent opinions."). But Van Devanter
balked at reducing his speech to writing, because "he never gets done looking
over the various features that he would like to consider." Letter from William
Howard Taft to Robert A. Taft, supra. If the Taft Court as a whole averaged
60 days between the argument of a case and its decision by written opinion,
Van Devanter took an average of 141.4 days after argument to publish his
opinions. See Figure 9. Several times Taft was forced tactfully to reassign to
other Justices cases originally given to Van Devanter so that they could be de-
cided within a reasonable period of time.
87. Letter from Willis Van Devanter to John H. Clarke (June 9, 1928)
(Van Devanter Papers).
88. Letter from Willis Van Devanter to John C. Pollock (June 7, 1921)
(Van Devanter Papers). At the time Van Devanter believed that he had a
chance to be named as Chief Justice to succeed Edward White. He had writ-
ten to Pollock, a federal district judge,
Confidentially, Justices McKenna, Day, McReynolds and Clarke have
said to me that they would be glad to see me appointed, but I realize
that an expression of their views may not be solicited and cannot with
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The concision and oral quality of Holmes's opinions were
inconsistent with these objectives. So, for example, Pierce But-
ler criticized Holmes's opinion in United States v. New York
Central Railroad Commission89 because "the failure of the opin-
ion to give the language of the act on which it rests is quite re-
markable.... The importance of the question, the parties &
the great sums involved combine to make fuller treatment de-
sirable."90 Taft also believed that despite Holmes's "genius for
giving a certain degree of piquancy and character to his opin-
ions by sententious phrases," his opinions lose "strength and
value by his disposition to cut down."
The chief duty in a court of last resort is not to dispose of the case, but
it is sufficiently to elaborate the principles, the importance of which
propriety be given unless solicited. Senator Kellogg has volunteered
to me the statement that he intends to recommend me and to recom-
mend that ex-Senator George Sutherland be named in my place. Ex-
Senator Bailey seems to think I will be the man, and others have vol-
unteered a friendly interest, but I am neither saying nor doing any-
thing nor permitting any of these statements to bring me any sense of
elation or to change the currents of my mind.
Letter from Willis Van Devanter to John C. Pollock (May 26, 1921) (Van
Devanter Papers). In the passage quoted in text, Van Devanter recounts his
virtues to Pollock. The passage continues,
People outside do not know this and in the nature of things would not
be supposed to know. Again, comment on it, save by someone inside,
might arouse resentment where a kindly feeling now exists. The only
thing for me to do is to take my usual vacation and let come what will.
Letter from Willis Van Devanter to John C. Pollock (June 7, 1921), supra.
89. 279 U.S. 73 (1929). The case involved the very important question of
whether the ICC could increase the amount of compensation that railroads
received for carrying the mail from the date of their filing an application for an
increase.
90. Letter from Pierce Butler to Willis Van Devanter, (Mar. 6, 1929) (Van
Devanter Papers). Butler continues, "But, under the circumstances, it seems
to me best to let it be circulated as it is. G.S. & E.T.S. will not decline, I sus-
pect. If vigorous dissent comes, it may be necessary to have the opinion prop-
erly expanded." In the end, there was no dissent. McReynolds, however, re-
sponded to Holmes's draft opinion with the tart observation, "If you did not
have the votes, this would be wrong." Holmes Papers. Brandeis, tweaking
Holmes's noted positivism, wrote, "I am glad you found it possible to yield to
your desire to do justice-I acquiesce." Id. Taft joined in Brandeis's teasing.
"I shall concur in this conclusion because the result is just though I could not
find that the language of the act justified it. I am glad it will prevail." Id. For
an earlier example of Taft's friendly jabs at Holmes's positivism, see his re-
sponse to Holmes's opinion in Forbes Pioneer Boat Line v. Board of Commis-
sioners, 258 U.S. 338 (1922): "I marvel at your bringing in a 'sense of justice."
Holmes Papers. The following Term, Holmes retorted by commenting on
Tafts draft opinion in Freund v. United States, 260 U.S. 60 (1922), "This
sounds to me like the voice from the burning bush-and though it effects Jus-
tice, a ticklish thing, I rejoice at it." Taft Papers, Reel 614.
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justify the bringing of the case here at all, to make the discussion of
those principles and the conclusion reached useful to the country and
to the Bar in clarifying doubtful questions of constitutional and fun-
damental law. In the old days, this Court, especially in the days of
Harlan, Peckham and others, wrote too long opinions, so that the Bar
grew tired. On the other hand, I think the Bar is not particularly well
pleased with too short opinions, for the good reason that I have re-
ferred to above.9'
Even Brandeis criticized Holmes for his failure sufficiently to
"consider the need of others to understand or sufficiently re-
gard the difficulties or arguments of others. So that he has a
surprisingly large [number of] petitions for rehearing in his
cases, because he does not seem to have considered arguments
of counsel that are very weighty with them and often he hasn't.
Philosophically he would admit difference between truth and
consent of others to truth, but he does not regard difference in
practice." 92
91. Letter from William Howard Taft to Charles P. Taft, 2nd (Nov. 1,
1925) (Taft Papers, Reel 277). See Letter from William Howard Taft to Clyde
B. Aitchison (Dec. 4, 1925) (Taft Papers, Reel 278).
I am afraid I can not guide you in the matter of judicial style. I
have great difficulty myself in the matter.... Clarity and as much
brevity as is consistent with making the case and question you are
deciding understood are usually what are needed, though it is hard
often to reconcile the two as objects. The more one sits where I sit,
the more he realizes the need of opinions for reviewing courts to aid
them to consider the cases which come before them in the same at-
mosphere in which they were presented and heard below.... Our
Court used to write very long opinions-too long. But I am convinced
that some of our members in their zeal to shorten what they say are
not as helpful as they should be to the Bar and the Public. Our chief
function in our Court is not go get rid of cases, it is to clarify the law
and to be helpful in other cases. It is not a discharge of that function
to be cryptical and leave the reader still guessing.
Id. Taft himself confessed "to a tendency to length that I try to restrain," not-
ing that "Judge Holmes and Judge McReynolds are very, very short." Letter
from William Howard Taft to Charles P. Taft, 2nd (Nov. 1, 1925) (Taft Papers,
Reel 277). See Letter of William Howard Taft to Horace Taft (Oct. 5, 1925)
(Taft Papers, Reel 276) ("I have [an] important opinion still in the stocks. It is
hard for me to compress it and to get it into proper shape. The strategy of
framing an opinion is as difficult as anything about the work."). For all his
objections, Taft nevertheless admired Holmes's power of concision, writiig
Holmes that "I envy your power of succinct statement." Holmes Papers (refer-
ring to North Dakota ex rel. Lemke v. Chicago & N.W.R. Co., 257 U.S. 485
(1922); see also Holmes Papers (referring to Duckett & Co. v. United States,
266 U.S. 149 (1924): "I regard your power in these taking cases to concentrate
on the point in a few words with admiration and awe.").
92. Brandeis-Frankfurter Conversations, supra note 74, at 335-36. The
"[truth of [the] matter," Brandeis told Frankfurter, is that Holmes "takes joy
in the trick of working out what he calls 'a form of words' in which to express
desired result. He occasionally says, 'I think I can find a form of words,' to
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If we carefully attend to discussion among the Taft Court
Justices, we can discern (at least) three distinct functions for
Supreme Court opinions to which they implicitly appeal. First,
the function of an opinion was to reflect the collective judgment
of the Justices who joined it. To fulfill this function, an opinion
had to satisfy an internal audience; it had to fulfill the expecta-
tions of as many Justices as were necessary to acquire the
status of an institutional judgment of the Court. The surest
sign of McKenna's growing incompetence was his inability to
write an opinion that discharged this function. Thus when
McKenna's draft opinion in Smietanka v. First Trust & Savings
Bank93 misstated the views of the conference, he was forced to
retreat in disgrace. He wrote Taft,
I must have been absent from the Conference Room when you stated
the case and then on my return voted carelessly. I had marked my
copy of the transcript with my sign for reversal and, not looking at my
docket, I took it for granted that the decision was in accordance with
my views, and hence the opinion.... Expressing regrets ... at the
trouble I have caused and confessing to some shame for my blun-
der...."94
which I reply, 'of course you can, you can find a form of words for anything."
Id. at 334; see also Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Felix Frankfirter (Jan.
29, 1929), in HALF BROTHER, HALF SON: THE LETTERS OF LouIs D. BRANDEIS
TO FELIX FRANKFURTER 356 (Melvin I. Urofsky & David W. Levy eds., 1991)
[hereinafter BRANDEIS-FRANKFURTER LETTERS] ("[Holmes] has had quite a
number of unimportant cases, but I think it also an element that he minimizes
the importance of those he gets. Of course, his determination to finish the job
on the Sunday following the assignment leads to this.").
93. 257 U.S. 602 (1922).
94. Memorandum from Joseph McKenna to William Howard Taft (Feb. 7,
1922) (Taft Papers, Reel 239). Eventually Taft took over the opinion and
wrote it himself. Although in his Memorandum to Taft McKenna had strongly
defended his view of the case, he did not dissent from Tafts opinion. Taft
wrote his brother Horace,
The worst and most embarrassing member [of the Court] ... is the
oldest member, McKenna. I don't know what course to take with re-
spect to him, or what cases to assign to him. In case after case as-
signed to him he will write an opinion, and bring it into conference,
and it will meet objection because he has missed a point in one case,
or, as in one instance, he wrote an opinion deciding the case one way
when there had been a unanimous vote the other, including his own.
He wrote an opinion in an Oklahoma case that we let get through the
other day, [Okla. Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 258 U.S. 234 (1922)]
which brought a petition for rehearing that is most humiliating to the
Court, and I think we shall have to grant it. I had to take back a case
from him last Saturday because he would not write it in accordance
with the vote of the Court on the right ground, and have taken it over
to myself.... The difficulty is of course that McKenna's vote may
change the judgment of the Court on important issues, and it is too
bad to have a mind like that decide when it is not able to grasp the
1298 [Vol. 85:1267
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Fidelity to the collective views of the Justices who joined
an opinion meant not merely getting those views right, it also
meant not materially exceeding them. Stone seems to have
been a particular offender in this regard. Taft remarked that
[Stone] has great difficulty in getting his opinions through, because
he is quite disposed to be discursive and to write opinions as if he
were writing an editorial or a comment for a legal law journal, cover-
ing as much as he can upon a general subject and thus expressing
opinions that have not been thought out by the whole Court.... I am
afraid he is disposed to inteiject a general disquisition looking toward
an embarrassing recurrence on his part to some other principle that
has been questioned or denied by the Court when that principle was
plainly before us. Without impeaching at all his good faith in matters
of that sort, we find we have to watch closely the language he uses. 5
Taft's observation is amply confirmed by the correspondence
accompanying Stone's draft opinions.96 In response to Stone's
opinion in Gulf Refining Co. v. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co.,97
for example, McReynolds wrote, "I think you have indulged in
rather too much discussion & said what may hurt. If confined
narrowly to the point I think your opinion would be better."
98
point, or give a wise and deliberate consideration of it.
Letter from William Howard Taft to Horace Taft (Apr. 17, 1922) (Taft Papers,
Reel 241). Taft labeled McKenna "a Cubist on the Bench," adding that "Cub-
ists are not safe on the Bench." Letter from William Howard Taft to Mrs. Fre-
derick J. Manning (June 11, 1923) (Taft Papers, Reel 254). Brandeis said of
McKenna,
[The] only way of dealing with him is to appoint guardians .... The
Chief & Van D. are his guardians-McReynolds tries to handle him
but does it badly. He knows he (McK) doesn't count, his suggestions
are [not] taken, so every once in a while he sends up a balloon just to
show that he is there .... His opinions are often suppressed-they are
held up & held up & gets mad & throws up the opinion and it's given
to someone else.
Brandeis-Frankfurter Conversations, supra note 74, at 326-27. Eventually the
Court decided to have Taft convince McKenna to retire. The incident is mov-
ingly recounted in a memorandum by Taft that is reproduced in Walter F.
Murphy & C. Herman Pritchett, COURTS, JUDGES, AND POLITICS: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 217-19 (2d ed. 1974).
95. Letter from William Howard Taft to Charles P. Taft, 2nd (May 12,
1929) (Taft Papers, Reel 311).
96. So, for example, in December of 1928 Taft had objected to a statement
in Stone's draft opinion in United Fuel Gas Co. v. Railroad Commission, 278
U.S. 300 (1929), because "[hle does not seem to be able to get it from our cases
except Brandeis's dissenting opinion and wants to get [it] into an opinion of
the Court. 'Heraus mit it.'" Letter from William Howard Taft to Willis Van
Devanter (Dec. 28, 1928) (Van Devanter Papers).
97. 279 U.S. 708 (1929).
98. Stone Papers.
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In response to Stone's opinion in Van Oster v. Kansas,99 Van
Devanter commented, "You have written discursively and in a
vein much like that of a student writing for a law journal."100
Pierce Butler would agree to join Stone's Van Oster opinion
only if Stone eliminated a paragraph containing a general
statement of the law. 101
99. 272 U.s. 465 (1926).
100. Stone Papers.
101. Van Oster concerned the constitutionality of a Kansas law authorizing
the forfeiture of an automobile used in the transportation of intoxicating liq-
uor, even as against an innocent owner. The paragraph, which Stone ulti-
mately omitted, said,
Such a law as we are now considering may be regarded harsh and
unwise, but we are concerned not with its wisdom but with the power
of the legislature to enact it. Where as here the challenged statute is
within the sphere of legislative power and the particular legal device
chosen to make effective the exercise of the power is consonant with
recognized principles, the objection that it is harsh and oppressive
must be addressed to the legislative and not to the judicial branch of
the government.... Conduct itself innocuous may be so related to
prohibited acts as to bring the former within the proscription of the
latter in order that the permitted legislative purpose may be attained.
Id. Butler asked if this paragraph was "really necessary? The statements are
very general. Can it not be omitted?" He agreed to join Stone's opinion "sub-
ject to the elimination of the paragraph." Id.
Butler also objected to a statement in Stone's draft opinion in Lucas v.
Alexander, 279 U.S. 573 (1929), a case about the taxation of insurance policies.
Stone had written that "value', as distinguished from market price or value,
can have no precise or definite connotation apart from the particular relation-
ship or purpose with respect to which the term is used." Stone Papers. At the
time the concept of "value" was jurisprudentially controversial, because it was
the basis on which the Court scrutinized the constitutionality of utility rate
regulation. See, e.g., St. Louis & O'Fallon Ry. Co. v. United States, 279 U.S.
461 (1929). Butler wrote Stone,
It seems to me that the sentence to which I called your attention
yesterday may be eliminated without disadvantage to your opin-
ion....
"Value" is now... much in controversy. That seems to me to be a
good reason for restricting the statements of this court to the ques-
tions to be decided.... There are some who insist that value is one
thing for one purpose and another for another.
And others think that constitutional protection depends upon the
meaning to be given to "value", and that if the term may be defined
according to the purpose for which appraisal is made the just compen-
sation and due process clauses may be evaded. It seems to me that in
your case the court need not enter that field and that therefore the
discussion should be restricted to the question in the case.
But if we must go into the matter I suggest in lieu of the sentence
in question that there be inserted the following: "But 'value' of private
property is that sum which would constitute just compensation if it
were taken by exertion of the sovereign power of eminent domain for
public use .... "
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The extant records of the Taft Court'0 2 reveal a surpris-
ingly healthy dialogue and exchange as authors struggled to
craft their opinions to express the specific views of the Justices
who joined them. 10 3 So, for example, when in the draft of his
opinion in Risty v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway
Co.1°4 Stone observed that federal courts "will ordinarily follow
the decisions of state courts as to the interpretation of a state
statute,"105 Holmes immediately wrote back that "I think they
ought always to follow state decisions on interpretation of state
statutes. I should pay no attention to wobbly phrases in that
matter."10 6 Stone omitted the adverb.
When in the draft of his opinion in Brooke v. City of Nor-
folk, 10 7 a case challenging the constitutionality of a tax imposed
in Virginia on a Virginia resident of the corpus of a trust fund
Memorandum from Pierce Butler to Harlan Fiske Stone (May 9, 1929) (Stone
Papers). Stone dropped the offending sentence, and Butler wrote back, "This
is improved and I am willing to go along." Id.
102. We shouldn't discount the possibility that these records are not repre-
sentative. We have more or less complete case records only for Justices
Holmes, Brandeis, and Stone, and very fragmentary case records for Taft.
103. In June of 1927 Taft reported to Moses Strauss, the managing editor
of the Cincinnati Times-Star,
We have been comparing notes in the Court over the work we do in
reaching our decisions and preparing our opinions. It is thorough to
the last degree, and the contrast between the rough and ready
method by which state courts and some of the lower Federal courts
decide their cases is very great. The amount of deliberation that we
give to them, the care with which we prepare the opinions and send
them about for every Judge to make himself familiar with the opinion
as it is to be pronounced, and the freedom with which we criticise the
opinions, all are an insurance against mistakes that so far as I know
no other Court has; and yet even in spite of that we make mistakes
and errors, but as far as we can exercise care, we do it.
Letter from William Howard Taft to Moses Strauss (June 5, 1927) (Taft Pa-
pers, Reel 292). Four months later Taft wrote his son on the same theme:
I sometimes feel that in discussing argued and submitted cases we
are too much hurried because of the certioraris, but the process of dis-
cussion through which we go before and after the opinion is written,
with the opinion of the opinion writer, saves us, so that I still main-
tain that there is no Court in this country, and I don't know whether
there is a Court anywhere, that gives more careful attention to the
cases we decide than we do. But it is at the cost of arduous and con-
tinuous labor.
Letter from William Howard Taft to Charles P. Taft, 2nd (Oct. 23, 1927) (Taft
Papers, Reel 296).
104. 270 U.S. 378 (1926).
105. Stone Papers (emphasis added).
106. Id. (emphasis added).
107. 277 U.S. 27 (1928).
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located, controlled, and administered in Maryland, Holmes
speculated that "[ilf the State and City had preferred to treat
her as owning an equitable estate for life, to estimate the value
of her interest by the use of the mortality tables and to tax that
as a fund, we presume that there would have been dispute,"
several members of the Court banded together in immediate
protest. Butler marked the passage and commented that "it
would better be left out."10 8 Sutherland also suggested "that we
ought not to express an opinion on this.... It does not seem
necessary to do so until the issue is made." Van Devanter
added, "Yes, but think you both discuss and state what is not
involved," while McReynolds bluntly observed that "I think the
opinion should be confined to the situation here presented &
should not undertake to say what would or would not be the
rule under different circumstances." Holmes deleted the of-
fending passages. 109
If the Justices could sometimes be demanding in their ex-
pectations of an opinion, an opinion writer could sometimes al-
ter the views of his colleagues. In McCarthy v. Arndstein,110 for
example, an important decision involving the question of
whether Fifth Amendment protections against self-
incrimination extended to the financial papers of a petitioner in
bankruptcy, the vote of the Conference was to reverse and the
case was assigned to Brandeis. After study, Brandeis "con-
cluded that the entry should be judgment reaffirmed,"' I ' and he
accordingly circulated an opinion reaching a conclusion con-
trary to the conference. His proposed opinion carried a unani-
mous Court.112 Other examples of Brandeis's draft opinions
108. Holmes Papers.
109. He wrote to Frankfurter,
In conference today I have a decision on a point not open to doubt,
which a few remarks extended to a page and a half. My brethren ex-
press doubt on what I thought obvious-and will cut it down to a
page-to which I have no objection. It is like Franklin's "John
Thompson Hatter makes and sells hats" with a picture-which his
friends by successive eliminations cut down to his name and the pic-
ture ....
HOLMES & FRANKFURTER, supra note 73, at 226.
110. 266 U.S. 34 (1924).
111. Brandeis Papers.
112. Taft responded to Brandeis, "I am inclined to go with you because I
don't know where else to go." Van Devanter, Sanford, and Butler all suggested
changes to the opinion that Brandeis subsequently made. Although it was
quite unusual for Brandeis to accept revisions suggested by Sanford, he fre-
quently accepted the proposed changes of Van Devanter. For typical exam-
ples, see Brandeis's draft opinions in West v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 200
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that caused the unanimous reversal of the initial resolution of a
case include Sprout v. South Bend 113 and St. Louis Southwest-
ern Railway Co. v. United States.114
A second function served by Supreme Court opinions was
justly to decide a particular case in a manner that satisfied liti-
gants that the Court had fairly and rationally "considered ar-
guments of counsel"115 and had adjudicated among them. The
parties to a case thus constituted a relevant audience for an
opinion. There was relatively little exchange among the Taft
Court Justices with regard to this function, in part because its
significance was simply taken for granted. 116 From time im-
(1929) ("I am relying upon you to protect from treacherous pitfalls a stranger
ranging over rugged country."); Bank of Jasper v. First Nat'l Bank of Rome,
258 U.S. 112 (1922); Bank of Am. v. Whiney Cent. Nat'l Bank, 261 U.S. 171
(1923); Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Parkersburg, 268 U.S. 35 (1925); Heald v.
District of Columbia, 259 U.S. 114 (1922); Price Fire & Water Proofing Co. v.
United States, 261 U.S. 179 (1923); St. Louis S.W. Ry. Co. v. United States,
262 U.S. 70 (1923); Tutun v. United States, 270 U.S. 568 (1926); St. Louis &
S.F. Ry. Co. v. Spiller, 275 U.S. 156 (1926); St. Louis-S.F. Ry. Co. v. Ala. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n, 279 U.S. 560 (1929). In fact, it was not at all uncommon for
Brandeis to send his opinions to Van Devanter before their circulation to the
full Court. See, e.g., Brandeis Papers (referring to Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co. v.
United States, 264 U.S. 258 (1924); Taubel-Scott-Kitzmiller v. Fox, 264 U.S.
426 (1924) ("You have thought so much on kindred questions that I am ventur-
ing to ask you to let me have your suggestions before enclosed opinion goes
into general circulation."); Smyth v. Asphalt Belt Ry. Co., 267 U.S. 326 (1925)
("May I trouble you to let me have your suggestions before I circulate this?");
In re Buder, 271 U.S. 461 (1926); Albrecht v. United States, 273 U.S. 1 (1927);
and United States v. Cal. Co-Operative Canneries, 279 U.S. 553 (1929) ("May I
have your suggestions before I circulate the opinion?")).
113. 277 U.S. 163 (1928).
114. 262 U.S. 70 (1923). A memorandum circulated by Stone reversed the
judgment of the Court in Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Chatters, 279 U.S.
320 (1929) ("I voted with the majority that jurisdiction to maintain the suit
against the Southern Railway Company had not been established. A study of
the case and the authorities has led me to a different conclusion. At the sug-
gestion of the Chief Justice I have embodied it in the following memorandum,
so that the matter may receive the further consideration of the Court.").
Stone's eventual opinion upholding jurisdiction was unanimous, even though
Sanford wrote back to Stone, "Regret that I cannot agree as to the Southern."
Stone Papers.
115. Brandeis-Frankfurter Conversations, supra note 74, at 335-36.
116. An exception is Tafts note to Holmes in response to the latter's sug-
gested changes in Taft's opinion in Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922): "I
shall be glad go talk with you about it and see whether I can modify what is
there said. The principle I state disposes of the argument of counsel so com-
pletely that I would like to retain them, but I am not an obstinate man." Let-
ter from William Howard Taft to Oliver Wendell Holmes (March 30, 1922),
quoted in David Joseph Danelski, The Chief Justice and the Supreme Court
185 (1961) (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Chicago) (on file
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memorial an essential judicial function had been to offer judg-
ment between contestants so as to preserve the peace.
Occasionally, however, the Justices would refer to their ob-
ligations to the parties. Thus Taft once suggested changes to a
draft Holmes opinion (which the latter accepted) on the
grounds that the draft "leaves our decision less positive than it
should be and is. You'll have a petition for rehearing and cre-
ate an impression of doubt on our part which does not conduce
to a 'once for all' decision."117 When Taft sought to praise
Brandeis's opinion in United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v.
Tod,118 which upheld the deportation of an alien because of his
possession of seditious literature, he wrote that "[c]ertainly
[Walter] Nelles [the alien's lawyer] ought to be satisfied that
his shadowy contentions have had close consideration and have
been fully and overwhelmingly answered." 119
A third function of a Supreme Court opinion was "suffi-
ciently to elaborate the principles, the importance of which jus-
tify the bringing of the case here at all, to make the discussion
of those principles and the conclusion reached useful to the
country and to the Bar in clarifying doubtful questions of con-
stitutional and fundamental law."120 From the perspective of
this function, the audience for a Supreme Court opinion was
the general legal public, which included state courts and lower
federal courts, the legal profession, Congress and state legisla-
tors. The purpose of an opinion was to clarify standards of fed-
eral law so as to provide guidance for those who needed to know
the law.
Taft was an especially articulate spokesman for this
standpoint; within the confines of the Court, he used his powers
of persuasion and leadership to encourage opinions that ful-
filled these functions. 121 So, for example, he praised Brandeis's
with author).
117. Holmes Papers (referring to a draft opinion in White Oak Transp. Co.
v. Boston, Cape Cod & N.Y. Canal Co., 258 U.S. 341 (1922)).
118. 263 U.S. 149 (1923).
119. Brandeis Papers. For Taft's comments on Brandeis's opinion in Gal-
veston Elec. Co. v. Galveston, 258 U.S. 388 (1922), see Brandeis Papers. ("This
is a carefully drawn opinion and answers every contention. Much more satis-
factory than what Judge Day calls a 'journal entry.'").
120. Letter from William Howard Taft to Charles P. Taft, 2nd (Nov. 1,
1925) (Taft Papers, Reel 277).
121. Sometimes Taft used his own opinions to achieve this function
through the frank advocacy of explicit law reform. For example, in Irwin v.
Wright, 258 U.S. 219 (1922), which concerned the question of whether suits to
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opinion in Great Northern Railway Co. v. Merchants' Elevator
Co.122 because "it will inform the courts and the profession and
your ignorant colleagues. It will be leading case showing what
this Court is for."123 Of Brandeis's opinion in St. Louis,
Brownsville, & Mexico Railway Co. v. United States124 Taft said
that "[t]his is a most useful opinion and straightens out the law
not only for the public but for your colleagues." 25 Brandeis's
opinion in United States v. Los Angeles & Salt Lake Railroad
enjoin a state officer from enforcing a statute abated upon the death or retire-
ment of the officer, he frankly appealed to Congress for legislative reform of an
otherwise unfair situation:
It may not be improper to say that it would promote justice if
Congress were to enlarge the scope of the Act of February 8, 1899, so
as to permit the substitution of successors for state officers suing or
sued in the Federal courts, who cease to be officers by retirement or
death, upon a sufficient showing in proper cases. Under the present
state of the law, an important litigation may be begun and carried
through to this court after much effort and expense, only to end in
dismissal because, in the necessary time consumed in reaching here,
state officials, parties to the action, have retired from office. It is a
defect which only legislation can cure.
Id. at 223-24. In the absence of such legislation, Taft candidly advised that
every effort should be made so as to achieve a fair outcome. See, e.g., Gorham
Mfg. Co. v. Wendell, 261 U.S. 1, 5 (1923) ("[Where] officers on behalf of State
or County consent to the substitution, the federal courts need not be astute to
enforce the abatement of the suit if any basis at all can be found in state law
or the practice of the state courts for substitution of the successors in office.").
Eventually the Court itself drafted the necessary legislation, which Congress
enacted as a section of the Act of February 13, 1925. The story is fully re-
counted in Snyder v. Buck, 340 U.S. 15, 22-26 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissent-
ing). Another example of Taft's use of opinions to provide explicit instructions
to other legal actors is Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44 (1922), in which the Court
struck down the Future Trading Act, 42 Stat. 187 (Aug. 24, 1921). In his opin-
ion for the Court, Taft "hinted rather plainly" that Congress could cure the
constitutional defects of the Act. Thomas Reed Powell, Umpiring the Federal
System: 1922-1924,40 POL. SC. Q. 101, 106 (1925). When Congress promptly
amended the deficiencies by enacting the revised Grain Futures Act, 42 Stat.
998 (Sept. 21, 1922), Taft cheerfully upheld the modified statute in Board of
Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1, 32 (1923) ("The Grain Futures Act which is now
before us differs from the Future Trading Act in having the very features the
absence of which we held, in the somewhat carefully framed language of the
foregoing, prevented our sustaining the Future Trading Act.").
122. 259 U.S. 285 (1922).
123. Brandeis Papers. Brandeis returned the favor the following term, re-
sponding to Taft's draft opinion in Cumberland Telephone & Telegraph Co. v.
Louisiana Public Service Commission, 260 U.S. 212 (1922): "This will be of
much service in clearing up a confusion quite widely experienced at the bar."
Taft Papers (Reel 614).
124. 268 U.S. 169 (1925).
125. Brandeis Papers.
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Co. 126 was "an admirable opinion [that] lays down an authorita-
tive rule for dealing with.., valuations that makes it a really
leading case. I congratulate you. This is most clarifying and
satisfactory."12
7
The Judiciary Act of 1925, of course, emphasized this func-
tion of Supreme Court opinions. As Taft said in promoting the
Act, "The real work of the Supreme Court has to do is for the
public at large, as distinguished from the particular litigants
before it."1 28 By empowering the Court to choose its own juris-
diction, the Act shifted the Court's emphasis away from opin-
ions addressed to private litigants, and toward opinions ad-
dressed to those concerned with the development of American
law. Justices like Taft and Van Devanter, however, seldom
perceived a conflict between these two audiences. They be-
lieved that the Court could best offer guidance to the legal pub-
lic by enunciating the same kind of stable and definite legal
principles as it would announce to litigants in the resolution of
a case.129 In their view, the 1925 Act merely affected the
126. 273 U.S. 299 (1927).
127. Brandeis Papers.
128. Taft, Address to the New York County Bar Association, supra note 27,
at5.
129. The characteristic rhetoric of Supreme Court opinions was thus one of
closure, as though the legal principles that both settled the case between the
parties and clarified the law for the rest of the country were the only possible
solution to the difficulties of the case. See Robert A. Ferguson, The Judicial
Opinion as Literary Genre, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 201, 207, 210, 213 (1990).
It is noteworthy that during this period Brandeis, whose emphasis on judicial
abstention evidenced his belief that there might be important differences be-
tween the fimction of settling the disputes of litigants and offering guidance to
the legal public, pioneered an idiosyncratic and distinctive style that sought to
inform legal actors precisely by resisting this framework of closure. Primarily
concerned with informing the institutional relationships of the emerging ad-
ministrative state, Brandeis frequently used his opinions to suggest to public
officials the myriad possibilities of legitimate legal action. In Missouri Pacific
Railroad v. Boone, 270 U.S. 466 (1926), for example, the specific legal question
for determination was whether state intrastate railway regulations that had
been preempted by federal control over the railroads during World War I could
be enforced without re-enactment after cessation of that control on February
29, 1920. Brandeis's opinion stresses the multiple ways that state regulations
might acquire legal force after 1920:
In order to remove doubts as to what tariffs were to be applicable
after the termination of federal control, Congress declared that the
existing tariffs, largely initiated by the Director General, should be
deemed operative, except so far as changed thereafter-that is, after
February 29, 1920-pursuant to law. Such modifications of intrastate
tariffs might result from action of the carriers taken on their own ini-
tiative. It might result from orders of the Interstate Commerce
1306 [Vol. 85:1267
HeinOnline -- 85 Minn. L. Rev. 1306 2000-2001
2001] OPINIONS AS INSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE
Commission. It might result from the making either of new state
laws or of new orders of a state commission acting under old laws still
in force and again becoming operative. Or such modification might
result from the mere cessation of the suspension, which had been ef-
fected through federal control, of statutes or orders theretofore in
force and still unaffected by any action of the authority which made
them. In any of these cases, the change would be effected "thereaf-
ter;" that is, after the termination of federal control.
Id. at 475-76. The rhetorical structure of this passage, its insistently reiter-
ated conjuring of possible methods that "might result" in an effective change of
law, serves to negate the closure made to seem inevitable in typical Court
opinions. Instead Boone unfolds a virtual roadmap for the guidance of public
officials attempting to negotiate the complex domain of federal and state rail-
road regulation. It is hard to imagine a sharper contrast to the typical aes-
thetic of a Holmes opinion, in which a "shapeless black immensity...
shrinks... to an infinitesimal luminous point." Letter from Oliver Wendell
Holmes to Mrs. John Chipman Gray (June 5, 1927) (Holmes Papers, Reel 24,
Frame 175). In opinions like Boone, Brandeis's ambition is to illuminate the
many paths available for the legal exercise of administrative and legislative
discretion. See, e.g., Missouri ex rel. St. Louis, Brownsville & Mex. Ry. Co. v.
Taylor, 266 U.S. 200, 208 (1924).
An important and little noted dimension of Brandeis's focus on facts is
that it also served to maintain this open space of potential legal action. Thus
in Hammond v. Schappi Bus Line, 275 U.S. 164 (1927), Brandeis confronted
the question of whether city ordinances regulating buses were consistent with
the dormant commerce clause. Instead of laying down a singular rule, he used
his opinion to explain how the scope of local competence would depend upon
contingent facts:
The contentions made in the briefs and arguments suggest,
among other questions, the following: Where there is congestion of
city streets sufficient to justify some limitation of the number of mo-
tor vehicles to be operated thereon as common carriers, or some pro-
hibition of stops to load or unload passengers, may the limitation or
prohibition be applied to some vehicles used wholly or partly in inter-
state commerce while, at the same time, vehicles of like character, in-
cluding many that are engaged solely in local, or intrastate, commerce
are not subjected thereto? Is the right in the premises to which inter-
state carriers would otherwise be entitled, affected by the fact that,
prior to the establishment of the interstate lines, the City had granted
to a local carrier, by contract or franchise, the unlimited right to use
all the streets of the City, and that elimination of the interstate vehi-
cles would put an end to the congestion experienced? May the City's
right to limit the number of vehicles, and to prohibit stops to load or
unload passengers, be exercised in such a way as to allocate streets on
which motor traffic is more profitable exclusively to the local lines
and to allocate streets on which the traffic is less profitable to the
lines engaged wholly, or partly, in interstate commerce? Is limitation
of the number of vehicles, or prohibition of stops to load or unload
passengers, of carriers engaged wholly, or partly, in interstate com-
merce, justifiable, where the congestion could be obviated by denying
to private carriers existing parking privileges or by curtailing those so
enjoyed? Are the rights of the interstate carrier in the premises de-
pendent, in any respect, upon the dates of the establishment of its
lines, as compared with the dates of the establishment of the lines of
the local carrier?
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Court's control over its own docket; it did not alter the terms on
which the Court would construct its opinions.
But in fact they were wrong. Fashioning an opinion justly
to resolve a dispute between parties is closely related to con-
ceiving an opinion as a routine method of disposing of a large
mandatory docket. It is rooted in the conception of the Su-
preme Court as a tribunal of last resort that predominated dur-
ing the first 150 years of the Court's existence. Crafting an
opinion in order to influence the administration and develop-
ment of the law, by contrast, requires reaching out beyond par-
ticular parties and addressing the entire community of legal ac-
tors. This alters the stakes of an opinion. It also transforms
the position of the Court. If the function of an opinion is to re-
solve disputes between parties, the Court can rest on its tradi-
tional authority as a tribunal deemed necessary to terminate
strife and avoid violence.13 0 But to the extent that an opinion is
addressed to the general legal public, this institutional function
competes with the Court's character as a lawgiver, as an origi-
nator of law, somewhat in the fashion of a "ministry of justice."
And this change may oblige an opinion to justify the authority
of the Court in a manner that is different from what would be
necessary were an opinion simply the means of resolving dis-
putes between private parties.
The sharp contrast between the opinion writing practices
of the Taft Court and those of the modern Court no doubt re-
flects these more subtle transformations. Of course such pro-
found changes are driven by many different causes, not merely
(or even especially) by the Judiciary Act of 1925. The Act, how-
ever, permanently and pervasively altered the institutional
ecology of Supreme Court opinions, and this changed organiza-
tional environment in turn shaped the impact of the many in-
These questions have not, so far as appears, been considered by
either of the lower courts. The facts essential to their determination
have not been found by either court. And the evidence in the record is
not of such a character that findings could now be made with confi-
dence.... Before any of the questions suggested, which are both novel
and of far reaching importance, are passed upon by this Court, the
facts essential to their decision should be definitely found by the
lower courts upon adequate evidence.
Id. at 170-72.
130. 'The right to sue and defend in the courts is the alternative of force.
In an organized society it is the right conservative of all other rights, and lies
at the foundation of orderly government." Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio R.
Co., 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907); see also Int'l Textbook Co. v. Pigg, 217 U.S. 91,
112 (1910).
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fluences that caused the decisionmaking practices of the Taft
Court to evolve into those of the contemporary Court. In the
remainder of this Lecture, I shall focus on two such fundamen-
tal shifts in the Court's decisionmaking practices. The first
concerns the role of dissent. The second involves the Court's
willingness to cite law review literature in its opinions.
III.
Figure 5 illustrates how sharply unanimity rates have
fallen between the Taft Court and the 1990s. In the 1921-1928
Terms, 84% of the Court's opinions were unanimous; by con-
trast, only 27% of the Court's opinions were unanimous during
the 1993-1998 Terms. 131 It has justly been observed that this
"increase in the frequency of the issuance of separate opinions
is a central event in the history of the Court's opinion-delivery
practices." 132
Figure 10, which traces the decline of unanimity term by
term from 1912 to 1957, allows us to examine this transforma-
tion somewhat more carefully. 133
131. Figure 5 also illustrates that during the period from the 1912 Term to
the 1920 Term, 82% of the Court's opinions were unanimous.
132. John P. Kelsh, The Opinion Delivery Practices of the United Supreme
Court 1790-1945, 77 WASH. U. L. Q. 137, 178 (1999). Unanimity rates were
also exceedingly high throughout the 19th Century; "[flew dissenting or con-
curring opinions were written before the turn of the century." Stacia L.
Haynie, Leadership and Consensus on the U.S. Supreme Court, 54 J. POL.
1158, 1158 (1992); see also Gregory A. Caldeira & Christopher J.W. Zorn, Of
Time and Consensual Norms in the Supreme Court, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 874,
882 (1998); David M. O'Brien, Institutional Norms and Supreme Court Opin-
ions: On Reconsidering the Rise of Individual Opinions, in SUPREME COURT
DECISION-MAKING 91-95 (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999).
It is noteworthy that at least as of 1970 unanimity rates in state supreme
courts did not seem to have fallen to anything like the low levels characteristic
of the United States Supreme Court. One study finds that in the period 1915-
1925, 88.9% of state supreme court opinions were unanimous, whereas in the
period 1960-70, 83.5% of such opinions were unanimous. Friedman et al., su-
pra note 52, at 787. For other studies, see Mark A. Kadzielski & Robert C.
Kunda, The Origins of Modern Dissent: The Unmaking of Judicial Consensus
in the 1930s, 14 UWLA L. REV. 43, 67-69 (1983); Kagan et al., supra note 65,
at 994 (reporting that 84.7% of state supreme court opinions in the period
1940-1970 were unanimous).
133. The data in Figure 10 for the 1912-1929 Terms are my own. I have
borrowed the data for the 1930-1957 Terms from Karl M. ZoBell, Division of
Opinion in the Supreme Court: A History of Judicial Disintegration, 44
CORNELL L.Q. 186, 205 (1959).
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Figure 10 suggests that although emphasis is sometimes
put on Taft's "absorbing ambition... in his own phrase, to
'mass' the Court," 134 and although this has been adduced as a
factor to explain the low rates of dissent during the prewar pe-
riod,135 the high rates of unanimity during Taft's tenure cannot
be attributed to him personally. They were in fact typical of
the pre-New Deal Court.136
This is not to say, however, that Taft did not "deprecate"37
dissents, which he did.138 He wrote to Clarke,
134. ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, THE SUPREME COURT: FROM TAFT TO
WARREN 60 (1968).
135. Thomas G. Walker et al., On the Mysterious Demise of Consensual
Norms in the United States Supreme Court, 50 J. OF POL. 361, 380-81 (1988);
cf. Caldeira and Zorn, supra note 132, at 878 ("Of the various explanations [for
consensus], none has figured more prominently than the influence of the chief
justice."); Haynie, supra note 132, at 1160 (speculating on the relationship be-
tween "leadership and consensus" because "Wudicial leadership is consistently
identified as one of the major influences on the court's behavior").
136. See supra notes 131-132.
137. Letter from William Howard Taft to Sir Thomas White (Jan. 8, 1922)
(Taft Papers, Reel 238).
138. Taft once received an unsolicited letter from one Walter S. Whiton, an
unknown attorney in Minneapolis, asking Taft if he did "not think that it
would be better all round, if no dissenting opinions of any court were printed
or published?" Letter from Walter S. Whiton to William Howard Taft (Apr. 16,
1923) (Taft Papers, Reel 252). Taft promptly replied, "I agree with you about
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I don't approve of dissents generally, for I think that in many cases,
where I differ from the majority, it is more important to stand by the
Court and give its judgment weight than merely to record my indi-
vidual dissent where it is better to have the law certain than to have
it settled either way.'39
He believed that "[m]ost dissents elaborated, are a form of
egotism. They don't do any good, and only weaken the prestige
of the Court. It is much more important what the Court thinks
than what any one thinks."140 Taft strongly counseled Harding
against nominating New York Court of Appeals Judge Cuthbert
Pound to replace Mahlon Pitney on the Court, because
[Pound] has a marked trait as a Judge that would make him of very
doubtful use on our Bench. He is a great dissenter. He was a profes-
sor of Law in Cornell for five or ten years, and he evidently thinks it
is more important that he should ventilate his individual views than
that the Court should be consistent and by team work should give
solidarity and punch to what it decides. We have one dissenter on the




Nor is it to say that Taft didn't work hard to build consen-
sus and avoid dissents. He believed that an important task of
the Chief Justice was "to promote teamwork by the Court so as
to give weight and solidarity to its opinions."142 He successfully
dissenting opinions. I think it would be better to have none, but the custom
has grown so now that it can not be eradicated, unless perhaps by act of Con-
gress. But I am quite sure that Congress would not sustain such legislation."
Letter from William Howard Taft to Walter S. Whiton (Apr. 19, 1923) (Taft
Papers, Reel 252). In fact the Constitution of the State of Louisiana forbade
the publication of dissents between 1898 and 1921. Art. 92, Louisiana Consti-
tutions of 1898 and 1913, in BENJAMIN WALL DART, CONSTITUTIONS OF THE
STATE OF LOUISIANA 616, 672 (1932).
139. Letter from William Howard Taft to John Hessin Clarke (Feb. 10,
1922), quoted in Danelski, supra note 116, at 184. So, for example, Taft wrote
to Holmes in response to Holmes's draft opinion in New Orleans Land Co. v.
Brott, 263 U.S. 98 (1923), "While I make the sign of the scissors to you, I do
not intend to do so to the public. I concur." Holmes Papers. In regard to
Holmes's opinion in National Ass'n of Window Glass Manufacturers v. United
States, 263 U.S. 403 (1923), Taft wrote, "I come in and shut my mouth."
Holmes Papers.
140. Letter from William Howard Taft to Willis Van Devanter (Dec. 26,
1921) (Van Devanter Papers). Taft continued, "[Blut that sense of proportion
is not present in the minds of some of our brethren. As to B[randeis], that
sense is not lacking but his ultimate purpose is to break down the prestige of
the Court." Id.
141. Letter from William Howard Taft to Warren G. Harding (Dec. 4,1922)
(Taft Papers, Reel 248). In that letter Taft also advised against the appoint-
ment of Learned Hand because "he would almost certainly herd with Brandeis
and be a dissenter. I think it would be risking too much to appoint him." Id.
142. Draft of a Tribute to Edward Douglas White (May 1921), cited in Dan-
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diminished dissension in such cases in United Mine Workers v.
Coronado,143 Hill v. Wallace,144 Railroad Commission of Cali-
fornia v. Southern Pacific Co.,145 Opelika v. Opelika Sewer,146
and FTC v. Claire Furnace Co. 14 7 He was willing to go to ex-
traordinary lengths to modify his own opinions to reach out to
others. In Wisconsin v. Illinois,48 for example, he had worked
for an entire summer on an opinion, advancing a very broad
theory of federal commerce power that he fervently supported.
But in order to attain unanimity he agreed to censor his own
views:
I worked all summer on the constitutional part of the opinion,... and
satisfied myself completely by an examination of the briefs and the
authorities on the subject, and I parted with it as a child that I was
glad to father, if it needed any fathering, and it is a real sacrifice of
my personal preference. But it is the duty of us all to control our per-
sonal preferences to the main object of the Court.4 9
What Figure 10 allows us to say is that Taft's interventions
were responsible for marginal changes along the edges of a
practice of unanimity that existed before Taft and that would
persist after him. Within the parameters of that practice,
many different factors, including but not exhausted by Taft's
efforts, affected the degree of the Court's unanimity.150 Figure
elski, supra note 116, at 177.
143. 259 U.S. 344 (1922). The circumstances are discussed in ALEXANDER
M. BICKEL, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS: THE
SUPREIE COURT AT WORK 77-99 (1957). Bickel also discusses Taft's efforts to
"mass the court" in the case of Sonneborn Brothers v. Cureton, 262 U.S. 506
(1923). See id. at 100-18.
144. 258 U.S. 44 (1922). The circumstances are discussed in Danelski, su-
pra note 116, at 188-89. Danelski also discusses Taft's efforts to minimize dis-
sents in American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U.S.
184 (1921). See Danelski, supra note 116, at 180-81.
145. 264 U.S. 331 (1924). The circumstances are discussed in MASON, su-
pra note 4, at 211-12, and in BICKLE, supra note 143, at 202-10.
146. 265 U.S. 215 (1924). See Holmes Papers
147. 274 U.S. 160 (1927). See Brandeis Papers.
148. 278 U.S. 367 (1929).
149. Letter from William Howard Taft to Pierce Butler (Jan. 7, 1929) (Taft
Papers, Reel 307).
150. Figure F offers some rough measure of Taft's ability to create consen-
sus. It examines the voting behavior of the eight Justices who both preceded
Taft and served with him. Figure F divides the number of times that a Justice
joined the opinion of the Court by the total number of cases in which that Jus-
tice participated. It then compares the resulting percentage for each Justice
for the 1915-1920 Terms to the percentage for each Justice for the 1921-1928
Terms. Figure F indicates that Taft generally had a positive effect, particu-
larly on Justices Van Devanter and McKenna. The data for Justices Day, Pit-
ney, and Clarke are potentially unreliable, however, because each served for
1312
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11 allows us to take a somewhat closer look at these factors by
focusing on unanimity rates during the 1921-1928 Terms.









1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928
It indicates, for example, that there was a sharp increase
in unanimity between the 1921 Term (72.8%) and the 1922
Term (91.1%). Of course there was a major change in Court
personnel between these two Terms. Justices Clarke, Day, and
Pitney resigned and were replaced, respectively, by Justices
Sutherland, Butler, and Sanford. Figure 12, which shows how
frequently individual Justices joined opinions for the Court
during the 1921-1928 Terms, 151 illustrates that the new Jus-
tices, as a group, were more likely to vote with the Court than
the Justices they replaced. This is particularly true of Suther-
land's replacement of Clarke. 152
so short a period with Taft. The seemingly negative effect that Taft had on
Clarke is particularly misleading; as Figure G demonstrates, the 1921 Term
was for Clarke simply the last straw in a rapidly deteriorating situation that
could not be attributed to Taft. It should also be noted that during the Taft
years McKenna's competence was open to question. See supra note 94.
151. For each Justice in Figure 12, 1 have divided the total number of times
he joined a Court opinion by the total number of cases in which he partici-
pated.
152. Clarke joined in the opinion for the Court 87.1% of the time, whereas
Sutherland joined 96.7% of the time. Butler and Sanford joined the Court's
opinions 97.8% and 97.5% of the time, respectively, while the corresponding
figures for Day and Pitney were 98% and 96.4%. During the 1922 Term, But-
ler joined the Court 100% of the time, Sanford 99% of the time, and Suther-
land 96% of the time. The sharp change between the 1921 and 1922 Terms is
shown more distinctly in Figure 13, which measures dissenting votes as a per-
centage of total court opinions. The data for the 1916-1920 Terms in Figure 13
comes from William G. Rice, How the Supreme Court Mill is Working, 56 AM.
L. REv. 763, 765 (1922).
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Figure 12: Percentage of All Opinions in Which a Justice









Figure 11 also indicates that rates of unanimity were very
high during the 1922-1925 Terms, but that this rate dropped
perceptibly during the remainder of the decade. This trend can
be seen more clearly in Figure 13, which measures dissenting
votes as a percentage of Court opinions.
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Although this pattern might be the result of random fluc-
tuations of the docket, it is possible to identify a number of po-
tential factors that may have contributed to this outcome.
There is some internal evidence, for example, that during
the first half of the 1920s dissent was suppressed within the
Court because of the need to fend off external attacks. In 1919
1314
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the AFL had launched an assault on judicial review153 that un-
leashed a wave of progressive efforts to restrict the power of the
Court to declare federal law unconstitutional. 154 In 1922 Rob-
ert La Follette advocated that Congress be able to overturn
Supreme Court decisions declaring Acts of Congress unconsti-
tutional. 55 In 1923 Senator William E. Borah proposed legisla-
153. For a good summary, see WILLIAM G. Ross, A MUTED FURY:
POPULISTS, PROGRESSIVES, AND LABOR UNIONS CONFRONT THE COURT, 1890-
1937, at 170-78 (1994).
154. Steven F. Lawson, Progressives and the Supreme Court: A Case for
Judicial Reform in the 1920s, 42 HISTORIAN 419 (1980).
155. Ross, supra note 149, at 192-217. La Follette's proposal was con-
tained in an address before the AFL.
He proposed an amendment to the constitution providing:
1.-That no inferior Federal Judge could set aside a law of Con-
gress on the ground that it was unconstitutional.
2.-That if the Supreme Court assumed to declare any law of
Congress unconstitutional Congress could, by repassing the law, nul-
lify the action of the court and thereafter the law would remain in full
force and effect precisely as though the court had never acted on
it ....The Senator's speech was a sizzler and he received a great ova-
tion. Delegates applauded, shouted and pounded the tables for sev-
eral minutes....
His first reference to Chief Justice Taft was greeted with hisses
from all parts of the hall....
After the hisses had subsided La Follette said:
"Ex-President Taft was appointed Chief Justice by President
Harding. Thus a man was invested with the prestige and influence of
Chief Justice who had been repudiated by the voters on his record....
"No one will contend that he could have been elected Chief Justice
by a vote of the people. And yet Chief Justice Taft wrote the opinion
that annulled the child labor law. He wrote the opinion in the Coro-
nado Coal Company case."
Earl L. Shaub, Labor Plans for Slash of Court Power: Federation Convention
Spends Day Denouncing Decisions Made by U.S. Supreme Court, S.F.
EXAMINER, June 15, 1922, at 11. For La Follette's proposal, see 62 CONG.
REC. 9074-82 (1922). For a proposed constitutional amendment, see H.R.J.
Res. 436, 67th Cong. (1923); 64 CONG. REC. 2607-15 (1923). For press reac-
tions to La Follette's proposal, see Is the Supreme Court Too Supreme?,
LITERARY DIGEST, July 1, 1922, at 21.
Taft was distressed by the attack. When Sutherland was confirmed to re-
place Clarke, Taft wrote him,
I write to congratulate you from the bottom of my heart on your
appointment to the Bench, and upon the reception which your nomi-
nation and confirmation have had by the American people.... I
should judge that the Court is about to enter upon another period of
agitation against its powers, such as it had in the period before Mar-
shall came onto the Bench; again after he locked horns with Jefferson
and Jackson; again during the period of the Fugitive Slave law; again
during the reconstruction days when Thad Stevens and the radical
Republicans defied the Court; and again when Bryan and the income
1315
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tion that would require the concurrence of at least seven mem-
bers of the Court in any decision invalidating an act of Con-
gress. 156 Matters came to a head when La Follette included his
amendment as a plank in his Progressive Party platform dur-
tax decision were made a part of the 1896 campaign. La Follette's
overwhelming victory in Wisconsin will put great confidence into the
hearts and souls of all who are opposed to property rights and the
support which the Constitution gives to them, and who are radically
hostile to the existence of the Supreme Court.... While it is un-
pleasant, I think perhaps it is well to fight out this issue and develop
in its clear and unmistakable features what the labor unions and La
Follette have in mind with respect to the Government and the change
of its constitutional structure. When that issue arises, I can not be-
lieve that there is any doubt of the strength of the conservative ele-
ment in the Republic. It may for the time throw Republicans and
Democrats together, as I hope it will. Of course were we to have a
radical Congress and a radical Senate, they might take steps either to
abolish or to practically destroy much of the useful jurisdiction of the
inferior Federal courts. We could be certain that the minute they had
power, they would frighten the country into a reaction, which would
teach a permanent lesson, but meantime the cause of justice in the
country would suffer. Of course we may count on a lot of weak-kneed
people who are conservative when conservatism seems to be strong,
and are radical when radicalism seems to be sweeping the country;
but there are many elements who do not manifest themselves superfi-
cially and seem to remain inert until they are startled by a danger
that ought to have been long foreseen. And it is upon those elements
that the hope and confidence in the preservation of our institutions
must be based. Meantime there is nothing for the Court to do but to
go on about its business, exercise the jurisdiction it has, and not be
frightened because of threats against its existence.
It is most interesting, in view of what we may anticipate, to read
the history of the Court just published by Warren. I do not agree with
a good many of his statements, nor do I subscribe to some of his con-
clusions, but he has massed together in historical form the history of
the Court to show that, with some periods of quiet, its whole history
has been one of threat, attack and defeat of its enemies, and it is a
proud record that on the whole the Court never bowed its head for
motives of political expediency, to yield its conscientious views and
convictions to assaults, of which it has had to meet so many in its life
of more than a century and a quarter.
I don't know why I have fallen into this disquisition, except that I
note in the press a good deal of excitement over the La Follette elec-
tion and the attacks of labor organizations upon our Court, and I
could not refrain from discussing the situation with you as you now
come into the Court with a general opinion as to the functions of the
Court similar to my own.
Letter from William Howard Taft to George Sutherland (Sept. 10, 1922)
(Sutherland Papers).
156. Ross, supra note 153, at 218-32; see also S. 4483, 67th Cong. (4th Sess.
1923). Borah's bill was just one of a rash of proposed legislation. See, e.g.,
H.R. 14209, 67th Cong. (4th Sess. 1923); H.R. 697, 68th Cong. (1923); H.R.
721, 68th Cong. (1923).
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ing the 1924 presidential campaign.157 Contemporary antago-
nists of the Court, like Jackson Harvey Ralston, the General
Counsel of the AFL, seized upon dissents as evidence of the
Court's illegitimate usurpation of power:
To show.., even more clearly the doubtful exercise of power by the
Supreme Court... we need but point to the repeated dissents on the
part of a minority continually made against the assumption that the
court knew more of the necessities of the times than the legislature.
Surely if the majority had based their action upon definitely under-
stood constitutional principles, no differences of moment need have
arisen.'58
The point was not lost in the Court. Taft wrote a friend
that La Follette "is probably framing an attack upon the Su-
preme Court's infamous nullification of valuable laws de-
manded by the people. He could find a good deal of material in
Brandeis's dissenting opinions."159 By July of 1924 Brandeis
157. Ross, supra note 153, at 254-84; see also KENNETH CAMPBELL
MACKAY, THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT OF 1924, at 11, 143 (1947).
158. Jackson Harvey Ralston, Shall We Curb the Supreme Court?, 71
FORUM 561, 565 (1924). Charges that dissents undermined the Court's claim
to speak with the authority of law were common during the tumultuous pe-
riod. See, e.g., Albert J. Beveridge, Common Sense and the Constitution,
SATURDAY EVENING POST, Dec. 15, 1923, at 25 ("[W]hen five able and learnedjustices think one way, and four equally able and learned justices, all on the
same bench, think the other way and express their dissent in powerful argu-
ment, sometimes with warm feeling, is it not obvious that the law in question
is not such a plain infraction of the Constitution as to be unconstitutional 'be-
yond all question'?"). Even John W. Davis, in his presidential address to the
ABA, was moved to observe that
much of the current discontent is caused perhaps by the publication of
dissenting opinions which serve to fan the flame of public distrust.
Certainly, it is not edifying to the lay mind that an opinion represent-
ing the considered judgment of the majority of any court should be ac-
companied at the moment of deliverance by an effort to prove its
manifest error.
Hon. John W. Davis, Present Day Problems, 9 A.B.A. J. 553, 557 (1923); see
also John K. Shields, Senator Condemns Legislative Efforts to Curb Supreme
Court, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1923, § 8, at 10 ("It will not be improper here to
suggest the impropriety of these dissenting opinions for the bad effect they
have upon the public mind concerning the wisdom of the court and the cer-
tainty of the law. It has been urged, with much force, that when a majority of
the court come to a conclusion and solemnly declare the law, its action is as
binding upon the minority as upon the parties and the public and the minority
by express dissent ought not to challenge the soundness or justice of the judg-
ment but yield to it the obedience and respect that is due the decisions of the
court.").
159. Letter from William Howard Taft to Gus Karger (Aug. 30, 1924) (Taft
Papers, Reel 267).
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could remark to Frankfurter that "the drive against the Court
has tended" to reduce dissents.160
The whole policy is to suppress dissents, that is the one positive result
of Borah 7 to 2 business, to suppress dissent so as not to make it 7 to
2. Holmes, for instance, is always in doubt whether to express his
dissent, once he's "had his say" on a given subject & he's had his say
on almost everything. You may look for fewer dissents. That's Van
Devanter's particularly strong lobbying with the members individu-
ally, to have them suppress their dissents. He is perhaps closest with
Butler, whom he treats as an elder brother, & while Butler is not easy
to move, the prudential arguments of Van D. as to what is "good-or
bad-for the Court" are weighty with him & with all of them.
6
We can speculate, then, that at least some dissenting votes
were repressed during the first half of the 1920s in order to de-
fend the Court from external assault. After La Follette's de-
feat, however, the Court could breathe a sigh of relief,162 be-
cause "the controversy over judicial review subsided for several
years after the 1924 election."163 With external pressure dimin-
160. Brandeis-Frankfurter Conversations, supra note 74, at 328. Figure 20
provides some support for Brandeis's assertion. It demonstrates that the
Court augmented its efforts to produce unanimous judgments during the 1923
Term. For an explanation of Figure 20, see infra note 205.
161. Brandeis-Frankfurter Conversations, supra note 74, at 330.
162. Letter from William Howard Taft to Willis Van Devanter (June 19,
1925) (Van Devanter Papers).
As I look back over the Term it seems to me we got through very
well.... We have had no unseemly dissensions among our members.
I think the result of the last election does not show that the Court
stands any better than it always has with the people but it shows to a
great many who were convinced that they could profit by abusing it
that they should look for some other field for their demagoguery more
profitable. I don't think I am mistaken in thinking that Borah and
that ilk are losing interest in efforts to change the Court.
Id. Taft wrote to his brother Horace that "[tihe greatest failure of La Follette
was his attack upon our court. He confessed his failure in his effort to mini-
mize the issue after the campaign was well on." Letter from William Howard
Taft to Horace Taft (June 20, 1925) (Taft Papers, Reel 275).
163. ROSS, supra note 153, at 285; see, e.g., The Supreme Court's New
Term, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 3, 1927, at 16 ("In 1801, the Court was
suffering from attacks in the press, and from suspicion from the other depart-
ments of the National Government. Now it is the most honored branch of the
federal institutions. Qualms as to its impartiality and apprehensions regard-
ing its political prejudice have long since vanished. Attacks upon its decisions
are rare, and questions of its integrity do not exist."). Indeed, as late as Feb-
ruary 1930, and just before the controversy over Hughes' nomination, so as-
tute a public observer as Mark Sullivan could comment on
the present and recent high public satisfaction with the Supreme
Court.... In the 1928 Presidential campaign the Supreme Court
never was mentioned even faintly as even the most minor kind of an
issue. The last occasion when dissatisfaction with any aspect of the
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ished, unanimity rates were free to drop during the second half
of the decade.
There are also several reasons why unanimity might have
been more difficult to achieve during these latter years. There
was yet another personnel change in 1925, when Joseph
McKenna resigned and in March was replaced by Harlan
Stone.164 Stone had been the Dean of the Columbia Law
School, but he came to the Court as a Coolidge appointee with
strong ties to Wall Street. 165 He "liked the solid virtues" and in
"his early days on the Court he was drawn to judges in whom
he found them-Justice Butler especially.., and Van Devan-
ter."166 His "first reactions" to Brandeis were "unfavorable."1 67
court expressed itself in politics was in 1924.... The movement came
to nothing.
Mark Sullivan, Public Esteem For Court Called Aid to Hughes, N.Y. HERALD
TRIB., Feb. 6, 1930, at 9.
164. Figure 12 illustrates that while Justice McKenna joined in opinions of
the Court 97.3% of the time, Stone joined only 94.0%.
165. For the attitude of The New Republic toward Stone before his ap-
pointment to the Bench, see Legal Orthodoxy, 11 NEW REPUBLIC 227 (June 23,
1917) (Review of Stone's LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION):
This... book... is devoted to the.., pious aim of "contributing
to the cause of good citizenship" by strengthening the traditional
American faith that God can govern his chosen people only through a
constitution, courts and lawyers.
In recent years shameless scepticism in regard to this faith has
raised its head; and this has brought forth a large number of devo-
tional books which, like the one before us, contain just enough infor-
mation to justify the ways of the Law and the Lawyers to man.
Though perfectly decorous and unexciting, these books thus belong to
revivalistic literature....
The noble purpose of these books does not call for much original
knowledge or novelty; and Dean Stone has in that respect wisely fol-
lowed the pattern set by ex-President Taft .... As the dean of one of
our large law schools, however, he has felt peculiarly called upon to
rebuke the adherents of sociologic jurisprudence who would make ju-
dicial decisions in regard to large public questions depend upon the
fallible and sometimes hasty human sciences of sociology and econom-
ics, instead of recognizing that a training in the law and elevation to
the bench must be sufficient if we are to maintain our system of gov-
ernment.
Id.
166. Alfred McCormack, A Law Clerk's Recollections, 46 COLUM. L. REv.
710, 710 (1946).
167. Id. at 714. There is some indication that the feeling was mutual. On
February 3, 1926, the New Republic, apropos of Connolly v. General Construc-
tion Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926), noted that "Mr. Justice Stone was with the ma-
jority. This is the third time since Mr. Justice Stone's accession to the Bench
that Mr. Justice Holmes and Mr. Justice Brandeis have expressed views dif-
ferent from the majority. Apparently Mr. Justice Stone does not find it conge-
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As Stone himself later recalled, "When I came to the Court
from a Wall Street environment, I had no adequate under-
standing of the man."168
This orientation is reflected in Stone's voting as a Justice,
as is illustrated in Figure 14.
Figure 14: Percentage of All Court Opinions in Which
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During the 1924 Term, Stone joined the Court's opinion
100% of the time,169 and he joined it 98% of the time during the
nial to shiver with Holmes and Brandeis; he prefers the warmth of the solid
majority." 45 NEW REPUBLIC 280 (Feb. 3, 1926). Brandeis wrote to Frank-
furter,
A passage in Feb 5 N.R. which I attribute to you suggests:
"Du bist am Ende was du bist.
Setz dir Perucken auf von millionen Locken,
Setz deiner Feuss auf ellen hohen Socken,
Du bleibst am Ende was du bist."
(You are in the end what you are
Put on wigs of millions of locks
Put on your feet very high socks
You remain in the end what you are)
BRANDEIS-FRANKFURTER LErrERS, supra note 92, at 229.
168. Letter from Harlan Fiske Stone to Irving Dilliard (Oct. 1941) (Stone
Papers).
169. Throughout the 1920s, Stone never expressed the support for civil lib-
erties one would expect from the author of footnote 4 of Carolene Products. He
joined speech-repressive opinions for the Court in Whitney v. California, 274
U.S. 357 (1927), and United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644 (1929), despite
strong dissents by Brandeis and Holmes. See Thomas Reed Powell, The Su-
preme Court and State Police Power, 17 VA. L. REV. 765, 788-89 (1931)
("[Tihus far at least, Mr Justice Stone is like the former Mr. Justice Clarke in
breaking with Justices Holmes and Brandeis on issues of freedom of speech
and association, though otherwise they are usually found in the same camp.").
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1925 Term. 170 By the 1926 Term, however, as Stone increas-
ingly began to associate with Brandeis and Holmes on ques-
tions of substantive due process, he joined the Court only 90%
of the time.171 By the end of the decade, Stone could refuse
Hoover's urgent offer of a cabinet position because, as he com-
mented to his ex-clerk Milton Handler, "You know the battle of
ideas that is going on in the Court and consequently know how
difficult it would be for me to abandon the fight for anything
else."172 Stone's shift undoubtedly contributed to the decline in
unanimity during the last years of the decade.
During World War I, Stone was on the Board of Inquiry that determined
whether draftees could claim conscientious objector status. See Harlan Fiske
Stone, The Conscientious Objector, 21 COLUM. U. Q. 253 (1919). For an unflat-
tering description of his demeanor in office, see ERNEST L. MEYER, "HEY!
YELLowBAcKs!": THE WAR DIARY OF A CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR 89-95
(1930). On Stone's lenient attitude toward legal discriminations against mi-
norities, see Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927); Corrigan v. Buckley, 271
U.S. 323 (1926); Cockrill v. California, 268 U.S. 258 (1925); and compare Ohio
ex rel. Clarke v. Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392, 396-97 (1927) (upholding a Cincin-
nati ordinance prohibiting aliens from obtaining licenses for pool halls), with
Jordan v. Tashiro, 278 U.S. 123, 128-30 (1928) (striking down as inconsistent
with a treaty a California prohibition on Japanese citizens creating a hospital
corporation).
170. So, for example, during the 1925 Term Stone wrote to Taft about the
latter's draft opinion in Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926):
You know I am a team player and I should not have kicked over the
traces if you had not accepted any of my views.... I have only been
longing to be helpful in the way which I believe we should all be, in
carrying on the difficult work of the Court-without... pride of opin-
ion or over insistence on anything.
Letter from Harlan Fiske Stone to William Howard Taft (Dec. 7, 1925) (Taft
Papers, Reel 278).
171. For important decisions marking Stone's transition, see Di Santo v.
Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34 (1927); Tyson & Bro. v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418
(1927); Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Minnesota, 274 U.S. 1 (1927). By 1929 the
Chicago Tribune could write that "in virtually every case of major importance
involving constitutional or economic issues in the last three years, Justices
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Louis Brandeis, and Harlan F. Stone have stood to-
gether in the minority .... ." 3 'Liberals' in Supreme Court Again Dissent to
Rail Ruling, Cm1. TRIB., May 22, 1929, at 4.
172. Letter from Harlan Fiske Stone to Milton Handler (Feb. 17, 1929)
(Stone Papers). From Taft's point of view, however, "Stone has become en-
tirely subservient to Holmes and Brandeis. I am very much disappointed in
him. I urged Coolidge to appoint him but he hungers for the applause of the
law school professors and the admirers of Holmes." Letter from William How-
ard Taft to Horace Taft (June 8, 1928) (Taft Papers, Reel 302). Compare Let-
ter of William Howard Taft to Charles P. Taft (Mar. 1925) (Taft Papers, Reel
272) ("We... are very much delighted with our new member Stone. He is a
real Judge, a real lawyer and a hard worker."). Stone also recalled that Taft's
enthusiasm for me seems to have waned after my opinion in the Bed-
ford Stone case, in which I expressed the view that under the provi-
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The slide in unanimity rates was also encouraged by Taft's
own failing health. In February 1924 Taft suffered severe pal-
pitations of the heart that prevented him from attending Wood-
row Wilson's funeral as an honorary pallbearer. 173 He resolved
"to try to do less work,"174 but nevertheless suffered a recur-
rence four months later 175 and again the following October. 176
sions of the Clayton Act labor unions could not be held to violate the
Sherman Anti-Trust law by merely refusing to work on non-union
material which had been the subject of interstate commerce. After
that he seems to have thought that, like Holmes and Brandeis, I was
"hopeless."
Letter from Harlan Fiske Stone to Thomas Reed Powell (Jan. 30, 1940) (Stone
Papers) (referring to Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters'
Ass'n., 274 U.S. 37 (1927)).
173. Letter from William Howard Taft to Horace Taft (Feb. 6, 1924) (Taft
Papers, Reel 261).
I had an attack of palpitation of the heart this morning... I sent for
the Doctor and he found what I had already found, that my pulse was
running fast and irregularly. He said that what I needed was rest,
and that I could not go to Woodrow Wilson's funeral this afternoon,
where I had intended to go as a pall bearer. I would have given any-
thing to go, not alone to pay a tribute to a deceased President, but
also to avoid the circulation against alarming reports as to my illness.
I explained that to the Doctor and the Doctor seemed to realize the
awkwardness of it, but it did not abate his insistence that I should be
quiet and run no risk. There is only one living ex-President, and I
don't care to reduce that number, so I obey orders.
Id.
174. Letter from William Howard Taft to Horace Taft (Feb. 16, 1924) (Taft
Papers, Reel 261); see Letter from William Howard Taft to James Gregg (Taft
Papers, Reel 261).
The truth is I have had a pretty close call to a breakdown. I hope,
however, to go back to Court on Monday, with a warning that I can
not do all the work there is to do. I was treating myself as I might
have treated myself thirty years ago. There is no fool like an old fool.
There is some hope, however, if he mends his ways.
Id.
175. Memorandum from William Howard Taft to members of his family
(June 8, 1924) (Taft Papers, Reel 265) ("The trouble with me is febrilation of
the auricle.").
176. Letter from William Howard Taft to Horace Taft (Oct. 10, 1924) (Taft
Papers, Reel 268).
The first day of the Court was a pretty exciting one, and I ate some
roast pork, something I rarely do, although I love the meat. I had a
heavy cold, waked up in a sweat about one o-clock, and found my
heart going as it did last January .... Visions of a recurrence of the
trouble and of my having to stay home from Court came over me, and
I was a good deal alarmed. Indeed it seemed to me as if I might have
to give up the office and spend my time trying to live.
Id. "If I am not going to be able to do my work (I was not able to go to Confer-
ence yesterday), I have got to resign." Letter from William Howard Taft to
Mrs. Frederick J. Manning (Oct. 12, 1924) (Taft Papers, Reel 268).
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Taft took the.point. "I do not strain myself to do as much work
as I did for the first three years. I have had a warning and I
am trying to respect it."11 7 In June 1926 Taft suffered yet an-
other and far more disabling heart attack,178 the effects of
which lasted throughout the summer.179 He began the 1926
Term hesitantly, 180 and he never again was able to assume
command of the Court with the same vigorous assurance as
previously. He increasingly complained that his "mental facili-
177. Letter from William Howard Taft to Henry E. Coe (Jan. 7,1925) (Taft
Papers, Reel 270).
178. Taft suffered the attack after serving as a judge of a national oratory
contest on "The Constitution." The contest was an effort to encourage "Ameri-
canization."
I had to go out last night to be one of the judges in the National Ora-
torical constitutional discussion, where seven contestants, represent-
ing two million applicants, were to be judged. The management was
not properly attentive to my needs, and in order to get to the place I
had to walk clear up to the top of the theater and then down. After I
got to bed, and had been in bed about twenty minutes, this thing
came on and it is still on.
Letter from William Howard Taft to Horace Taft (June 5, 1926) (Taft Papers,
Reel 283). Other judges at the contest included Justices Van Devanter, Suth-
erland, Sanford, and Butler. Los Angles Boy First in Contest of School Ora-
tors, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 1926, at 1. The winning oration, which the New York
Times reproduced in full, featured passages like the following:
Only an American, one who knows our history, can feel the sacred
symbolism of that Constitution; only one whose soul is steeped in the
spirit of the far-off days when the old meeting-house in Philadelphia
felt the throb of the great hearts of the constitutional fathers can un-
derstand.
What solemn obligation is ours, to teach those who come among
us from foreign shores, and who often, all too often, come to scoff be-
cause they do not understand. And here is our duty, here is our obli-
gation, too, for those who do not know must be enlightened; and those
who do not care must be taught to love our institutions, and the Con-
stitution by which they live.
And for those who come with hatred in their hearts, ladies and
gentlemen, no words of mine could fully express the indignation that
should rouse every true American heart to stand on guard as they did
on Concord Bridge, who gave to us our flag, our country, our Consti-
tution.
Id.
179. "I have had, as you know, trouble with my heart for now more than
two years. It is recurrent.... I haven't succeeded as yet this summer in get-
ting back to normal regularity.... I don't like it, and I think it may interfere
more or less with my work." Letter from William Howard Taft to Mrs. Charles
D. Norton (Aug. 10, 1926) (Taft Papers, Reel 284).
180. "I am as careful as I can be. I am trying to see if I cannot hold myself
in such way as to continue work. My fibrillation continues but it is not exces-
sive and I am hopeful that by care, I may avoid its being so." Letter from Wil-
liam Howard Taft to Henry D. Taft (Sept. 30, 1926) (Taft Papers, Reel 285).
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ties" were "dulling a bit and that it takes more work for me to
get hold of questions and to dispose of them."181 "The truth is,"
he wrote a friend, "that my mind does not work as well as it
did, and I scatter."182
It seems likely that the Court's declining unanimity rates
at the end of the 1920s in part reflects Taft's failing ability en-
ergetically and proactively to intervene into the Court's delib-
erations so as to achieve consensus, as he had done during his
first Terms in cases like United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal
Co. 183 By the end of his Chief Justiceship, Taft was merely
181. Letter from William Howard Taft to Mrs. Frederick J. Manning (Oct.
23, 1927) (Taft Papers, Reel 296). Taft continued, "However, I have to stay on
the Bench until 1931 in order to earn my pension, and that I must struggle to
do, unless I am so weakened that I can not do the work." Id. Taft wrote to his
son Robert,
I sometimes feel that I do not have time enough in making ready for
Conferences to examine with the closeness they deserve the argued
and submitted cases, but they are examined by the Court with care.
They have more time than I have, and sometimes they humiliate me
with their pointing out matters that I haven't given time enough to
the cases to discover. The familiarity with the practice and the thor-
oughness of examination in certain cases that Van Devanter is able to
give makes him a most valuable member of the Court, and makes me
feel quite small, and as if it would be better to have the matter run by
him alone, for he is wonderfully familiar with our practice and our
authorities. Still I must worry along until I get to the end of my ten
years, content to aid in the deliberations when there is a difference of
opinion.
Letter from William Howard Taft to Robert Taft (Oct. 23, 1927) (Taft Papers,
Reel 296).
182. Letter from William Howard Taft to J.M. Dickinson (Dec. 12, 1928)
(Taft Papers, Reel 306). "The work of the Court not so much in writing opin-
ions as in getting ready for Conferences grows heavier and heavier. I feel tired
over it and suffer from a lack of quickness of comprehension, which has not
heretofore troubled me much." Id. Writing in February 1929, Van Devanter
observed that "[t]he Chief Justice's health is such that he will retire when he
can, which will be in 1931." Letter from Willis Van Devanter to Mrs. John W.
Lacey (Feb. 12, 1929) (Van Devanter Papers). In that same letter, Van Devan-
ter reports that
Mr. Justice McReynolds will certainly retire when he can, which will
be in 1932. He would retire now if he could. Mr. Justice Sutherland
is not in good health and will certainly retire when he can which will
be in 1932. I will be 70 in April and unless there is a great change for
the better in Dollie's [his wife's] condition I shall retire during the
year. I am making no public announcement but my mind is becoming
pretty well fixed on retirement.
Id. The history of the New Deal would no doubt have been considerably dif-
ferent were Van Devanter's predictions to have proved accurate. One must
wonder exactly why Van Devanter, McReynolds, and Sutherland chose to re-
main on the Court.
183. 259 U.S. 344 (1922); see also supra note 143.
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hanging on. "I am older and slower and less acute and more
confused. However, as long as things continue as they are, and
I am able to answer in my place, I must stay on the Court in
order to prevent the Bolsheviki from getting control."
184
In this vacuum of leadership, the Court slid toward fac-
tionalism.185 A month before his disabling stroke, Taft wrote
184. Letter from William Howard Taft to Horace Taft (Nov. 14, 1929) (Taft
Papers, Reel 315).
185. See supra note 172 and accompanying text. A good example of this
factionalism may be found in the correspondence surrounding Stone's opinion
in United Fuel Gas Co. v. Railroad Commission, 278 U.S. 300 (1929), an "im-
portant" case "dealing with the problem of valuation of a natural resource."
Letter from Harlan Fiske Stone to Milton Handler (Jan. 22, 1929) (Stone Pa-
pers). After Stone circulated his opinion, he received the following letter from
Van Devanter:
I looked over your opinion in No I and found myself quite reluctant to
accept it as written. Accordingly I made various changes which to me
seemed desirable. Since then I have shown them to the Chief Justice
and Justices Sutherland, Butler and Sanford. These being all that it
was convenient to see. They authorize me to say they approve the
changes and join me in asking their adoption.
Letter from Willis Van Devanter to Harlan Fiske Stone (n.d.) (Stone Papers).
For Taft's reaction, see note 96 supra.
A glimpse of how this factionalism infected the everyday operations of the
Court can be seen in George Sutherland's preparations for a European vaca-
tion. Sutherland had been quite sick with "chronic colitis" during the Fall of
1927, missing nearly three months of the Term. See Letter of Dr. Thomas R.
Brown to William Howard Taft (Dec. 22, 1927) (Taft Papers, Reel 297); Letter
of William Howard Taft to Charles P. Taft Jr. (Apr. 1, 1928) (Taft Papers, Reel
300). Sutherland planned to leave for Italy "for his health" on May 19th, be-
fore the end of the 1927 Term. See Letter of George Sutherland to Dr. Thomas
R. Brown (Mar. 16, 1928) (Sutherland Papers); Letter of William Howard Taft
to Robert A. Taft (Apr. 15, 1928) (Taft Papers, Reel 301); Letter of William
Howard Taft to George Sutherland (May 17, 1928) (Sutherland Papers) ("I was
humiliated not to have called to say good bye to you and Mrs. Sutherland but a
chapter of accidents interfered with a well laid plan .... I am hoping that this
will reach you before you leave these shores for a real cure. I have been de-
lighted with how strong you are now and how much work you have done of the
hard kind of opinion writing that consumes thinking energy. I am looking
forward with satisfaction to greeting you both in the full bloom of youthful
health. And what pleasure you will have in the consciousness that you are not
a slave to a lot of opinions the thought of which would continue to cloud your
slimmer.... [Kinow too you carry with you the loving thoughts and hopes of
all your colleagues. They are real and sincere and awaken fervor."); Letter
from George Sutherland to William Howard Taft (May 18, 1928) (Taft Papers,
Reel 302) ("That was a very sweet going away letter .... I shall think of you
always as my good Chief for whom my admiration and affection run a close
race."). In preparation for his journey, Sutherland sent a memorandum to
Taft on May 15, 1928, instructing the Chief Justice on Sutherland's votes in
pending cases. Sutherland Papers. Concerning Quaker City Cab Co. v. Penn-
sylvania, 277 U.S. 389 (1928), for example, Sutherland announced, "[If Van
Devanter writes the opinion I shall unhesitatingly agree to it. If written by
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his brother that "[olf course we have a dissenting minority of
three in the Court. I think we can hold our six to steady the
Court. Brandeis is of course hopeless, as Holmes is, and as
Stone is." 186 The intensity of the struggle is well captured in a
anybody else, I will agree to what you and he accept." Id. Concerning Na-
tional Life Insurance Co. v. United States, 277 U.S. 508 (1928), Sutherland
wrote, "An opinion satisfactory to you will be satisfactory to me." Id. The po-
litical alignments in the memorandum bear out Tafts prescience when, specu-
lating to Van Devanter in August 1922 on Sutherland's "doubtless" nomina-
tion to the Court, he had correctly conjectured that Sutherland "will be one of
our kind I think." Letter from William Howard Taft to Willis Van Devanter
(Aug. 19, 1922) (Taft Papers, Reel 244). By contrast, in National Life Insur-
ance Co. v. United States, 277 U.S. 508 (1928), a dissenting Harlan Stone had
written to Oliver Wendell Holmes on June 7, 1928, that "I think it is good for
the dissenters to stand together when they can." Stone Papers.
186. Letter from William Howard Taft to Horace Taft (Dec. 1, 1929) (Taft
Papers, Reel 316). Aware of his own ill health, and aware also of Stone's am-
bitions to succeed him, Taft continued,
Should Stone ever have the administration of the Chief Justiceship,
he would find himself embarrassed in respect to a good many princi-
ples that we have declared as the result of a great many years of care-
ful consideration. However, the only hope we have of keeping a con-
sistent declaration of constitutional law is for us to live as long as we
can, because should Hoover's administration continue, I do not doubt
there will be an attempted revolution.... I don't think that Hoover
knows as much as he thinks he does, and that it is just as well for him
to remember the warning in the Scripture about removing landmarks.
The truth is that Hoover is a Progressive, just as Stone is, and just as
Brandeis is, and just as Holmes is, but should the change take place,
they will find themselves in a situation full of difficulties in determin-
ing how far they are going, especially when they have made the
change and don't realize how far it will carry them.
Id.
Taft's brother wrote back remarking on Taft's "pessimism," and advising
that "[y]ou and I have got to get used to the fact that we belong to the former
generation and that things are sliding along." Letter from Horace Taft to Wil-
liam Howard Taft (Dec. 2, 1929) (Taft Papers, Reel 316). Taft answered,
You speak of my pessimism. I suppose it must have had reference
to the situation in the Court. My feeling with respect to the Court is
that if a number of us die, Hoover would put in some rather extreme
destroyers of the Constitution, but perhaps we are unduly exercised,
because of the conservative members of the Court we have six, and
two of the remainder are Brandeis and Holmes. Brandeis is 73 and
Holmes is 89. He enters his ninetieth year next month. I have no
doubt there is persistent hope, especially by the younger crowd of col-
lege professors, that in some way or other Holmes will be continued
on the Court while the rest of us die off.... I think the Court on the
whole stands very well. Of course there are quite a number of ex-
tremists and we are likely to hear a good deal more from them than
from the other side, and it is the dissenters who make the loudest
noise. I think that Hoover is a new man and thinks that everything
ought to be new. He will learn a good deal before he gets through. I
think he is trying to do the best he can, and we can probably solve
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memorandum written by Stone to McReynolds just after Tafts
resignation. It is worth quoting at length:
I have your note of yesterday's date. I, of course, do not regard it
as presumptuous. On the contrary, I thank you for it, for I hold very
strongly that willingness to speak our views and to listen to those of
others should guide the actions of all the members of our Court....
I am sure you will give me credit for being sincere in the views
which I express. IfI did not hold them strongly and believe that very
many thoughtful men, trained in the law, would agree with them, I
should not take the trouble to write any dissent....
I think you will not misunderstand me when I add that I am pro-
foundly convinced that... some very serious mistakes have been
made by the Court, which would not have been made had it not been
for the disposition of the majority to rush to conclusions without tak-
ing the trouble to listen to the views of the minority. If the majority
overrules the settled decisions of the Court, if it insists on including
in opinions, over the protests of the minority, what is not necessary to
the decision-see Justice Sutherland's opinion in... Patton v. United
States,' 7 as the latest example-if it insists on putting out opinions
which do not consider or deal with questions raised by the minority, it
must, I think, be expected that the minority will give some expression
to their views. Otherwise, their function is reduced to registering a
vote which is not even published.
What I have written in Nos 281 and 282188 is, I think you will
agree, at least worthy of consideration, but I was not even given an
opportunity to state my position at the Conference. If the Court is
willing to put out its opinion without meeting that argument or refer-
ring to its own decisions.., any consequences for such ill considered
action should not, I think, be attributed to me or what I have written.
Very much the same thing might, I think, be said of No. 222.89 The
opinion of the Court is made to rest on propositions that are demon-
strably not sound and lead to consequences which, it seems to me, we
all ought to be eager to avoid. But if we are not to reach that result,
at least the opinion should deal in some plausible manner with the is-
sues raised in my dissent-at least if I am expected to remain si-
lent.19o
These are very strong words, and yet, as Figure 10 illus-
trates, 74% of the Court's opinions in the 1929 Term were
everything if we can only live, because delay makes for conservatism.
Letter from William Howard Taft to Horace Taft (Dec. 8, 1929) (Taft Papers,
Reel 316).
187. 281 U.S. 276 (1930).
188. United States v. Adams, 281 U.S. 202 (1930).
189. Missouri ex rel. Mo. Ins. Co. v. Gehner, 281 U.S. 313 (1930).
190. Memorandum from Harlan Fiske Stone to James McReynolds (Apr. 3,
1930) (Stone Papers). Unfortunately I have been unable to locate the
McReynolds memorandum to which Stone is responding.
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unanimous. 191 Although division and tension within the Court
was high, it nevertheless decided cases with a degree of una-
nimity that would be quite unimaginable today. 192 It is clear,
therefore, that fluctuations in the dissent rate during the
1920s, although responsive to many factors, including changes
in external circumstances, Court personnel, and Taft's own
leadership, nevertheless occurred within boundaries that mark
the Taft Court as genuinely different from the contemporary
Court. The question is why this might be so.
One possibility is that the Court's docket during the 1920s
was simply less divisive than today. Although this explanation
threatens to collapse into tautology, since the question of what
counts as divisiveness is what we are seeking to illuminate,
there is nevertheless some plausibility in contrasting the con-
temporary Court, which publishes a relatively small number of
opinions in highly-selected, controversial, and significant cases,
with the Taft Court, which published many more opinions in
routine and "trifling" cases. This hypothesis is sometimes
phrased in terms of the Judiciary Act of 1925, which shifted the
Court's docket away from trivial cases forced on the Court by
its mandatory jurisdiction 193 and toward the more important
but controversial cases that could be chosen through certio-
rari.194
191. If one looks at the cases cited by Stone in his memorandum, for exam-
ple, Nos. 281 and 282 were decided on April 14, 1930 as United States v. Ad-
ams, 281 U.S. 202 (1930), in a unanimous opinion by Oliver Wendell Holmes.
Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930), also decided on April 14, 1930,
features Holmes, Brandeis, and Stone concurring in the result, but not writing
a separate opinion. Only in No. 222, Missouri ex rel. Missouri Insurance Co. v.
Gehner, 281 U.S. 313 (1930), also decided on April 14, 1930, did Stone, joined
by Holmes and Brandeis, dissent.
192. Indeed, Figure 20 suggests that the Court responded to increased fac-
tionalism by redoubling its efforts to achieve unanimity. For an explanation of
Figure 20, see infra note 205.
193. See, e.g., Sun Ship Bldg. Co. v. United States, 271 U.S. 96, 99 (1926)
("Valuable time was taken in hearing these cases. After arguments on behalf
of the claimants, we declined to hear the other side because the correctness of
the judgments of the Court of Claims was clear. It is fortunate for all that un-
der the Act of February 13, 1925, judgments of the Court of Claims entered
after May 13, 1925, can only be reviewed here after a showing of merits.").
Figure 22 graphically illustrates the effect on unanimity rates of the disap-
pearance of these cases. After the 1925 Act, cases reaching the Court through
its mandatory appellate jurisdiction tended to consist primarily of those posing
difficult constitutional issues. See supra note 23. Unanimity rates in opinions
for these cases plunged from 92.4% in the 1921 Term to 64.7% in the 1928
Term.
194. See, e.g., Stephen C. Halpern & Kenneth N. Vines, Institutional Dis-
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Figures 15 and 16 illustrate how the Court obtained juris-
diction in the cases that it decided by full opinion in the 1921
and 1928 Terms.
Figure 15: Jurisdiction of Cases in Which the Court




H Mandatory Jurisdiction i Discretionary Jurisdiction m3Other
unity, the Judges'Bill and the Role of the U.S. Supreme Court, 30 W. POL. Q.
471, 480-81 (1977) ("Eliminating the right of appeal in many minor and uncon-
troversial cases freed the court to concentrate in obligatory appeals on only
those cases raising salient national issues. Granting the justices much wider
discretion to choose from among the cases appealed to them, the number and
nature of those they wished to decide, provided greater opportunity to choose
difficult and disputatious cases. Greater dissent was made more likely not
only by the specific reforms of the Act but by the expectation as to how the jus-
tices would utilize their new powers. The Act's supporters advanced a concep-
tion of the Court as an institution which should reserve its judgments only for
the most important national policy questions."). In 1949 Chief Justice Vinson
made this point by way of explaining the decreasing rates of unanimity in Su-
preme Court opinions:
IT]he very nature of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction is such that
the easy cases, the clear and indisputable cases, very seldom come be-
fore the Court. Our discretionary certiorari jurisdiction encompasses,
for the most part, only the borderline cases-those in which there is
conflict among lower courts or widespread uncertainty regarding
problems of national importance.... Considering, therefore, the im-
portance and difficulty of the cases which the Court must decide, it is
not strange that there is some of the same disagreement on the Court
as exists among others of the bench and bar concerning the questions
decided.
Vinson, supra note 40, at 1273; see also Ben W. Palmer, Supreme Court of the
United States: Analysis of Alleged and Real Causes of Dissents, 34 A.B.A. J.
677, 679 (1948) ("Under the certiorari system the Court now picks out for ad-
judication cases involving the most difficult questions of constitutional law
and statutory construction; cases of the utmost public or political importance;
cases that bring to focus the interests of pressure groups-the claims and con-
tentions of vast social, economic, political, religious and ideological forces that
engage the deepest passions and the most aggressive loyalties of minority mil-
lions of men and women.").
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Figure 16: Jurisdiction of Cases in which Court Issued
Full Opinions, 1928 Term
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The effect of the 1925 Act is readily apparent. In the 1921
Term, 19% of the Court's opinions were issued in cases that
came to the Court through the discretionary writ of certiorari.
By the 1928 Term this proportion had almost tripled, so that
55% of the Court's opinions were issued in such cases.195 Yet if
unanimity rates are disaggregated by jurisdiction, the results
do not show any apparent connection between the Court's ju-
risdiction and unanimous opinions.
In fact Figure 17 illustrates that during the 1921-1928
Terms, 83% of the opinions written in cases reaching the Court
through its mandatory jurisdiction were decided unanimously,
whereas 87% of the opinions written in cases that reached the
Court through the discretionary writ of certiorari were unani-
mous.
195. By contrast, 92% of all full opinions issued by the Court in the 1993-
1998 Terms were issued in cases that came to the Court by way of the discre-
tionary writ of certiorari. For purposes of this discussion, I have defined the
Court's "mandatory" jurisdiction as appellate cases that have reached the
Court by way of appeal, writ of error, or certification. The Court's "discretion-
ary" jurisdiction, by contrast, is defined as cases that have reached the Court
by way of the writ of certiorari. All remaining cases, whether appellate or
original, are included within the category of "other." On the contemporary
erosion of the distinction between mandatory and discretionary jurisdiction,
an erosion that began at the end of the 1927 Term, see Hartnett, supra note
24, at 1708-12.
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This does not suggest that the Court's ability to achieve
unanimity was substantially undermined by its capacity to se-
lect for more "controversial" cases through the exercise of cer-
tiorari jurisdiction. We should also note that although the
Court's docket had shifted decisively toward certiorari by the
end of the 1920s, Figure 10 demonstrates that the Court's rates
of unanimity did not begin their free-fall until the mid-1930s.
Thus "changes in the Court's ratio of obligatory to discretionary
cases do not coincide with the Justices' patterns of increasing
dissent activity."196 Evidently the centrifugal thrust of discre-
tionary jurisdiction was during the Taft Court contained by a
more powerful centripetal force toward unanimity.
To explore the nature of this force, it is useful to compare
the Justices' private views of a case with their willingness pub-
licly to express dissent. We are fortunate to have preserved
Justice Butler's docket books for the 1922-1924 Terms, and
Justice Stone's docket books for the 1924-1929 Terms.197 If we
196. Walker et al., supra note 135, at 365. "The discretionary share of the
Court's docket rose dramatically immediately following the [1925] Act and re-
mained relatively stable thereafter .... However .... significant escalation in
both the dissent and concurrence rates did not occur until almost fifteen years
later." Id.
197. The docket books are located in the office of the Archivist of the Su-
preme Court. For a discussion of the reliability of docket books, see Forrest
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consider only the 1922-1928 Terms, the docket books allow us
to tally the votes in some 1200 of the 1381 published full opin-
ions issued by the Court during these Terms. 198 These 1200
opinions, which for ease of reference I shall call the "conference
cases," seem representative. As published, for example, 86% of
the conference cases were unanimous, as were 86% of the total
set of 1381 opinions.
Docket books present nontrivial questions of interpreta-
tion. They were meant to be personal and private documents;
most were burned at the end of the Term.199 They contain a
good deal of idiosyncratic notation. But if we examine the con-
ference cases that were ultimately decided by unanimous opin-
ions, we can divide them into three categories:
* Cases which were unanimous in conference. 2°°
* Cases in which one or more Justices have voted in
conference against the ultimate resolution of the
case. In such cases Justices have switched their
votes for the Court to achieve unanimity in its pub-
lished opinion.
* Cases in which one or more Justices have expressed
uncertainty in conference, either by "passing" or
"acquiescing" or otherwise refusing to vote because
of indecision. In such cases, Justices have resolved
their uncertainty in favor of the Court's judgment
for the Court to achieve unanimity in its published
opinion.
Of the 1028 conference cases that were ultimately decided
unanimously by a published opinion of the Court, 58% were
also unanimous in conference, 30% required a switch in vote in
order to obtain ultimate unanimity, and a further 12% required
Maltzman & Paul J. Wahlbeck, Inside the U.S. Supreme Court: The Reliability
of the Justices' Conference Records, 58 J. POL. 528 (1996).
198. Justice Butler joined the Court in January 1923, and so his docket
book for the 1922 Term does not contain any cases before that time. There are
also a number of cases that simply do not have docket book entries. This could
be for any number of reasons, ranging from the fact that either Butler or Stone
had recused himself in the case or had failed to attend conference or had omit-
ted to record the votes of the conference.
199. "When I was a law clerk... I had access to the docket book of Justice
Brandeis. It was burned with the others at the end of the term, and I hope
that custom still obtains." Remarks of Paul A. Freund, A Colloquy, Proceed-
ings of the Forty-Ninth Judicial Conference of the District of Columbia Circuit
(May 24, 1988), reprinted in 124 F.R.D. 241, 347 (1988).
200. I include within this category cases in which the votes of one or more
Justices are not recorded.
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Justices to overcome uncertainty in order to achieve unanimity.
Within the complete set of 1200 conference cases the unanimity
rate, as measured by a unanimous vote at conference, was only
50%.201 The unanimity rate for the published opinions of the
conference cases was by contrast 86%. This establishes that it
was common practice during the Taft Court for Justices to
change their votes between conference and the publication of
an opinion.202 In the complete set of 1200 published conference
opinions, a Justice changed his vote to join the Court opinion
680 times.20 3 Like Taft, they were willing to "make the sign of
the scissors" in private, but reluctant to do so "to the public."' °4
201. The unanimity rate was 60% if one counts as unanimous those cases
in which Justices explicitly express uncertainty in conference. These results
are represented in Figure 18. The raw data are these: The set of conference
cases consists of 1,200 decisions. Of these 1,028 were ultimately decided
unanimously. Of these, 601 were also unanimous in conference; 304 had dis-
senting votes in conference; and 123 had no dissenting votes but did have Jus-
tices who registered uncertainty in conference. If one considers the entire set
of 1,200 cases, 670 (56%) had the same vote in conference as the ultimately
published opinion; in 358 (30%), one or more Justices switched his conference
vote to join the court opinion; and in 129 (11%), there were no dissenting votes
in conference, but one or more Justices ultimately resolved an uncertainty ex-
pressed in conference in order to join the Court opinion. In 18 cases (2%), one
or more Justices who voted with the Court in conference refused to join the
published Court opinion; in 11 cases (1%), one or more Justices switched their
conference vote away from the Courts opinion; in 6 cases, one or more Justices
expressed uncertainty in conference, but resolved their uncertainty by dissent-
ing from the Court's opinion; in 5 cases, one or more Justices voted against the
Court's judgment in conference, but ultimately switched their vote to support
the Court's judgment while refusing to join the Court's opinion; and in 3 cases
there were switches of votes in both directions, both for and against the
Court's ultimate opinion.
202. This conclusion is confirmed by a forthcoming article in the American
Journal of Political Science that analyzes conference voting during the period
of Chief Justice Morrison R. Waite. Using Waite's docket books, the article
analyzed 2,863 cases and found that while only 9% of these decisions had one
or more dissenting votes when published, 40% did within the conference. See
Lee Epstein, Jeffrey A. Siegal & Harold J. Spaeth, The Norm of Consensus on
the U.S. Supreme Court, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 362 (2001).
203. Taft changed his vote to join the Court opinion 48 times; McKenna, 38
times; Holmes, 80 times; Van Devanter, 45 times; McReynolds, 99 times;
Brandeis, 95 times; Sutherland, 87 times; Butler, 60 times; Sanford, 93 times;
and Stone, 35 times. Figure H represents these numbers as a percentage of
the total number of cases in which each Justice participated. Figure H shows
that McKenna was the Justice most likely to switch his conference vote, doing
so in 10.3% of all cases in which he participated. Justice McReynolds was the
next most likely, switching his vote in 9.3% of all cases in which he partici-
pated. Justices Van Devanter and Taft, by contrast, switched their conference
vote in only 3.9% and 4.7% of the cases in which they participated. This is a
bit misleading, however, because Taft and Van Devanter so rarely differed
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The differences between unanimity in published opinions
and unanimity in conference voting are summarized in Figure
18.205
from the Court in conference. Figure I therefore calculates the percentage of
all a Justice's dissenting votes in conference that are switched to join a Court
opinion. It indicates that Taft and Van Devanter were actually quite willing
to change their votes in order to display judicial solidarity, switching (respec-
tively) 80.0% and 83.3% of their dissenting votes in order to join the opinion of
the Court. By this measure, Justices Stone (50%) and Brandeis (57.2%) were
the least pliable of the all the Justices, with McReynolds (59.3%) and Holmes
(60.6%) close behind them.
Figure J represents the converse of Figure H. It shows the ability of a
Justice to attract votes. For each Justice, Figure J divides the total number of
votes that changed to join a Justice's opinion by the total number of the Jus-
tice's opinions. Figure J allows us to see why McKenna was such a weak Jus-
tice. Not only did he change his vote to join the opinions of other Justices in
10.3% of his cases, but other Justices only infrequently changed their votes to
join his opinions. McKenna attracted votes at the rate of only 28 for every 100
opinions. McKenna's performance can be contrasted with that of Van Devan-
ter, who attracted votes at the rate of 74 for every 100 opinions. Figure J gives
us some measure of the authority wielded by Van Devanter within the Court.
It also demonstrates why Butler was such a powerful Justice-in Brandeis's
assessment "one of the most powerful on [the] Bench"-as were Sutherland
and Holmes. Brandeis-Frankfurter Conversations, supra note 74, at 336. San-
ford, on the other hand, was quite weak. (Brandeis said of him that "Sanford
ought never to have been above D.J.-a dull bourgeois mind-terribly tire-
some." Id.)
Figure K, which displays the percentage of a Justice's unanimous opinions
that were without dissenting or uncertain votes in conference, shows the rela-
tive success of different Justices in achieving unanimity. Thus 76% of
McKenna's unanimous opinions were already unanimous in conference,
whereas only 47% of Butler's unanimous opinions were unanimous in confer-
ence. Figure K confirms the internal authority carried by Justices Butler,
Holmes, Sutherland, and Van Devanter. Figure L illustrates how these differ-
ences affected Taft's assignment of opinions. Figure L calculates the number
of a Justice's cases that had a unanimous vote in conference (without dissent-
ing or uncertain votes) as a percentage of the Justice's total number of opin-
ions (in the set of conference cases). Not surprisingly, 69% of the cases
McKenna wrote were already unanimous in conference, whereas only 38% of
the cases written by Butler were unanimous in conference.
204. See supra note 139.
205. Figure 19 compares for each Term between 1922 and 1928 the per-
centage of conference cases that were decided by a unanimous published opin-
ion, the percentage of conference cases that were unanimous in conference
(without dissenting or uncertain votes), and the percentage of conference cases
ultimately decided unanimously that had uncertain but no dissenting votes in
conference. The percentage of published opinions that are unanimous can be
expressed as a multiple of the percentage of cases that are decided unani-
mously within conference. The greater the multiple, the more the Court has
succeeded in transforming private disagreement in conference into public
unanimity. Figure 20 displays these multiples for each Term between 1922
and 1928. It shows that the Court made especially concerted efforts to main-
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Figure 20: Unanimity Rate of Published Conference
Opinions as a Multiple of Conference Unanimity Rate
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Two aspects of Figure 18 are especially striking. The first
is that the rate of unanimity in conference during the Taft
Court (50%) was almost double that achieved now by the Court
in its published opinions (27%).206 This suggests that the
Court's spontaneous view of the substantive issues raised by its
docket was in fact more cohesive in the 1920s than at present.
If the Court's voting at conference is disaggregated by jurisdic-
tion, however, it is clear that this cohesiveness was strained by
the Judiciary Act of 1925. The data are summarized in Figure
21, which indicates that although there is virtually no differ-
ence in the rate of unanimity for the published opinions of the
conference set when cases reaching the Court through its man-
datory and discretionary jurisdictions are compared-84% and
87%, respectively 207-at conference the unanimity rate for the
former was 55%, while it was only 41% for the latter.20 8
206. See supra Figure 5.
207. This difference is not statistically significant at the .05 level.
208. This difference is statistically significant at the .01 level. These fig-
ures define a unanimous conference vote as one without dissenting or uncer-
tain votes. If a unanimous conference vote is defined as one merely without
dissenting votes, cases reaching the Court through its mandatory jurisdiction
were 64% unanimous in conference; cases reaching the Court through the dis-
cretionary writ of certiorari were 53% unanimous in conference. Figure 22
shows the percentage of conference cases both decided unanimously at confer-
ence (without dissenting and uncertain votes), and decided by a unanimous
published opinion, term by term and disaggregated by jurisdiction. It shows
that the cases reaching the Court through its discretionary certiorari jurisdic-
tion were less unanimous at conference than were cases that reached the
Court through its mandatory jurisdiction, although the margin between the
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two began to lessen aflter the Judiciary Act of 1925 took effect, and by the 1928
Term cases reaching the Court through its certiorari jurisdiction were actually
more unanimous in conference than were cases that had reached the Court by
way of its mandatory jurisdiction. This was probably because the "trifling"
controversies that could previously have been brought to the Court through
writ of error and appeal were eliminated from the Court's docket. See supra
note 193. The increasing dissensus associated with the Court's mandatory
docket after the 1925 Act is striking; no such trend is discernable in the cases
that came to the Court through certiorari. Figure 23, which displays the same
multiples as those illustrated in Figure 20, see supra note 205, but disaggre-
gated by jurisdiction, shows that the Court made significantly greater efforts
to achieve unanimity in opinions published in cases reaching the Court
through certiorari than in cases reaching the Court through its mandatory ju-
risdiction. The difference is in fact quite striking. In opinions written in cases
that had reached the Court through its mandatory jurisdiction, the percentage
of published opinions that were unanimous ranged from 1.4 to 1.8 times the
percentage of cases that were unanimous in conference. Multiples for cases
that reached the Court through the discretionary writ of certiorari, by con-
trast, were higher in every single Term, ranging from 1.8 to 2.7. It is almost
as if the decision to use the writ of certiorari to hear and decide a case carried
within it an implicit commitment especially to strive to decide it unanimously.
This may reflect the fact that in such cases the Court felt particularly obli-
gated to provide clear and unambiguous guidance to the legal public.
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This difference suggests that spontaneous unanimity was
indeed harder to achieve in the more controversial cases se-
lected through certiorari than in the more routine, "trifling"
cases that the Court had been obliged to hear prior to 1925 be-
cause of its mandatory jurisdiction. 209 But the fact that at con-
ference the Court was able reach unanimity on 41% of even
209. But see supra Figure 22 and note 193.
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these controversial cases suggests that the Court's ideological
cohesion was greater in the 1920s than today.210 There are no
doubt many factors that could contribute to this. We might
consider, for example, the massive increase of the reach and
significance of federal law, which both augments the occasions
for dissensus and magnifies the stakes in particular cases.211
Or we might ponder the assault on the cohesiveness of legal
reasoning created by "American Legal Realism" that David M.
O'Brien has suggested "made consensus more difficult."2 12
Analysis of these various causes lies outside the boundaries of
this Lecture; for our purposes it is sufficient to note that, at
least when measured by conference voting in the more difficult
cases arising from discretionary certiorari jurisdiction, mem-
bers of the Taft Court seem to have had spontaneous reservoirs
of ideological coherence apparently unavailable to their modem
counterparts. 21 3
210. We cannot know the full extent of the difference, because we do not
know the conference voting records of the contemporary Court. It might be
that the Cours current 27% unanimity rate, which is largely obtained in
cases coming to the Court through certiorari, overstates the spontaneous cohe-
sion of the contemporary Court.
211. At an early stage of my research, I had attempted to classify the
Court's opinions by their subject matter. Although I ultimately classified all
the opinions decided during the Court's 1923 Term, I discontinued the effort
because I found the process of classification to be too arbitrary to provide reli-
able data. Nevertheless, for what it is worth, of the 47 opinions in the 1923
Term that I classified as dealing with "constitutional law" (which included is-
sues of Due Process, Equal Protection, interstate commerce, both dormant and
plenary, and the Contracts Clause), 74% were decided unanimously. This is
less than the 86% unanimity rate for all opinions decided that Term. The
unanimity rate at conference for the 45 such opinions of which we have con-
ference records was 47%, which equals the rate of unanimity at conference for
all cases during the 1923 Term. See Figure 19. Forty-three of these 45 opin-
ions had come to the Court through its mandatoryjurisdiction. Of these, 49%
were decided unanimously at conference, compared to a 54% conference una-
nimity rate for all cases in the 1923 Term coming to the Court through its
mandatory jurisdiction. See Figure 22. If instead of subject matter we view
the certification process as a proxy for difficult cases, since lower federal
courts would likely certify only especially significant or especially divisive
questions of law, we can say that during the 1921-1928 Terms, the Court pub-
lished 56 full opinions in cases coming to the Court by way of certification from
lower federal courts. Of these, 80% were unanimous. Of the 43 of these opin-
ions for which we conference records, 51% were unanimous in conference. For
discussions of certification, see REYNOLDS ROBERTSON & FRANcIs R.
KIRKHAM, JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
§§ 112-19 (1936); Hartnett, supra note 24, at 1710-12.
212. O'Brien, supra note 132, at 101.
213. I should note, however, that, as Figure 22 illustrates, the unanimity
rate in conference for opinions in cases that reached the Court through its
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The second striking aspect of Figure 18 is the huge dis-
crepancy between the level of unanimity in conference and the
level of unanimity in published opinions. This difference
clearly reflects an institutional aversion to dissent.214 Justice
Van Devanter put the matter well: "Unanimity of opinion is
very desirable and is always sought, but never at the sacrifice
of strong conviction."215 This norm of agreement is expressed in
case after case in the extant record of circulated opinions. Jus-
tice Butler,216 for example, responded to a Stone opinion with a
short disquisition on the subject:
I voted to reverse. While this sustains your conclusion to affirm, I
still think a reversal would be better. But I shall in silence acquiesce.
Dissents seldom aid us in the right development or statement of the
law. They often do harm. For myself I say: "Lead us not unto Temp-
tation."
217
To Holmes, Butler announced, "I voted the other way & remain
unconvinced, but dissenting clamor does not often appeal to me
mandatory jurisdiction in the 1928 Term was only 35.3%, while the unanimity
rate in conference for opinions in cases that reached the Court through its dis-
cretionary jurisdiction was only 38.6%. These figures come very close to the
unanimity rate of the published opinions of the contemporary Court. Figures
19 and 23 indicate, however, that the Taft Court took extraordinary pains dur-
ing the 1928 Term to maintain a relatively high rate of unanimity in its pub-
lished opinions.
214. See supra text accompanying note 55; Lee Epstein et al., supra note
202.
215. Justice Willis Van Devanter, The Supreme Court of the United States,
5 IND. L.J. 553, 560 (1930). Van Devanter continued, "Whatever may be the
effect upon public opinion at the moment, freedom to dissent is essential, be-
cause what must ultimately sustain the court in public confidence is the char-
acter and independence of the judges." Id.
216. In 1923 Brandeis commented to Frankfurter apropos of Butler,
Referring to a writer in June 1923 Journal of Am Bar Assoc. who
would suppress all dissenting opinions as "vanity of dissent," [Bran-
deis] said "he isn't alone in that view. P. Butler rather regards
dissents as vanity of dissenters & would like not to have them. He
himself rarely dissents-partly because of newness, partly because of
disbelief in them."
Brandeis-Frankfurter Conversations, supra note 74, at 313-14.
217. Stone Papers (referring to France v. French Overseas Corp., 277 U.S.
323 (1928)). Butler was so pleased with his disquisition that he sent it under
separate cover to Taft. Letter from Pierce Butler to William Howard Taft
(May 19, 1928) (Taft Papers, Reel 302). In that same case, Taft wrote to
Stone, "I suppose I ought not to dissent. I think we dissent too much espe-
cially when a principle has once been decided." Stone Papers. Stone himself
refused to join Brandeis's dissent in Cudahy Packing Co. v. Hinkle, 278 U.S.
460 (1929), claiming that he had a "general disposition not to dissent unless I
feel strongly on the subject." Letter from Harlan Fiske Stone to Louis D.
Brandeis (Feb. 16, 1929) (Brandeis Papers).
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as useful. I shall acquiesce."218 To yet another draft opinion,
he responded, "I voted the other way and am still inclined that
way, but acquiesce for the sake of harmony & the Court."219
Brandeis concurred in an opinion of Stone, noting that "I
think this is woefully wrong, but do not expect to dissent."220 In
response to the draft of a Holmes opinion, Brandeis remarked,
"I think the question was one for a jury-but the case is of a
class in which one may properly 'shut up."221 To the draft of
218. Holmes Papers (referring to Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry.
Co. v. White, 278 U.S. 456 (1929)). In that same case, Butler wrote privately
to Van Devanter,
You and I voted to reverse. The opinion does not change my view of
the matter. I still think the ordinance as applied here unreasonable
& arbitrary. I also think... that evidence was erroneously excluded.
But it is doubtful whether dissenting opinion or the mere noting of
disagreement would do any good; and, unless you incline the other
way, I am disposed to acquiesce. What say you?
Letter from Pierce Butler to Willis Van Devanter (Jan. 22, 1929) (Van Devan-
ter Papers). Van Devanter wrote Holmes, "I do not agree. But as the matter
is open to discussion, I shall not object, but acquiesce." Holmes Papers. In an-
other Holmes opinion, Butler wrote to Holmes, "I voted the other way; but
yielding to the weight of reason and votes, I acquiesce." Id. (referring to W.
Union Tel. Co. v. Georgia, 269 U.S. 67 (1925)).
219. Stone Papers (referring to Standard Oil Co. v. Marysville, 279 U.S.
582 (1929)). To the draft of a Brandeis opinion, he replied, "I voted & still pre-
fer to reverse, but I shall acquiesce unless one protests." Brandeis Papers (re-
ferring to St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. v. Ala. Pub. Serv. Conm'n, 279 U.S.
560 (1929)). In this same case, Sutherland wrote to Brandeis, "Not for, but
shall not be 'agin.' Id. McReynolds wrote, "I am not wholly in accord with
this but do not care to say anything." Id.
220. Stone Papers (referring to Heiner v. Tindle, 276 U.S. 582 (1928)). In
that same case, Holmes commented, "My inclination is the other way .... But
I don't intend to say anything if you can get a majority" Id. In response to
the draft of Tafes unanimous opinion in Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co. v.
Nye Schneider Fowler Co., 260 U.S. 35 (1922), Brandeis wrote, "I still think
the reasoning as to $100 fee wrong. But the opinion handles the matter so
deftly that I think there will be no such lasting harm done as to require dis-
sent. So as our Junior says: TU shut up.' Taft Papers (Reel 614). Although
Holmes acknowledged that the opinion was "plausibly reasoned," he added,
"but as I voted the other way and still have some misgivings I retain them to
see if any dissent is written. It would not be by me." Id.
221. Holmes Papers (referring to Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Southwell, 275
U.S. 64 (1927)). Brandeis joined Holmes's opinion in AG. Spalding & Bros. v.
Edwards, 262 U.S. 66 (1923), even though Brandeis thought that Holmes's
"construction of this Constitutional provision is wrong." Holmes Papers.
Holmes, in turn, responded to the draft of Brandeis's unanimous opinion in
Taubel-Scott-Kitzmiller v. Fox, 264 U.S. 426 (1924), with the observation that
"I am unconvinced. I think the other interpretation more reasonable."
Brandeis Papers. To that same opinion, McReynolds wrote, "I shall not ob-
ject." Id. Butler wrote, "I think you make a strong argument for the result &
it is likely you are right. As you know I inclined the other way. I am con-
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another unanimous Stone opinion, Holmes commented, "I in-
cline the other way. If B[randeis] who I believe voted as I did
writes, . . . probably I shall concur with him. If he is silent, I
probably shall ... shut up."222 Sutherland wrote to Brandeis, "I
thought otherwise, but shall probably acquiesce."223 To the
draft of a unanimous Stone opinion, Sutherland replied, "I had
a different view, and shall withhold final determination in or-
der to see what the other stubborn members have to say."224
Without registering a dissent, Sutherland responded to a
Holmes opinion, "Sorry, I cannot agree. 2 25
Sanford replied to the draft of a unanimous Holmes opin-
ion with the comment, "I regret that I cannot see my way clear
to agree.... I shall probably not dissent, unless some one else
does so. ' 226 To the draft of another opinion, he answered, "I re-
tent-& concur." Id. And McKenna answered, "This leaves me no excuse not
to be right so I say Yes." Id.
222. Stone Papers (referring to Seeman v. Phila. Warehouse Co., 274 U.S.
403 (1927)). Brandeis had written to Stone, "I shall probably acquiesce &
await Conference before deciding." To the draft of Stone's unanimous opinion
reversing a criminal conviction in Brasfield v. United States, 272 U.S. 448
(1926), Holmes wrote, "I shall not dissent .... But I would not reverse for
what the Judge did." In that same case, Sanford wrote Stone, "I regret that I
cannot concur except in the result.... But I shall not dissent or express any
separate opinion." Stone Papers. To Taft's draft opinion in Continental In-
surance Co. v. United States, 259 U.S. 156 (1922), Holmes responded, "Where
reason totters on the throne, Faith takes my hand and leads me on." Taft Pa-
pers (Reel 615). In response to Tafts draft opinion in United States v. Rider,
261 U.S. 363 (1923), Holmes wrote, "I defer humbly to the Commander in
Chief. What he says goes." Taft Papers (Reel 615).
223. Brandeis Papers (referring to United States v. Ludey, 274 U.S. 295
(1927)). In this same case, Taft wrote, "I concur but these discussions always
make my head buzz." Id. Sanford wrote, "While I voted to 'reverse' with some
doubt, this doubt has been removed by your clear and strong presentation of
the case-and I unreservedly concur." Id.
224. Stone Papers (Fox River Paper Co. v. R.R. Comm'n, 274 U.S. 651
(1927)). Butler commented, "I voted the other way in this and will withhold
further expression until I hear what others say at the Conference." Id.
225. Holmes Papers (referring to United States v. Sischo, 262 U.S. 165
(1923)).
226. Holmes Papers (referring to Mercantile Trust Co. v. Wilmot Rd. Dist.,
275 U.S. 117 (1927)). To this same opinion, Brandeis responded, "I do not as-
sent to your interpretation of the statute, but I 'shut up.'" Id. To the draft of
another unanimous Holmes opinion, Sanford responded, "I regret that I do not
see my way clear to concurring in this view (albeit most persuasively stated),
but do not expect to dissent." Holmes Papers (referring to United States v.
Cambridge Loan & Bldg. Co., 278 U.S. 55 (1928)). To that same opinion, Suth-
erland wrote, "I give up. You are very persuasive, tho I still 'have my doubts.'"
Id. Butler wrote, "Doubtfully yes. I shall be glad to consider opposing views if
any are expressed." Id. And Taft answered, "I concur. I don't like to do so
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gret that I cannot concur but shall not dissent."227 To an opin-
ion by Brandeis, McReynolds wrote, "I thought otherwise but
do not care to say anything now."228 To a Holmes opinion,
McReynolds commented, "I have my doubts but not the neces-
sary votes. Wherefore I am mum.2 29 To the draft of another
unanimous Holmes opinion, Van Devanter wrote, "I am not sat-
isfied, but if others agree I shall have nothing to say."
230
McKenna, who, as Figure H illustrates, was the most inclined
of any Justice to alter his conference vote, turned concession
into a virtual art form:
I voted the other way but my effort is to please so I will accede.uI
Plausible if not sound. And being alone there seems no reason for
making a fuss
2
to do so because the result should be different but if Congress wishes it differ-
ent let it draft the law accordingly."
227. Holmes Papers (referring to Am. Ry. Express Co. v. Levee, 263 U.S. 19
(1923)). To the draft of a unanimous Brandeis opinion, Sanford wrote, "I still
have great doubt, but shall not dissent." Brandeis Papers (referring to Napier
v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 272 U.S. 605 (1926)). To the draft of a Stone
opinion, Sanford wrote, "Regret that I cannot agree, but do not expect to dis-
sent." Stone Papers (referring to N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 310
(1929)).
228. Brandeis Papers (referring to W. & Atl. R.R. Co. v. Hughes, 278 U.S.
496 (1929)). To that same opinion, Butler responded, "I voted to reverse, but I
acquiesce in the views of the majority as attractively put by you." Id. Suther-
land returned simply, "I yield." Id. To another unanimous Brandeis opinion,
McReynolds answered simply, "Sorry but I cannot agree." Brandeis Papers
(referring to United States v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 263 U.S. 515 (1924)); see also
Brandeis Papers (referring to Davis v. Cornwell, 264 U.S. 560 (1924), a
unanimous Brandeis opinion to the draft of which McReynolds had responded,
"Sorry but I cannot agree").
229. Holmes Papers (referring to Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S. 22
(1922)). To another Holmes opinion, McReynolds wrote, "Maybe it should be
as it seems destined to be. But yr humble servant has something rather
deeper than a doubt." Id. (referring to Diaz v. Gonzalez Y Lugo, 261 U.S. 102
(1923)).
230. Id. (referring to Gardner v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 261 U.S. 453
(1923)). To that same opinion, Sutherland responded, "I am sorry not to agree
with you, at least, for the present." Butler answered, "I still have grave doubt
as to the result." Brandeis wrote, "I think you are wrong... -But I... shall
'shut up' unless others make a stir." Id. In another case, Van Devanter wrote
to Stone, "I do not agree but shall submit." Stone Papers (referring to Raffel v.
United States, 271 U.S. 494 (1926)). In that same case, Sanford wrote, "This
is a strong presentation and while my doubt in the question is not entirely re-
moved, I shall acquiesce in silence unless some one else dissents." Butler
wrote, "In Silentio." Id.
231. Brandeis Papers (referring to Int'l Ry. Co. v. Davidson, 257 U.S. 506
(1922)). In that same case, Pitney wrote, "I say nothing." Id.
232. Holmes Papers (referring to First Nat'l Bank of Aiken v. J.L. Mott
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I voted the other way but I have resolved on amiability & concession,
so submit. I am not sure that I am not convinced. 3
You have the art of making the wrong appear the better reason and
gives me excuse to acquiesce, and as I hail opportunities to be amica-
ble I say yes.'
Narrow treading but there is only one result when one opposes, or
tries to oppose, a majority. Besides by yielding one gets the praise of
being susceptible to reason.25
Dubitante. There are objections against a plenum and objections
against a vacuum but one of them must be true.n6
What is fascinating about these various communications is
that they do not so much express a "norm of consensus,"2 37 as a
norm of acquiescence. The Justices preserve their differences,
but they each assume that in the absence of strong reasons,
these differences should be put aside so that the Court can pre-
sent a united front to the public, 238 an image of unity expected
to produce "the impact of monolithic solidarity on which the au-
thority of a bench of judges so largely depends.1239 Figures 19
Iron Works, 258 U.S. 240 (1922)).
233. Holmes Papers (referring to Fed. Baseball Club of Baltimore v. Nat'l
League of Profl Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922)). To this draft opinion,
Brandeis responded, "I have grave doubt, but shall acquiesce." Id.
234. Holmes Papers (referring to Stevens v. Arnold, 262 U.S. 266 (1923)).
To that same opinion, Brandeis wrote, "I take your word for it." Id.
McReynolds answered, "I shan't row with you tho I was inclined to agree with
the Dist. Court." Id. And Taft commented, "I concur, though it is only because
of my blind faith in you .... " Id.
235. Brandeis Papers (referring to Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry.
v. Tennessee, 262 U.S. 318 (1923)).
236. Brandeis Papers (referring to United States v. Pa. R.R. Co., 266 U.S.
191 (1924)). To the draft of this unanimous Brandeis opinion, McReynolds re-
sponded, "I hold a different view." Id. Sutherland commented, "Shall acqui-
esce." Id.
237. O'Brien, supra note 132, at 111.
238. Thus Holmes consistently averred that "I rather shudder at being held
up as the dissenting judge and more or less contrasted with the Court." Letter
from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Felix Frankfurter (Nov. 22, 1929), in HOLMES
& FRANKFURTER, supra note 73, at 244-45. "I dislike even the traditional
'Holmes Dissenting.'" Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold J. Laski
(Nov. 10, 1923), in 1 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS, supra note 82, at 560; see also
Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Miss Little (Feb. 4, 1929) (Holmes Pa-
pers, Reel 35, Frame 368) ("I rather grieve to be made to appear as chiefly oc-
cupied in dissenting. That is not my main business."); Letter from Oliver
Wendell Holmes to Mrs. John Chipman Gray (Nov. 22, 1929) (Holmes Papers,
Reel 24, Frame 339) ("I do not like being made to appear as a dissenting judge,
though no doubt I have dissented more than some because I represent a mi-
nority on some very fundamental questions, upon which both sides should be
heard.").
239. LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 72-73 (1958). Thus Canon 19 of
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and 20 suggest that the Court may actually have striven
harder to preserve unanimity as internal rates of dissensus at
Conference increased. It is clear that this norm of acquiescence
is responsible for sustaining the extraordinarily high rates of
unanimity that characterize the published opinions of the Taft
Court, rates that were 20 to 40 percentage points higher than
unanimity in conference voting.
It is useful to begin our analysis of this phenomenon by
considering the significance of the norm of acquiescence for the
three distinct functions of Supreme Court opinions that we
identified in Part II. With respect to the function of represent-
ing the institutional judgment of the Court, the norm of acqui-
escence facilitated the achievement of institutional unity. Jus-
tices must have believed that, in the absence of what Van
Devanter called "strong conviction," it was their institutional
responsibility to join an opinion for the Court. The norm of ac-
quiescence also established among the Justices expectations of
reciprocity, or, in McKenna's words, of "amiability." There was
thus a price to be paid for failing to fulfill the responsibility of
joining Court opinions.
Brandeis thus remarked to Frankfurter that "there is a
limit to the frequency with which you can [dissent], without ex-
asperating men;24 0... [You may have a very important case of
your own as to which you do not want to antagonize on a less
important case etc. etc."241 He noted that the "[g]reat difficulty
of all group action.., is when & what concessions to make.
Can't always dissent-may have dissented much just then."242
He once responded to Taft's invitation to join a separate opin-
the 1924 Canons of Judicial Ethics exhorted 'judges constituting a court of
last resort" to "use effort and self-restraint to promote solidarity of conclusion
and the consequent influence ofjudicial decision." Canon 19, supra note 55.
240. A dissenting Justice, Brandeis told Frankfurter, doesn't "want to vent
feelings or raise rumpus." Brandeis-Frankfurter Conversations, supra note 74,
at 309.
241. Id. at 317. Brandeis added that "there may not be time, e.g. Holmes
shoots them down so quickly & is disturbed if you hold him up." Id. For an
example, see id. at 327.
242. Id. at 309. At another point Brandeis observed to Frankfurter,
IThere are reasons for withholding dissent, so that silence does not
mean actual concurrence. (1) All depends on how frequent one's dis-
sents have been when the question of dissenting comes, or (2) how
important case, whether it's constitutionality or construction. So that
I sometimes endorse an opinion with which I do not agree, "I acqui-
esce"; as Holmes puts [it] "I'll shut up."
Id. at 328.
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ion, "I agree with your criticism of the... opinion. You will re-
call that I voted the other way; and the opinion has not re-
moved my difficulties.... But I have differed from the Court
recently in three expressed dissents and concluded that, in this
case, I had better 'shut up,' as in Junior days."243
It is not necessary to establish a norm of acquiescence in
order to sustain amicable working relationships among mem-
bers of the Court.2 " The norm instead offers a way for individ-
ual Justices to negotiate potential conflicts between their own
intellectual perspectives and their perceived obligation to con-
tribute to "solidarity of conclusion and the consequent influence
of judicial decision." 245 The norm acquires its significance from
the strength of this obligation. But the nature and force of this
obligation depends upon the importance of the impact of Su-
preme Court opinions on persons outside the Court. To histori-
cally situate the norm of acquiescence, therefore, we must ana-
lyze it in connection to the outward-looking functions of
Supreme Court opinions. We must focus on the relationship
between the norm and the ability of Supreme Court opinions to
243. Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to William Howard Taft (Dec. 23, 1922)
(Taft Papers, Reel 248). The case was FTC v. Curtis Publishing Co., 260 U.S.
568 (1923), and Brandeis ended up joining Taft's opinion, perhaps because the
stakes were high enough. The majority opinion was by McReynolds, and, as
Brandeis wrote to Taft,
I differ widely from McReynolds concerning the functions and prac-
tices of the Trade Comm'n.... I think the Court's treatment of the
Federal Trade Comm'n-is much like that given the I.C.C. in its
early years-and I fear that the fruit of our action may again be bit-
ter. It is not good statesmanship to clamp down safety valves.
Id. Existing documents show Taft negotiating through Van Devanter to effect
changes in the McReynolds opinion, even as he determined to write sepa-
rately, "dubitante."
244. Working relationships among members of the Taft Court should thus
be compared with those among members of the contemporary Court as de-
scribed by Justice Scalia. See Antonin Scalia, The Dissenting Opinion, 1994 J.
SUP. CT. HIST. 33, 40-41 (1994) (asserting that dissents "do not, or at least
need not, produce animosity and bitterness among the members of the
Court.... [D]issents are simply the normal course of things. Indeed, if one's
opinions were never dissented from, he would begin to suspect that his col-
leagues considered him insipid, or simply not worthy of contradiction."); see
also Stanley H. Fuld, The Voices of Dissent, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 923, 928-29
(1962) ("In conference, each of the judges expresses himself frankly as he be-
lieves the law and the facts require and, when it comes time to publish his
opinion, whether for majority or for minority, his writing reflects his actual
thinking, with no punches pulled, though stated in reasoned and temperate
tones. The personal atmosphere of the court is today, as it has ever been, in-
stinct with a feeling of friendliness and good will.").
245. Canon 19, supra note 55.
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resolve disputes between parties or to affect the future growth
and administration of the law.
These two functions stand in very different relation to the
norm of acquiescence. Although dissent can influence the atti-
tude of litigants to the resolution of their case, it cannot modify
the binding and dispositive force of the Court's judgment on the
parties before it. That judgment, however, has no such disposi-
tive force on the general legal public, which is therefore much
more likely to be affected by a strong dissent. In addition, the
trade-off between institutional solidarity and individual belief
is quite different if all that is at stake in a Supreme Court opin-
ion is the proper adjudication of a dispute between particular
parties, than if the future development of the legal system also
hangs in the balance.
These considerations suggest that the concept of the Su-
preme Court opinion at the core of the Judiciary Act of 1925
was singularly calculated to exert pressure on the norm of ac-
quiescence. As the Court's opinions began to modulate from
the relatively routinized decisions of a court of last resort to in-
terventions designed to shape the progress of American law, it
is no wonder that a norm which developed and flourished in the
first context began to falter in the second. The collapse of una-
nimity and the changing nature of Supreme Court opinions are
thus intimately connected.
The point requires careful formulation, however, because
courts resolve disputes between parties by articulating legal
principles, and these principles both decide specific cases and
also become precedents for the resolution of future cases. The
audience for all court opinions, therefore, hovers ambiguously
between particular parties and the general legal public. The
relationship between these two audiences very much depends
upon a jurisprudential account of how law works to accomplish
its ends. If judicial opinions are understood to influence the le-
gal system through the enunciation of definite and stable prin-
ciples, upon which legal actors can rely, there is essentially no
distinction between opinions addressed to the general legal
public and opinions addressed to the parties to a particular
case. The purpose of an opinion is to announce certain and
fixed legal standards that will simultaneously discharge the
Court's obligation to both audiences.
This jurisprudential understanding of law casts potential
dissenters into an exceedingly awkward position. Whether a
potential dissenter looks to the effect of his dissent on the par-
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ties to the case, or to its effect on the future evolution of the
law, dissent potentially undermines the certainty and confi-
dence which is a principal virtue of judicial decisionmaking.
And if stare decisis functions, as it should, to fix and establish a
Court's opinion as regnant law, dissent seems merely ineffec-
tual. As Edward White put it, "The only purpose which an
elaborate dissent can accomplish, if any, is to weaken the effect
of the opinion of the majority, and thus engender want of confi-
dence in the conclusions of courts of last resort."246 A potential
dissenter is thus relegated to registering his conscientious per-
sonal difference from the judgment of an opinion.247 That is
why, in its effort to discourage dissent on courts "of last resort,"
Canon 19 of the ABA's 1924 Canons of Judicial Ethics focused
primarily on the exhortation that a judge not "yield to pride of
opinion or value more highly his individual reputation than
that of the court to which he should be loyal. Except in cases of
conscientious difference of opinion on fundamental principle,
dissenting opinions should be discouraged in courts of last re-
sort."2 4 8
The norm of acquiescence that is visible in the Taft Court
fits comfortably with this jurisprudential perspective. If the in-
stitutional justification for dissent is unclear; if dissent carries
potentially large deleterious effects for the establishment of
law, both with respect to the parties and to the legal public; if
the benefits to a dissenter are chiefly personal; then a norm of
acquiescence offers a face-saving way for a dissenter to mediate
between private intellectual disagreement and participation in
the common goal of creating effective law.
It should come as no surprise, therefore, that those who
opposed judicial dissent at the turn of the century typically ap-
pealed to a jurisprudential account of law that stressed fixity
and finality. A 1905 article in The Green Bag argued that
"[tihe fundamental security of all peoples lies, not in the justice,
but in the certainty, of their laws," from which it deduced that
246. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 608 (1895)
(White, J., dissenting).
247. Stone sometimes represented his practice of dissent in exactly these
terms. So, for example, he once wrote to T.R. Powell, "One of my colleagues
was once greatly surprised when I told him that I did not write a dissent to
convince him. He then asked, 'What do you write it for?' I replied: 'So that
others will not think that I agree with you, and of course I have to sleep with
myself every night and I like to rest well.'" Letter from Harlan Fiske Stone to
T.R. Powell (Dec. 16, 1935) (Stone Papers).
248. Canon 19, supra note 55.
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"the Dissenting Opinion is of all judicial mistakes the most in-
jurious."2 49 "There never should be a dissenting opinion in a
case decided by a court of last resort," propounded the Albany
Law Journal in 1898.250 "No judge, lawyer or layman should be
permitted to weaken the force of the court's decision, which all
must accept as an unappealable finality."251
It is a maxim of the law that it is to the interest of the public that
there should be an end to litigation. It certainly is to the interest of
the public that when a question is settled by the highest tribunal, it
should remain settled for all time. The result of a dissenting opinion
is simply to open up for future discussion, bickering and litigation the
question which should then be finally settled by that tribunal. Some-
body must settle the question; it must be settled somewhere; that tri-
bunal has been selected as the final arbiter, and when it once settles
it, it should remain settled forever.n2
One can discern an echo of this position in Holmes's an-
nounced reticence "to express his dissent, once he's 'had his say'
on a given subject."2 3 Holmes believed that "[there are obvi-
ous limits of propriety to the persistent expression of opinions
that do not command the agreement of the Court."254 If a case
or a legal principle were important enough, he was willing to
249. William A. Bowen, Dissenting Opinions, 17 GREEN BAG 690, 693
(1905).
Obviously, if the Dissenting Opinion is injurious at all, it will be most
unfortunately so in those cases which are of the greatest public mo-
ment. Yet it is the almost unbelievable fact, that it is the uniform
justification of dissenting judges that the importance of the case war-
rants and demands their dissent.
Id.
250. Evils of Dissenting Opinions, 57 ALB. L.J. 74, 75 (1898).
251. Id.
252. Id. at 74. The article adds, "The decision should be that of the court,
and not of the judges as individuals. The judges should get together and ren-
der a decision settling the points in controversy." Id.
Dissenting opinions may be as pleasant to the minority judge as it
is for a boy to make faces at a bigger boy across the street, whom he
can't whip. They give a judge an opportunity of exhibiting his indi-
vidual views and opinions. But what good does that do? What cares
the public for the judge's individual views, except in so far as, by rea-
son of his position, they assume the force of law? The only concern of
the public is with the decision of the court as a court, so that they may
know what it is, and know how to govern themselves.
Id. at 75. From this perspective, dissent was not only useless, it was also de-
structive of the law itself.
253. Brandeis-Frankfurter Conversations, supra note 74, at 330; see also N.
See. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes, J. dissenting)
("[1It is useless and undesirable, as a rule, to express dissent. .. ")
254. FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441, 456 (1922) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
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dissent, to articulate an understanding of the law different
from that announced by the Court.255 But once his understand-
ing was rejected, Holmes adopted the view that he would not
continue to reiterate his own perspective. 256 Only in the most
consequential circumstances, as for example in the area of
freedom of speech, would he candidly repeat a position in the
teeth of dispositive judicial resolution. And then he would re-
255. Holmes was careful, however, to cast his dissent as a disagreement of
legal principle rather than as a quarrel with the Court. Just as he frequently
regarded opinions as expressions of "pure principle," Letter from Oliver
Wendell Holmes to Felix Frankfurter (Nov. 6, 1926), in HOLMES &
FRANKFURTER, supra note 73, at 206, so he stressed that in writing dissents
"[wie are giving our views on a question of law, not fighting with another
cock," Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold J. Laski (Nov. 10, 1923),
in 1 HOLMES-LAsKI LETTERS, supra note 82, at 560. Before agreeing to join a
Brandeis dissent, for example, he once insisted that Brandeis remove a sen-
tence to the effect that "[tihe Court gives no reason for declaring [the Federal
Gift Tax Act] to be unreasonable." Holmes explained, "I think it better never
to criticize the reasoning in opinions of the Court and its members. I feel very
strongly about this. Of course it is OK to hit them by indirection as hard as
you can." Brandeis Papers (referring to Untermyer v. Anderson, 276 U.S. 440
(1928)). Holmes added, "If you will modify these expressions so as to avoid the
personal touch I am with you, with delight." Id. Holmes edited another
Brandeis dissent "to avoid the dogmatic air when one is in a minority." Id. (re-
ferring to United States v. Or. Lumber Co., 260 U.S. 290 (1922)). "Dissenting
Judges often say "this Court' etc.," Holmes observed. "It has an air of horror or
contempt and I dislike the phrase extremely. I hope you will change it." Id.
Thus although Holmes experienced the "pleasure in writing" dissents as flow-
ing from the power to "say just what you think" without "having to blunt the
edges and cut off the corners to suit someone else," it was a pleasure that did
not derive from debating with the Court, but rather from the free pursuit of
legal principles, the articulation of "some proposition broader than it is wise to
attempt except in a dissent." Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Mrs. John
Chipman Gray (May 5, 1928) (Holmes Papers, Reel 24, Frame 228); see also
Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold J. Laski (Aug.16, 1924), in 1
HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS, supra note 82, at 646-47 (noting the advantages of
dissenting); Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Baroness Moncheur (Jan.
27, 1928) (Holmes Papers, Reel 27, Frame 216).
256. See, e.g., Washington v. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219, 228 (1924)
(Separate Opinion of Holmes, J.) ("The reasoning of Southern Pacific Co. v.
Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, and cases following it never has satisfied me, and there-
fore I should have been glad to see a limit set to the principle. But I must
leave it to those who think the principle right to say how far it extends.");
Miles v. Graham, 268 U.S. 501 (1925) (Holmes had dissented in Evans v. Gore,
253 U.S. 245 (1920), the precedent applied by Miles); Thomas C. Grey, Holmes
on the Logic of the Law, in THE PATH OF THE LAW AND ITS INFLUENCE 131, 141
(Steven J. Burton ed., 2000) (describing Holmes's reluctance to depart from
precedent); Thomas C. Grey, Molecular Motions: The Holmesian Judge in The-
ory and Practice, 37 WM. & MARY. L REV. 19, 27-36 (1995) (discussing
Holmes's tendency to defer to precedent and legislative judgment).
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mark, as he did in his dissent in Gitlow v. New York, 257 that
"the convictions that I expressed in [Abrams] are too deep for it
to be possible for me as yet to believe that it and Schaefer...
have settled the law."258 In the absence of such deep conviction,
Holmes implied, acquiescence in a settled rule of law would be
necessary to ensure respect for the value of judicial finality.
If Holmes's conception of dissent was compatible with a
strong norm of acquiescence, Brandeis struggled to articulate a
conception of dissent that undercut the jurisprudential founda-
tions of the norm. Brandeis sought to distinguish circum-
stances in which judicial finality was a significant jurispruden-
tial virtue from those in which it was not. "In ordinary cases,"
he said to Frankfurter in 1923, "there is a good deal to be said
for not having dissents."25 9
You want certainty & definiteness & it doesn't matter terribly how
you decide, so long as it is settled. But in these constitutional cases,
since what is done is what you call statesmanship, nothing is ever
settled-unless statesmanship is settled & at an end.
260
This is an unusually suggestive passage, because it explicitly
ties the norm of acquiescence to an account of how law achieves
its purposes, and it offers a discriminating explanation of the
difference between ordinary law, where the value of finality is
highly consequential, and constitutional law, where it is not.261
257. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
258. Id. at 673 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
259. Brandeis-Frankfurter Conversations, supra note 74, at 314.
260. Id.
261. By the 1930s, Brandeis was able to offer a clear line of demarcation.
See, e.g., Comm'r v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406-07 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is
more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it
be settled right.... This is commonly true even where the error is a
matter of serious concern, provided correction can be had by legisla-
tion. But in cases involving the Federal Constitution, where correc-
tion through legislative action is practically impossible, this Court
has often overruled its earlier decisions.
Id. In the 1920s, however, Brandeis was still considerably more tentative on
the point. See, e.g., Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 42-43 (1927)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting):
It is usually more important that a rule of law be settled, than
that it be settled right. Even where the error in declaring the rule is
a matter of serious concern, it is ordinarily better to seek correction
by legislation. Often this is true although the question is a constitu-
tional one. The human experience embodied in the doctrine of stare
decisis teaches us, also, that often it is better to follow a precedent, al-
though it does not involve the declaration of a rule. This is usually
true so far as concerns a particular statute whether the error was
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Brandeis's explanation of the diminished importance of finality
in constitutional law does not turn on the primacy of constitu-
tional justice, but rather on the fact that constitutional law is a
form of "statesmanship," and statesmanship requires continu-
ous flexibility and growth. It is no act of statesmanship to an-
nounce a rule and expect it, in the words of the Albany Law
Journal, to "remain settled forever."262
Brandeis advanced an image of constitutional law as re-
quiring the continuous "capacity of adaptation to a changing
world. 12 63 In a draft dissent he made this point explicitly: "Our
Constitution is not a strait-jacket. It is a living organism. As
such it is capable of growth.... Because our Constitution pos-
sesses the capacity of adaptation, it has endured as the funda-
mental law of an ever developing people." 264 Fittingly enough,
Taft, whose view of dissent was very different from that of
Brandeis, insisted that this passage be omitted before he would
join Brandeis's dissent.265 Taft believed that the "Constitution
made in construing it or in passing upon its validity. But the doctrine
of stare decisis does not command that we err again when we have oc-
casion to pass upon a different statute. In the search for truth
through the slow process of inclusion and exclusion, involving trial
and error, it behooves us to reject, as guides, the decisions upon such
questions which prove to have been mistaken. This course seems to
me imperative when, as here, the decision to be made involves the
delicate adjustment of conflicting claims of the Federal Government
and the States to regulate commerce. The many cases on the Com-
merce Clause in which this Court has overruled or explained away its
earlier decisions show that the wisdom of this course has been hereto-
fore recognized.
Id. (footnotes omitted). For a good discussion of Brandeis's approach to prece-
dent, see Morton J. Horwitz, Foreword: The Constitution of Change: Legal
Fundamentality Without Fundamentalism, 107 HARV. L. REv. 32, 53 n.99
(1993). For an example of a similar perspective to Brandeis's, see Letter from
Harlan Fiske Stone to John Bassett Moore (Apr. 10, 1929) (Stone Papers)
("[O]rdinarily I do not record dissents in matters of statutory interpretation.").
262. Evils of Dissenting Opinions, supra note 250, at 75.
263. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 472 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting).
264. Brandeis Papers (draft of Brandeis's dissent in United States v. More-
land, 258 U.S. 433 (1922)).
265. Taft wrote,
I am very pleased with your opinion... except the last four or five
sentences in respect to the growth of the Constitution. I object to
those words, because they are certain to be used to support views that
I could not subscribe to. Their importance depends, as old Jack
Bunsby used to say, on their application, and I fear that you and I
might differ as to their application.... Now it is possible-I have felt
that way myself sometimes - that these particular sentences consti-
tute the feature of the opinion that you most like, and therefore that
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was intended, its very purpose was, to prevent experimentation
with the fundamental rights of the individual. 2 66 For Taft the
fundamental point of constitutional law was precisely to fix
these rights and to render them "settled."267
The jurisprudential difference between Brandeis and Taft
has important consequences for the norm of acquiescence. 268 If
the law is regarded as continuously and properly evolving, the
costs of acquiescence increase, because assent to a mistaken
opinion affects the future development of the law. So far from
merely expressing conscientious personal disagreement, dissent
constitutes, in the famous words of Charles Evans Hughes, "an
appeal to the brooding spirit of the law, to the intelligence of a
future day, when a later decision may possibly correct the error
into which the dissenting judge believes the court to have been
betrayed.2 69
you don't care to eliminate them. If not, I can write a short concur-
ring opinion, avoiding responsibility for those words ....
Letter from William Howard Taft to Louis D. Brandeis (Mar. 30, 1922) (Taft
Papers, Reel 240). Brandeis replied, "I believe strongly in the view expressed
in the last five sentences but I agree with you that they are not necessary and
I am perfectly willing to omit them." Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to William
Howard Taft (Mar. 39, 1922) (Taft Papers, Reel 240).
266. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 338 (1921).
267. Taft's perspective might be said to reflect the received wisdom of the
time. For a good example, see, e.g., South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S.
437, 448-49 (1905).
The Constitution is a written instrument. As such its meaning
does not alter. That which it meant when adopted it means now. Be-
ing a grant of powers to a government its language is general, and as
changes come in social and political life it embraces in its grasp all
new conditions which are within the scope of the powers in terms con-
ferred. In other words, while the powers granted do not change, they
apply from generation to generation to all things to which they are in
their nature applicable. This in no manner abridges the fact of its
changeless nature and meaning. Those things which are within its
grants of power, as those grants were understood when made, are still
within them, and those things not within them remain still excluded.
Id.
268. For good discussions of the transition in American jurisprudence to
the Brandeis view of constitutional law, see Howard Gillman, The Collapse of
Constitutional Originalism and the Rise of the Notion of the "Living Constitu-
tion" in the Course of American State-Building, 11 STUD. AM. POL. DEv. 191
(1997); Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty,
Part Four: Law's Politics, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 971, 1019 (2000); G. EDWARD
WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL 198-239 (2000). Gillman,
Friedman, and White date the demise of the Taft view to about the time when
Figure 10 suggests that unanimity rates began to collapse.
269. CHARLES EVANs HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES 68 (1928).
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If the virtue of law is conceived to lie in its flexibility and
adaptability, rather than in its stability and firmness, a poten-
tial dissenter must weigh the "dissatisfaction" that a dissent
may engender 270 against his obligation to future generations
wisely to shape the development of the law.271 Once the insti-
tutional structure of the Court decisively oriented its opinions
toward the development of the law and its reception by the
general legal public, and once members of the Court began to
270. See Evils of Dissenting Opinions, supra note 250, at 75.
If a dissenting opinion is well written it impresses not only the par-
ticular litigant, but all who read it, with the idea that injustice has
been done by the courts; a feeling of dissatisfaction arises, a feeling of
great wrong is cast broadcast. The court has been weakened in popu-
lar esteem, for in the opinion of the reader of the dissenting opinion it
has lent itself to injustice and inflicted wrong.
Id.
271. "Even where the theory of the dissent does not ultimately prevail, its
expression is no futile gesture. The law is not a dead or static mechanism. It
is a living organism which grows and develops to meet the ever-shifting pano-
rama of life." Joseph M. Proskauer, Dissenting Opinions, 160 HARPER'S
MONTHLY MAG. 549, 554 (April 1930). To Frankfurter, Stone commented that
Proskauer's article was "good and very instructive to a lot of people who think
law, especially in our Court, is a system of mathematics. Sometime, though, I
think if it were applied with scientific precision, that we might come out better
than we do now." Letter from Harlan Fiske Stone to Felix Frankfurter (Apr.
4, 1930) (Stone Papers). On the relationship between Brandeis's view of law to
Stone's own practice of dissent, see Letter from Harlan Fiske Stone to Felix
Frankfurter (June 8, 1928) (Stone Papers):
I always write a dissent with real reluctance, and often acquiesce in
opinions with which I do not fully agree, so you may know how
strongly I have really felt in order to participate in so many dissents
as I have recently. But where a prevailing view rests upon what ap-
pears to me to be false economic notions, or upon reasoning and
analogies which will not bear analysis, I think great service is done
with respect to the future development of the law, in pointing out the
fallacies on which the prevailing view appears to rest, even though
the particular ruling made should never be reversed.
Id. Frankfurter answered this letter by affirming, "I also share your convic-
tion as to the 'great service' which is rendered by dissenting opinions for the
future development of the law." Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Harlan
Fiske Stone (June 11, 1928) (Stone Papers).
By the 1930s, Stone had become entirely comfortable with this position.
See Harlan F. Stone, Dissenting Opinions Are Not Without Value, 26 J. AM.
JUDICATURE Socly 78, 78 (1942) [hereinafter Stone, Dissenting Opinions]
("While the dissenting opinion tends to break down a much cherished illusion
of certainty in the law and of infallibility of judges, it nevertheless has some
useful purposes to serve.... Its real influence, if it ever has any, comes later,
often in shaping and sometimes in altering the course of the law."); Letter
from Harlan Fiske Stone to T.R. Powell (Dec. 16, 1935) (Stone Papers) ("Of
course I agree with you that no amount of criticism will affect the courts today,
but it is likely to have a profound effect on the courts of the next generation.").
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regard "growth" as "the life of the law, 2 72 the norm of acquies-
cence was undermined from within. By the end of the 1940s,
when, as Figure 10 indicates, the norm of acquiescence had ut-
terly collapsed, a Justice like William 0. Douglas, perhaps the
most consummate dissenter in the history of the Court, could
affirm that "philosophers of the democratic faith will rejoice in
the uncertainty of the law and find strength and glory in it."273
And it is undoubtedly the case that the virtual disappearance of
unanimous Court opinions, which is in part a consequence of
this very jurisprudential view of the law, helped in turn to pro-
duce a law that was in fact more uncertain and labile.
IV.
In Part III, I argued that institutional norms of unanimous
decisionmaking can reveal something significant about the
Court's changing apprehension of the jurisprudential nature of
law. In this Part of my Lecture, I shall consider what practices
of opinion writing can tell us about the Court's understanding
of its own institutional authority. I shall discuss two such
practices: the norm of acquiescence and the citation of scholarly
law review literature.
272. Washington v. W.C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219, 236 (1924) (Bran-
deis, J., dissenting). There is clearly no necessary or logical relationship
between this jurisprudential account of law and the role of the Court envi-
sioned by the 1925 Act. That is why Justices like Taft and Van Devanter
could simultaneously support the Act and advocate a jurisprudence that em-
phasized stability and certainty. But in the long run there might be a natural
affinity between envisioning the Court as akin to a "ministry of justice" and
envisioning the law as evolving continuously to adjust to a changing social en-
viromnent.
273. William 0. Douglas, The Dissent: A Safeguard of Democracy, 32 J. AM.
JUDICATURE SOCY 104, 105 (1948). Douglas continued,
Certainty and unanimity in the law are possible both under the
fascist and communist systems. They are not only possible; they are
indispensable; for complete subservience to the political regime is a
sine qua non to judicial survival under either system....
When we move to constitutional questions, uncertainty necessar-
ily increases. A judge who is asked to construe or interpret the Con-
stitution often rejects the gloss which his predecessors have put on
it.... And so it should be. For it is the Constitution which we have
sworn to defend, not some predecessor's interpretation of it. Stare de-
cisis has small place in constitutional law. The Constitution was
written for all time and all ages. It would lose its great character and
become feeble, if it were allowed to become encrusted with narrow, le-
galistic notions that dominated the thinking of one generation.
So it is that the law will always teem with uncertainty.
Id. at 105-06.
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A.
A major justification for the norm of acquiescence was the
need to preserve the authority of the Court. When progressives
in the 1920s attacked judicial review, they pointed to dissent as
evidence that the Court's decisions were not compelled by legal
necessity and that they therefore represented a form of political
judgment best left to "the legislature."274 At issue in this form
of attack, as Taft rightly understood, was "the prestige of the
Court,"275 which derived from its prerogative to pronounce law.
Unanimity preserved the appearance of legal compulsion,
which is why Canon 19 recited that "solidarity of conclusion"
was prerequisite to preserve the "influence of judicial deci-
sion.1276 It was precisely this sense of "influence" that Chief
Justice Warren sought to summon thirty years later when he
struggled to make Brown v. Board of Education277 into a
unanimous decision.
The norm of acquiescence aspired to achieve the "influence"
of unanimity for as many of the Court's decisions as was possi-
ble. The norm was thus justified not only by a particular ac-
count of law, but also by the effort to maintain the institu-
tional authority of the Court.278 That is why figures like Taft,
who fervently believed in the institutional primacy of the
Court, were so infuriated by dissent.
The three dissenters act on the principle that a decision of the whole
Court by a majority is not a decision at all, and therefore they are not
bound by the authority of the decision, which if followed out would
leave the dissenters to be the only constitutional law breakers in the
country. 2
79
The relationship between judicial authority and the norm
of acquiescence was recognized early on. In 1898 the Albany
Law Journal conceptualized dissent as appealing over the head
of the Court directly to "the people." But, the Journal asked,
"what can the people do?"
274. Ralston, supra note 158, at 565.
275. Letter from William Howard Taft to Willis Van Devanter (Dec. 26,
1921) (Van Devanter Papers); see also supra note 158.
276. Canon 19, supra note 55.
277. 347 U.S. 483, 486 (1954).
278. "Being out-voted the minority does not accept the judgment of the ma-
jority, but appeals to the judgment of the profession and to the lay public for
vindication, thereby sowing the seeds of discontent." J.W. Sturgis, Majority
Abdication, 9 A.B.A. J. 815, 815 (1923).
279. Letter from William Howard Taft to Henry L. Stimson (May 18, 1928)
(Taft Papers, Reel 302).
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A dissenting opinion is to some extent an appeal by the minority-
from the decision of the majority-to the people. What can the people
do? They can't alter it; they can't change it; right or wrong, they must
respect and obey it. Why shake the faith of the people in the wisdom
and infallibility of the judiciary? Upon the respect of the people for
the courts depends the very life of the Republic.n °
The passage is remarkable because it constructs such a
strict opposition between the "courts," which pronounce law,
and the "people," whose duty is to "respect and obey" the law.
Dissent is useless, the Albany Law Journal argues, because the
attitudes of the people bear no connection to the construction of
law. This sharp distinction is underwritten by a rigid contrast
between law and politics. Discontent with judicial decision-
making is deemed irrelevant because courts are imagined as
implementing the law, and the law is conceived as entirely dis-
tinct from popular will.
Such a crude distinction between courts and the people, be-
tween law and politics, is very difficult to sustain in a democ-
racy. But if the authority of the Court flows from its preroga-
tive to pronounce law, and if the law declared by the Court
depends to some extent upon the popular will, then a norm of
acquiescence which precludes a potentially dissenting Justice
from appealing to the people can come to seem merely arbitrary
and autocratic. This is because "the reputation and prestige of
a court-the influence and weight that it commands-depend
on something stronger and more substantial than an illusion"
of "absolute certainty and of judicial infallibility."28' The repu-
tation and prestige of the Court must instead depend upon the
Court's institutional ability correctly to discern the law, which
is to say correctly to discern so much of the popular will as un-
derlies the law. To the extent that popular will is itself formed
through processes of public discussion in which the Court itself
plays a part,282 the suppression of dissent can come to seem
equivalent to the arbitrary foreclosure of public dialogue. The
logic advanced by the Albany Law Journal is thus radically in-
verted.
By the 1940s, after the constitutional crises of the New
Deal focused national attention on democratic control of the
280. Evils of Dissenting Opinions, supra note 250, at 75.
281. Fuld, supra note 244, at 928.
282. For a discussion of the dialectical relationship of the Court to the
popular will that sustains law, see Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal
Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and
Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 513-517 (2000).
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Court, there were Justices who were prepared to argue that
democracy itself justified the practice of addressing dissents to
the general public. William 0. Douglas explicitly conceptual-
ized dissent as a form of political speech, so that a judge's right
and obligation to dissent was like the freedom of speech exer-
cised by any citizen:
Disagreement among judges is as true to the character of democ-
racy as freedom of speech itself....
Democracy, like religion, is full of sects and schisms.... No man
or group of men has a monopoly on truth, wisdom or virtue. An idea,
once advanced for public acceptance, divides like an amoeba....
The truth is that the law is the highest form of compromise be-
tween competing interests; it is a substitute for force and violence...
It is the product of attempted reconciliation between the many di-
verse groups in a society. The reconciliation is not entirely a legisla-
tive function. The judiciary is also inescapably involved. When
judges do not agree, it is a sign that they are dealing with problems
on which society itself is divided. It is the democratic way to express
dissident views. Judges are to be honored rather than criticized for
following that tradition, for proclaiming their articles of faith so that
all may read.283
Because "no... group of men has a monopoly on truth,"
Douglas conceives Justices of the Court as "proclaiming their
articles of faith," rather than as participating in the institu-
tional and authoritative pronouncement of the law.284 The dis-
tinction between law and politics is effaced, as is any account of
the distinct institutional authority of the Court.285 From this
perspective it is only a short step to conceive dissent as, in the
words of Justice Brennan, a contribution "to the marketplace of
competing ideas."286 There is no doubt that some such trans-
formation has contributed to the transformation of the Taft
Court's norm of acquiescence into an ethic "of individual ex-
283. Douglas, supra note 273, at 105-06.
284. See, e.g., Jesse W. Carter, Dissenting Opinions, 4 HASTINGS L.J. 118,
118 (1953) ("The right to dissent is the essence of democracy."); Id. at 123
("Freedom of speech is one of the greatest rights guaranteed to the individual
by the Bill of Rights and is an essential ingredient of any democracy. It ap-
plies no less to the dissenting judge than it does to the average citizen....
[T]he same right to freedom of expression should be accorded judges as is ac-
corded legislators or the executive in their respective fields.").
285. See, e.g., Richard B. Stephens, The Function of Concurring and Dis-
senting Opinions in Courts of Last Resort, 5 U. FLA. L. REV. 394, 400 (1952)
("Freedom of expression for the appellate judge is closely related to the consti-
tutional guarantee of freedom of speech.").
286. William J. Brennan, Jr., In Defense of Dissents, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 427,
435 (1986).
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pression."28 7 To the extent that the norm of acquiescence was
understood to uphold the Court's prestige as the unique voice of
the law, the collapse of the norm can illuminate the shifting
boundary between law and politics.
B.
Although La Follette's frontal assault on judicial review
might be understood as a claim that constitutional meanings
were to be democratically determined, his efforts did not strike
a responsive chord within the Taft Court.288 What may be de-
scribed as the Court's liberal wing was not tempted to deny the
distinction between law and politics. The problem from their
perspective was not that there was no law for the Court to ap-
ply, but that the Court was applying the law incorrectly. The
audience for their dissent was thus typically those who were
able expertly and accurately to comprehend the requirements
of the law. At least that is how Stone framed the question in
1942, when he observed that the appeal of "a considered and
well stated dissent... can properly be only to scholarship, his-
tory and reason, and if the business of judging is an intellectual
process, as we are entitled to believe that it is, it must be capa-
ble of withstanding and surviving these critical tests."
2 89
Unlike Douglas, who postulated the general public as the
audience for dissent, Stone imagined dissent as addressed to
those in a position to evaluate the technical, "critical" work of
judging, which is not reducible to mere political will. As he
wrote to Frankfurter, in a letter sadly wondering whether "dis-
senting has any utility beyond enabling the dissenter to live
comfortably with himself,"2 90 "I take some comfort... to know
that there are those who study our work with painstaking care
287. O'Brien, supra note 132, at 107.
288. Although Brandeis was widely rumored to be La Follette's first choice
for a Vice Presidential running-mate, see La Follette To Run For Presidency As
Progressive; Brandeis May Be Choice for Vice Presidential Nomination at
Cleveland Conference. Offer To Be Made Today, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 1924, at
Al, even Taft believed that despite Brandeis's manifest sympathy for La Fol-
lette, Brandeis "would not go so far as La Follette with reference to the aboli-
tion of the power of the Court," Letter from William Howard Taft to Max Pam
(Sept. 12, 1924) (Taft Papers, Reel 267). Brandeis seems to intimate as much
in his letter to Felix Frankfurter of June 16, 1922. See BRANDEIS-
FRANKFURTER LETTERS, supra note 92, at 103.
289. Stone, Dissenting Opinions, supra note 271, at 78.
290. To which Stone added, "But that is sufficient justification for me."
Letter from Harlan Fiske Stone to Felix Frankfurter (Jan. 16, 1930) (Stone
Papers).
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and appreciate its significance."291 But whereas in the 19th
Century such an audience of experts would have been located
in the practicing "profession,"2 92 Stone looked in a very differ-
ent direction. He looked toward the institution of legal "schol-
arship."
The Court's struggle to establish a relationship with legal
scholarship during the 1920s nicely illuminates the tensions
underlying the Court's claim of authority to define federal law.
If a dissent addressed over the head of the Court to the general
public called into question the Court's institutional preroga-
tives by blurring the boundary between law and politics, a dis-
sent addressed over the head of the Court to the legal academy
called into question the Court's unique competence to articulate
law. Struggle over this issue is apparent not only in the will-
ingness of dissenters to appeal to the scholarly literature of the
legal academy, but in the Court's intolerance of such citations
in its own majority opinions.
The emergence of legal academia as a potential threat to
the status of the Court was in the 1920s a relatively recent
phenomenon.293 Writing in 1931, Cardozo discussed "the old
prejudice" against "law teachers." "For a long time," he re-
marked, "the practicing lawyers, and the judges, recruited for
291. Id.
292. So, for example, the editors of the American Law Review argued in
1886 that "the practice of writing dissenting opinions" ought not to be prohib-
ited by legislation, because
lilt has always been recognized that judicial decisions which
merely announce conclusions of law, without either referring to au-
thority for such conclusions or offering reasons in support of them,
carry little weight. If mere legislation is the office of the courts, they
would carry the weight which an act of legislation carries. Experi-
ence, we take it, shows that judicial decisions which are neither
founded on authority nor on sound reasoning are never allowed to
remain unquestioned by the profession. Cases are known where such
decisions, always unsatisfactory to the profession, have been con-
stantly assailed and finally overthrown after the lapse of many years.
It is the office of the judge who writes a judicial decision to give the
reasons upon which the court proceeds. The proper administration of
justice is not satisfied with anything else. If these are omitted, the
judgment becomes a mere arbitrary exercise of power. If it is the of-
fice of the judicial courts to furnish the reasons which the court gives
for its decision, it cannot be affirmed with any show of logic that it is
not equally their office to furnish the reasons which a portion of the
court may give for the opposing view.
Dissenting Opinions, 20 AM. L. REV. 428, 429 (1886).
293. On the tension between the judiciary and the new profession of legal
academia, see JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUsTICE: LAWYERS AND
SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA 91-92 (1976).
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the most part from the ranks of the practitioners, were suspi-
cious that there would be a loss of practical efficiency if the
teachers in the universities were not made to know their
place. 12 94 But he noted that "[within the last ten or fifteen
years the conspiracy of silence has been dissolving" due to "a
disturbance of the weights of authority and influence":
Judges and advocates may not relish the admission, but the sobering
truth is that leadership in the march of legal thought has been pass-
ing in our day from the benches of the courts to the chairs of universi-
ties.... [Tihe outstanding fact is... that academic scholarship is
charting the line of development and progress in the untrodden re-
gions of the law.
295
In 1926 Learned Hand, speaking to an audience of academ-
ics, confirmed "that you will be recognized in another genera-
tion anyway, as the only body which can be relied upon to state
a doctrine, with a complete knowledge of its origin, its author-
ity and its meaning."296 By 1941 Charles Evans Hughes could
remember the days "thirty years" before when
Mr. Justice Holmes would refer somewhat scornfully to the 'notes' in
law school reviews which ventured, not always with modesty, to criti-
cise pronouncements of the Supreme Court. I recall that at one time
he admonished counsel who had the temerity to refer to them in ar-
gument that they were merely the "work of boys." He thought the
limit had been reached when what he had said in his judicial opinions
was approved by the students as being "a correct statement of the
law. 297
But now, Hughes explained, matters were quite different. "It is
not too much to say that, in confronting any serious problem, a
wide-awake and careful judge will at once look to see if the sub-
ject has been discussed, or the authorities collated and ana-
lyzed, in a good law periodical.2 98
Stone's turn to legal academia was thus not the idiosyn-
cratic response of a former Dean of the Columbia Law School.
It reflected the fact that law schools had become a "'fourth es-
294. Benjamin N. Cardozo, Introduction, SELECTED READINGS ON THE LAW
OF CONTRACTS FROM AiMERICAN AND ENGLISH LEGAL PERIODICALS vii, viii-ix
(Ass'n of Am. Law Schs. ed., 1931).
295. Id. at ix.
296. Learned Hand, Have the Bench and Bar Anything to Contribute to the
Teaching of Law?, 24 MICH. L. REV. 466, 468 (1926).
297. Charles E. Hughes, Foreword, 50 YALE L.J. 737, 737 (1941). When
Stone circulated the draft of his opinion in Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S.
494 (1926), Holmes remarked on Stone's citation of a Harvard Law Review
note: "If this is one of those editorial notes, I should not cite it." Stone Papers.
Stone, however, refused to remove the citation. 271 U.S. at 499.
298. Hughes, supra note 297, at 737.
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tate' of the law,"299 bringing to bear a breadth and depth of
comprehension that palpably competed with judges for the
mantle of expert authority. This was an authority that clearly
appealed to Brandeis, who expressed to Frankfurter his convic-
tion that "[m]uch of the best and original legal thinking in
America during the last generation is to be found in the law
journals."300 Brandeis believed that "law schools ought not to
let Ct get by-country ought to insist on quality,"30 1 and in dis-
sent he would explicitly cite law review articles to sustain con-
clusions like "helpful discussion by friends of the Court, have
made it clear that the rule declared is legally unsound."30 2
If a dissent addressed to the general public challenged the
Court's authority by blurring the very meaning of "law," a dis-
sent addressed to the expertise of legal academia challenged
the Court's authority in a different way. It posed the issue of
whether judges or academics would control the articulation of
law. Holmes saw this very clearly. He once identified the au-
thority of the Court as "something ultra academic-I do not
299. Id.
300. BRANDEIS-FRANKFURTER LETTERS, supra note 92, at 121. Brandeis
continued,
[It is, in the main, inaccessible to the bench and the bar. Now that
the law journals have become an incident of the law schools of the
Universities, the number of valuable contributions should increase
rapidly. Would it not be desirable that the Law Schools should coop-
erate in publishing an Index covering all valuable articles, which
have appeared during the last 35 years... and arrange for supple-
ments to be published annually thereafter? The fact that articles
would be thus made accessible should tend to encourage production.
Id. at 121-22.
301. The Brandeis-Frankfurter Conversations, supra note 74, at 309.
Brandeis emphasized to Zechariah Chafee "the value of a Law School profes-
sorship, as a fulcrum in efforts to improve the law and through it, society." IV
THE LETTERS OF Louis D. BRANDEIS 564 (Melvin I. Urofsky & David W. Levy
eds., 1975).
302. Washington v. W.C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219, 236, n.18 (1924)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting). Fifteen years after Dawson & Co., Brandeis's dis-
senting appeal to the usefulness of law review literature would evolve in the
hands of his protdg6 Frankfurter into a Court opinion that could overrule a
precedent (Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245 (1920)) on the basis of a frank avowal
that "[tihe decision met wide and steadily growing disfavor from legal scholar-
ship and professional opinion." O'Malley v. Woodrough, 307 U.S. 277, 281
(1939). In dissent, Butler grumbled that as against "the deliberate judgments
of this Court" Frankfurter could adduce only the "selected gainsaying writings
of professors,-some are lawyers and some are not-but without specification
of or reference to the reasons upon which their views rest. And in addition it
cites notes published in law reviews, some signed and some not; presumably
the latter were prepared by law students." Id. at 298 (Butler, J., dissenting).
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mean academic in the extreme but beyond academic considera-
tions," and he was highly ambivalent about this authority:
I have sometimes criticised the Harvard Law Rev. for the offhand and
august way in which it says that a case may be supported or cannot
be. After all there is something ultra academic-I do not mean aca-
demic in the extreme but beyond academic considerations-in the
opinions of an experienced Judge. And the young men of a law school
don't realize that. But of course a judicial opinion like a scientific one
must stand or fall on its reasons not on dogma, but as the legal prem-
ises are not qualified with the accuracy of science, and as the main
justification of the law in my opinion is the fact that it has come out
this way rather than some other which so far as I can see is equally
good, I think the decisions of an important Court must command a
certain respect because it is a decision and the opinion of experienced
men, whether it seems right academically or not. Of course you won't
think that this means I am getting personally into a noli me tangere
frame of mind. I welcome every criticism from logic to English, and
try to learn from it. But if anyone is to dogmatize it must be the man
in power not the law student.
30 3
Holmes was torn between conceiving the authority of
courts as flowing from their capacity to announce the arbitrary
dicta of the state, and conceiving their authority as resting in-
stead on the validity of their "reasons."3°4 On the first view, the
authority of an opinion is "beyond academic considerations"; its
judgment "must command a certain respect because it is a deci-
sion." On the second, the authority of an opinion must "stand
or fall on its reasons," and the authority of a Court's decisions
are accordingly made subject to the evaluation of those whose
experience and insight are capable of applying what Stone
called the "critical tests" of judgment.305 A judgment of the
Court must earn respect because it is right, rather than merely
command respect because it is a decision. Holmes could never
quite reconcile the conflict between these two perspectives.
Because Holmes himself believed that the understanding
of an "experienced Judge" could not be rivaled, he was not him-
self tempted to appeal to the realm of legal scholarship in his
303. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to John Henry Wigmore (May 17,
1906) (Holmes Papers, Reel 39, Frame 15).
304. A.W.B. Simpson finds an analogous tension between "a concept of law
rooted in reason, and one rooted in authority" in the genre of the legal treatise.
A.W.B. Simpson, The Rise and Fall of the Legal Treatise: Legal Principles and
the Forms of Legal Literature, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 632, 665 (1981). Simpson
associates the latter view of law with "the spirit of positivism." Id. at 668; see
also Collier, supra note 48, at 215-23 (distinguishing "institutional authority
from intellectual authority").
305. Stone, Dissenting Opinions, supra note 271, at 78.
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opinions or dissents.306 But Justices like Stone and Brandeis
had come to Hand's view that judges "have little opportunity to
go into questions as thoroughly and as scientifically as can
those engaged in research in the universities,"307 and they
therefore had greater reason to appeal to the authority of legal
academia. The implicit challenge to the Court's authority en-
tailed in this appeal to academic expertise did not go unnoticed.
It was in fact the site of determined struggle throughout the
1920s.
Although Taft, as a sophisticated former Yale law profes-
sor, was perfectly capable of writing to the Secretary of the Yale
Law Journal to congratulate him "on the growing prestige" of
the publication and to commend him on the Journal's doing
"great good in considering carefully and discussing freely and
frankly and criticising the opinions of the Courts,"308 in fact the
implicit threat to the Court's institutional position rankled him.
He dismissed articles attacking the Court's decisions as "the
way the academicians... get even with us." 30 9 When the erst-
306. See Figures 26-28.
307. Letter from Harlan Fiske Stone to Hessel E. Yntema (Oct. 24, 1928)
(Stone Papers)..
308. "It helps the cause of justice, and it helps the courts; and while there
may be differing opinions as to the particular criticism and its soundness, this
does not in the slightest degree detract from its usefulness." Letter from Wil-
liam Howard Taft to A.G. Gulliver (Feb. 6, 1922) (Taft Papers, Reel 239).
309. Letter from William Howard Taft to Horace Taft (Jan. 7, 1929) (Taft
Papers, Reel 307). The oddly disjunctive relationship between Taft and the
legal academy is nicely captured by the occasion when Roscoe Pound asked
Taft to consent to be interviewed by Pound's student Olson for the purpose of
legal research. Taft graciously accepted, and then wrote Pound this account of
the interview:
Mr. Olson presented your letter of introduction of December 24th.
I am afraid I was not very helpful to him. I don't quite understand
what his particular purpose was. You describe it and he describes it
as the investigation of the psychology of judicial decisions. So far as
he developed it to me, it was to read me a criticism of my opinions and
to question their reasoning, and then to invite my dissent or answer
to his criticisms. Of course I could not spend my time meeting criti-
cisms of my opinions and arguing them out with a law student. Just
what kind of a study in psychology he was engaged in, other than that
of the use of his reasoning powers to assault the opinions of our
Court, I was unable to see. Of course it is the right of every law stu-
dent.., to read opinions and to approve or question their soundness,
but I am sorry that I haven't the time to give to Mr. Olson the oppor-
tunity to practice his psychological research by defending each one of
my opinions which he happens to differ with. I, therefore, asked him
to excuse me from what I really did not have time for. Of course it is
the privilege of every student and every American citizen to question
the opinions of a Court, but it is hardly the duty-perhaps it is hardly
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while Solicitor General James M. Beck sent Taft an academic
article criticizing Taft's opinion in Myers v. United States,310
Taft dryly noted "that another Commission of University Pro-
fessors is engaged in reversing the Supreme Court. The con-
tinuance of the discussion is not a matter which causes me to
sit up nights."31'
Underlying the irony lay real anger. That members of the
Court would abet an assault on the Court's authority by pan-
dering to academic expertise was almost intolerable to Taft.
Near the end of his life, Taft dismissed Stone because "he hun-
gers for the applause of the law school professors and the ad-
mirers of Holmes."312 Taft's ire at Brandeis's dissent in Olm-
stead v. United States,313 a case holding that the Fourth
Amendment provided no protection against wiretapping, modu-
lated easily into resentment at the scholars for whom Brandeis
wrote:
His claques in the law school contingent will sound his praises and
point the finger of scorn at us, but if they think we're going to be
frightened in our effort to stand by the law and give the public a
proper-for the Judge who has written them, to supplement what he
may have said in his opinions and to sustain the correctness of his
conclusions by further discussion of them with young gentlemen pur-
suing their research.
Letter from William Howard Taft to Roscoe Pound (Jan. 3, 1924) (Taft Papers,
Reel 260).
310. 272 U.S. 52 (1926). Letter from James M. Beck to William Howard
Taft (Oct. 24, 1929) (Taft Papers, Reel 315). Beck observed, "As often, the Col-
lege Professors attempt to reverse the Supreme Court." Id.
311. Letter from William Howard Taft to James M. Beck (Oct. 25, 1929)
(Taft Papers, Reel 315). When Milton Handler, fresh from his clerkship with
Stone, sent Taft a copy of Handler's article that had just appeared in the Co-
lumbia Law Review, he evinced full awareness of the strained relationship be-
tween legal academia and the Court:
I suppose that the chief raison d'etre of an article is the sublima-
tion of the ego of the writer, and how else can this be done but by a
restrained criticism of Judicial opinion. Only by showing the Courts
to be wrong can the author display his own unparalleled wisdom. I
fear that in this paper I fall into this pattern of law writer. While
somewhat critical of the work of the Court, I have tried to approach
the problem in a truly impartial and scientific way and I hope that my
study will be of some value in this field.
Letter from Milton Handler to William Howard Taft (Nov. 19, 1928) (Taft Pa-
pers, Reel 306). Taft replied graciously thanking Handler for the article, add-
ing that "[wle are always glad to be advised by academic leaders." Letter from
William Howard Taft to Milton Handler, November 23, 1928 (Taft Papers)
(Reel 306).
312. Letter from William Howard Taft to Horace Taft (June 8, 1928) (Taft
Papers, Reel 302).
313. 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928).
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chance to punish criminals, they are mistaken, even though we are
condemned for lack of high ideals.
14
Part of this anger was no doubt due to the fact that the
strained relationship between the Court and the law schools
had become entangled with factional divisions within the Court
itself. Not only were "the dissenting minority of three"315 lion-
ized in the law journals, 316 which must have been personally
galling,317 but the progressive cast of American legal academia
in the 1920s was quite hostile to the conservative constitutional
vision that the majority of the Court was seeking to imple-
ment.318 "I have no doubt," Taft wrote his brother, "there is
314. Letter from William Howard Taft to Horace Taft (June 8, 1928) (Taft
Papers, Reel 302). Four days later, Taft confided to his brother that "I shall
continued to be worried by attacks from the academic lawyers who write col-
lege law journals but I suppose it is not a basis for impeachment." Letter from
William Howard Taft to Horace Taft, June 12, 1928 (Taft Papers, Reel 302).
315. Letter from William Howard Taft to Horace Taft (Dec. 1, 1929) (Taft
Papers, Reel 316).
316. It was a noteworthy occasion when every so often an article favorable
to the majority appeared in the law journals. See, e.g., Letter from William
Howard Taft to Willis Van Devanter (Jan. 12, 1929) (Taft Papers, Reel 307) ("I
call your attention to the fact that once in a while even the Yale Law Journal
thinks that the opinion of the majority of the Court should be sustained."); see
also Letter from Dean Joseph R. Long to William Howard Taft (Dec. 10, 1922)
(Taft Papers, Reel 248) (enclosing article praising Tafts opinion in Baily v.
Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922) (commonly known as the Child Labor
Tax Case)); Letter from William Howard Taft to Dean Joseph R. Long (Dec.
12, 1922) (Taft Papers, Reel 248) ("I appreciate much your article."); Letter
from Henry St. George Tucker to William Howard Taft (Dec. 11, 1922) (Taft
Papers, Reel 248) (calling Taft's "attention" to the "very interesting" Long arti-
cle).
317. Thus when Taft began a campaign to persuade Yale to grant Willis
Van Devanter an honorary degree, praising Van Devanter as "one of the ablest
Judges that we have ever had on the Court," Taft was forced to explain Van
Devanter's relative public obscurity by the fact that "[hie has not what some of
our Judges have by reason of their relations to Law Schools-a claque who are
continually sounding their praises, but when it comes to keeping the Court
straight and consistent with itself, he is the man who does it." Letter from
William Howard Taft to William Phelps (May 30, 1927) (Taft Papers, Reel
292).
318. Jerold S. Auerbach has written that "[iun the two decades preceding
World War I a sense of public responsibility and an identification with political
reform provided law teachers with their special identity." AUERBACH, supra
note 293, at 81; see also Jerold S. Auerbach, Enmity and Amity: Law Teachers
and Practitioners, 1900-1922, 5 PERSP. AM. HIST. 551 (1971) (reviewing the
teaching of law as a profession). Taft was particularly outraged by mobiliza-
tion within the law schools over the Sacco and Vanzetti case. He wrote an un-
solicited letter to the President of Yale University complaining of the involve-
ment of the law faculty in protesting the convictions:
I don't know how much influence you can exercise with respect to
the Yale Law School, but I am a good deal troubled in respect to
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persistent hope, especially by the younger crowd of college pro-
fessors, that in some way or other Holmes will be continued on
something I have seen in the newspapers. The Harvard Law School
is suffering from the exercise of influence upon it by Felix Frank-
furter. He seems to be closely in touch with every Bolshevistic com-
munist movement in this country. I know him very well. He is a man
of ability and can be in certain directions quite useful, but for some
reason or other he is against courts and recognized authority, a very
bad tendency in a college law professor. I don't know anything about
this criminal prosecution of two Italians .... I have no objection to
the criticism of judicial opinions or judicial judgments-That is neces-
sary. Nor have I any objection to this by professors of law schools, be-
cause they are competent men and may often exercise a very useful
influence upon judges to help the science of the law, but I think it
quite unwise for a law school of Connecticut, far removed from the
situation, to have its Dean and Professors join in a public meeting
and protest against the conduct of litigation in another State and sec-
ond an article by Frankfurter. I don't know that anything can be
done about the further activities of Dean Hutchins in this matter, but
I think it would be wise to talk to him on the subject and say that as
the Dean of the Law School he should restrain himself and not rush
in, as he evidently has, and put the Law School, of which he is the
head, in such a movement which involves the weighing of facts as well
as of law, and relates to a trial which took place when Hutchins must
have been a boy.... [Mly interest in Yale makes me feel that I am
justified in suggesting to you that you restrain Hutchins ....
Letter from William Howard Taft to James R. Angell (May 1, 1927) (Taft Pa-
pers, Reel 291); see also Yale Liberals Defend Sacco and Vanzetti; Review of
Conviction Urged by Dean Hutchins, Professor C.B. Clark and Others, N.Y.
TIMES, April 30, 1927, at 23; cf. Robert M. Hutchins, Cross-Examination to
Impeach, 36 YALE L.J. 384, 385-88 (1927). For Angell's cool reply, see Letter
from James R. Angell to William Howard Taft (May 3, 1927) (Taft Papers,
Reel 291). The following week Taft complained to Elihu Root,
I think our Law Schools might be about better business than attempt-
ing to decide how trials ought to be conducted in capital cases in old
Massachusetts, without other knowledge of the record than that de-
rived from a magazine article by Prof. Felix Frankfurter, who has be-
come an expert in attempting to save murderous anarchists from the
gallows or the electric chair. I don't like to characterize any great
profession, but I think the profession of law teacher, as well as the
clerical profession, does not always exercise the best judgment in
keeping out of fields in which they are apt to make egregious mis-
takes.
Letter from William Howard Taft to Elihu Root (May 12, 1927) (Taft Papers,
Reel 291). After Sacco's and Vanzetti's executions, Taft wrote to one of Massa-
chusetts Governor Fuller's advisors in the case that
[ilt is remarkable how Frankfurter with his article was able to pre-
sent to so large a body of readers a perverted view of the facts and
then through the world wide conspiracy of communism spread it to
many many countries. Our law schools lent themselves to the vicious
propaganda. The utter lack of substance in it all is shown by the
event. It was a bubble and was burst by the courage of the Governor
and his advisors.
Letter from William Howard Taft to Robert Grant (Nov. 4, 1927) (Taft Papers,
Reel 296).
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the Court while the rest of us die off."319 Of the unremitting
criticisms of legal scholars, Taft remarked that "these gentle-
men are so much torn by their anxiety about the Supreme
Court that it is a wonder we are able to survive it." 32 0
When the occasional academic dared to trespass upon the
boundaries of judicial prerogative, the reaction of Taft and
other Justices could be swift and murderous, as Stone learned
to his chagrin in 1927. After the Court decided Liberty Ware-
house Co. v. Grannis,321 which held that federal courts had "no
jurisdiction" to proceed in a diversity suit according to the
terms of "the Declaratory Judgment Law of Kentucky,"322 Pro-
fessor Edwin Borchard of the Yale Law School, long a passion-
ate advocate of a federal declaratory judgment statute,32 3 wrote
to Stone to express his concern that the Court "has recently
taken what I believe to be a very unfortunate 'sideswipe' at the
declaratory judgment as a procedural method for challenging
the constitutionality of a statute."32 4 He explained to Stone
that he was "writing a comment on the case, and on the dan-
gers to the declaratory judgment involved in it, for the Yale
319. Letter from William Howard Taft to Horace Taft, December 8, 1929
(Taft Papers) (Reel 316). In 1930, Van Devanter's intimate friend, federal dis-
trict Judge John C. Pollock, wrote him that
I notice in a recent Law Review very high commendation of the legal
opinions, more especially dissenting opinions, of a couple of gentle-
men, you will readily realize to whom I refer. I cannot understand
this and do not appreciate the viewpoint from which they are written.
I apprehend you have seen the same. I begin to think every once in a
while that as we grow older we grow out of touch with a lot of ideas
that some people appreciate very highly, but which will not work out
in practice.
Letter from John C. Pollock to Willis Van Devanter (Apr. 17, 1930) (Van
Devanter Papers).
320. Letter from William Howard Taft to Moses Strauss (Feb. 19, 1929)
(Taft Papers, Reel 308). Taft brushed off Edward Corwin's criticisms of Tafts
opinion in Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922), characterizing
them as the objections "of the class not of lawyers but of government philoso-
phers who think that the Constitution ought to be moulded to suit their par-
ticular sociological views as they may vary from time to time." Letter from
William Howard Taft to Horace Taft (Sept. 7, 1922) (Taft Papers, Reel 245).
321. 273 U.S. 70 (1927).
322. Id. at 76.
323. See, e.g., EDWIN M. BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS (1919);
Edwin M. Borchard, The Declaratory Judgment-A Needed Procedural Re-
form, 28 YALE L.J. 1, 105 (1918); Edwin M. Borchard, The Declaratory Judg-
ment, NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 12, 1921, at 192.
324. Letter from Edwin M. Borchard to Harlan Fiske Stone (Feb. 4, 1927)
(Stone Papers). Grannis was decided on January 3, 1927.
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Law Journal," and asked if it would be "proper" for him to send
it "to each member of the Court."325
Stone replied that "I would say that I think it would be
quite in order for you to send your article in the Law Journal to
all the members of the Court."326 Borchard accordingly sent a
copy of his Comment to each Justice,327 with an accompanying
letter that politely referred to the inadequacy of the reasoning
in Grannis and suggested that occasion be taken, "if you find it
consistent, to prevent the unfortunate result to which the
Court's opinion... may easily lead."328 Borchard sent a copy of
325. Id.
326. Letter from Harlan Fiske Stone to Edwin M. Borchard (Feb. 7, 1927)
(Stone Papers). For Borchard's reply, see Letter from Edwin M. Borchard to
Harlan Fiske Stone (Feb. 9, 1927) (Stone Papers). At the time, Stone was
writing the Court's opinion in Fidelity National Bank & Trust Co. v. Swope,
274 U.S. 123 (1927), in which the Court in effect upheld federal jurisdiction of
a state declaratory judgment. Stone had been assigned Swope at the end of
January when Taft, "[uin the redistribution of cases to help out our dear friend
Van, because of his near breakdown," asked that Stone take over the case.
Letter from William Howard Taft to Harlan Fiske Stone (Jan. 26, 1927) (Stone
Papers). Taft added, "All the members of the Court voted to reverse the case
except McReynolds, who was passed. Your forced familiarity with questions of
this kind in the St. Louis case [Missouri v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 273 U.S. 126
(1927)], which you were not able to use in the opinion handed down recently,
may prove to be of use to you in this case. I hope so." Id. Swope issued on
April 11, 1927. See 274 U.S. at 123. Van Devanter adjudged it "a fine opinion,
judicial through and through. Enriches straight from the beginning to the
conclusion." Stone Papers. Taft also thought it "a good opinion." Id. On April
29, Walter Wheeler Cook wrote Stone to congratulate him on the Swope opin-
ion, confessing that Grannis had "alarmed me greatly. I feared the court was
getting into a position where it would find itself bound to hold a federal de-
claratory judgment statute unconstitutional as giving non-judicial power."
Letter from Walter Wheeler Cook to Harlan Fiske Stone (Apr. 29, 1927) (Stone
Papers). Stone replied to Cook that "I was not a little troubled when I came to
write" Swope "about some of the things that had been said about what is a
'case' or 'controversy' or judicial power' within the meaning of the Constitu-
tion." Letter from Harlan Fiske Stone to Walter Wheeler Cook (May 2, 1927)
(Stone Papers).
327. See Edwin M. Borchard, Declaratory Actions as "Cases" or "Controver-
sies," 36 YALE L.J. 845 (1927).
328. Letter from Edwin M. Borchard to William Howard Taft (Apr. 15,
1927) (Taft Papers, Reel 290). In full, the letter said,
I venture to ask your consideration of this Comment, which deals
with the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Liberty Ware-
house Co. v. Grannis .... In that case, the Court, speaking through
Mr. Justice Sanford, held, or intimated that the declaratory judgment
procedure, now adopted by statute in some twenty-one states, was
unconstitutional, because it did not present a "case" or "controversy".
This conclusion is not, I respectfully venture to think, justified by the
facts, and I have, in the Comment referred to, expressed the opinion
that the question was not adequately argued before the Court. I
1369
HeinOnline -- 85 Minn. L. Rev. 1369 2000-2001
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:1267
his letter to Stone, together with a note explaining what he had
done and observing that "[iut would be too bad if, through an
inadvertence, such a useful procedure as the declaratory action
should be strangled. I trust you will be convinced that this is
so, and will use your influence in the Court to obtain some re-
consideration of the procedure in question."329
Three days later, Stone wrote Taft to express his concern
about Grannis:
I think we will have in increasing measure statutes like those in-
volved in... the Grannis case ... and that we ought to be extremely
cautious about limiting the utility of such statutes.
I have been troubled about the decision in the Grannis case for
that reason and my sense of discomfort has not been allayed by read-
ing in the April number of the Yale Law Review, at page 845, a com-
ment on the Grannis case which expresses my own doubts about it.
I don't know how you or any of the other members of the Court
would feel about reopening the question in the Grannis case, but I
think that there is some ground for giving the question some
thought.330
To Stone's evident surprise, Taft responded in a white fury:331
would not dare trouble you with my views on this matter, but for the
fact that I believe that the opinion of the Court, which may or may
not have been dictum, threatens with extinction, on insufficient
grounds, what, in my opinion, is one of the most useful procedural re-
forms of recent years .... I trust you will be kind enough to give this
matter your consideration, and perhaps take some occasion, if you
find it consistent, to prevent the unfortunate result to which the
Court's opinion in the Liberty Warehouse case may easily lead. I beg
also to call your attention to the April (1927) Harvard Law Review
(page 903), in which the editor appears to share the subscriber's view
of the effect of the Court's decision in the Liberty Warehouse case.
Id. We have extant the letters that Borchard sent to Van Devanter, Taft, San-
ford, and Sutherland. They are identical. Taft's copy is marked "No ans." Id.
329. Letter from Edwin M. Borchard to Harlan Fiske Stone (Apr. 15, 1927)
(Stone Papers).
330. Letter from Harlan Fiske Stone to William Howard Taft (Apr. 18,
1927) (Taft Papers, Reel 290). On Taft's daily memorandum of things to do for
April 21, 1927, the fourth item on the list reads, "Take up Borchard's letter."
Taft Papers (Reel 290).
331. Taft held very definite views of Borchard prior to this incident. In
1924, Nicholas Murray Butler had written Taft asking for recommendations
for an international law scholar to replace John Bassett Moore at Columbia.
Taft replied in most unpleasant terms:
There is a man who has had a good deal of experience in international
matters, who is now the Law Librarian at Yale. His name is Edwin
Borchard. He has gotten up a compendium on a phase of interna-
tional law which I think has been well regarded. But I think he has
reddish tendencies and I doubt if you would wish to take him over.
He is Hebraic in look, and I have no doubt in fact. He is always for
the Brandeis view of every constitutional question. I lodged a com-
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Replying to your letter of April 18th and the question of declara-
tory judgments raised by Borchard in his general assault upon the
Court by letter, I am inclined to think that I had better allow the thing
to proceed just as it is until somebody raises the question again. Bor-
chard has aroused the indignation of the members of the Court at his
method of attempting to induce the Court to reconsider or rehear the
issue in which he is so much interested. Our brother Butler was par-
ticularly incensed. I haven't answered Borchard's letter, and I am
rather inclined not to do so. If I did, I might have to write him a dis-
ciplinary letter. It is burdensome to do so.
3 32
Flustered, Stone retreated, writing Taft a letter agreeing that
"there is nothing to be done further at present upon the subject
plaint with Swan against having him instill in the minds of the Yale
Law School men that spirit of constitutional construction, for I believe
that they have been using him on the subject of Federal Constitu-
tional Law.
Letter from William Howard Taft to Nicholas Murray Butler (Dec. 30, 1924)
(Taft Papers, Reel 270).
332. Letter from William Howard Taft to Harlan Fiske Stone (Apr. 24,
1927) (Taft Papers, Reel 291) (emphasis added). The following year the Court
decided Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Ass'n., 277 U.S. 274 (1928), in which
Brandeis, in his opinion for the Court, offhandedly remarked (citing Grannis)
that a declaratory judgment "is beyond the power conferred upon the Federal
judiciary." Id. at 289. Taft responded to Brandeis's draft opinion, "Borchard
will moan but he can not by tears change our jurisdiction." Brandeis Papers.
On Brandeis's personal dislike of declaratory judgments and campaign against
them, see EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE
CONSTITUTION: ERIE, THE JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE
FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 124-32 (2000).
Curiously enough, Taft had another run-in with Borchard at the end of
the 1926 Term. In June 1927 Taft wrote the opinion for the Court in an ob-
scure case, Weedin v. Chin Bow, 274 U.S. 657 (1927), which concerned the citi-
zenship status of the children of American citizens who did not reside in the
United States. Tafts published opinion, which was released on June 6, 1927,
deliberately and specifically criticized a passage from Borchard's book, The
Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad (1915), charging that it relied on evi-
dence that "does not bear out the conclusion to which it is cited." Taft Papers
(Reel 292). Borchard instantly telegraphed Taft at his summer residence in
Murray Bay, Canada, to explain that Tafts charge rested on an apparent con-
fusion regarding the reference of various footnotes. See Telegram from Edwin
M. Borchard to William Howard Taft (June 9, 1927) (Taft Papers, Reel 292).
He also sent a letter worrying that Taft's accusation, which was based on "an
inadvertent mistake," "might by the profession be deemed to impugn my reli-
ability." Letter from Edwin M. Borchard to William Howard Taft (June 9,
1927) (Taft Papers, Reel 292); see also Letter from William Crosskey to Wil-
liam Howard Taft (June 9, 1927) (Taft Papers, Reel 292). After consulting
with his law clerk, William Crosskey, Taft removed the offending passages.
See Weedin, 274 U.S. at 673-74; Letter from William Howard Taft to Charles
Cropley (July 5, 1927) (Taft Papers, Reel 292); Letter from Charles Cropley to
William Howard Taft (June 30, 1927) (Taft Papers, Reel 292); Telegram from
William Howard Taft to Charles Cropley (June 10, 1927) (Taft Papers, Reel
292).
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matter of the Liberty Warehouse case"333 repeating "what I said
to you orally-that my writing to you on this subject was en-
tirely on my own initiative.... It was not inspired by Bor-
chard's letter, as I did not receive it until the day after I had
sent my letter to you" and acknowledging that Borchard's letter
"shows a lack of a sense of propriety which perhaps merits a
positive rebuke, although I shall content myself by not answer-
ing it." 334 But Stone concluded his letter by returning to what
was for him the central point: "I am more concerned with the
thoroughness and scientific quality of our decisions and opin-
ions than I am with the lack of propriety of others for whom we
are not responsible, even though they ought to know better."335
333. Letter from Harlan Fiske Stone to William Howard Taft (Apr. 25,
1927) (Taft Papers, Reel 291). But Stone added,
My experience, however, in writing the opinion in the Swope case
convinces me that we ought to approach this type of question when it
comes up again with the greatest caution, and that we ought not to
follow some of the things that have been said in earlier cases, al-
though quite possibly we can follow what was actually decided.
Id.
334. Id.
335. Id. Borchard clearly had no idea of the hornet's nest he had aroused.
He wrote Stone again in 1928, affirming that "the law journals ... have
agreed that Judge Sanford made a mistake" in Grannis, and complaining of
further dicta damaging to a potential federal declaratory judgment statute in
Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Burley Tobacco Growers' Co-Operative Marketing
Ass'n, 276 U.S. 71 (1928). Letter from Edwin M. Borchard to Harlan Fiske
Stone (Mar. 1, 1928) (Stone Papers). He asked Stone to "to talk this matter
over with the Chief Justice" and perhaps to arrange "a meeting with Judge
Sanford or any of the other Judges who would aid in preventing a further dis-
aster to the declaratory judgment." Id. In December, ignorant of Brandeis's
personal opposition to declaratory judgments, see supra note 332, and credit-
ing Brandeis's public professions of respect for scholarly opinion, Borchard
wrote Stone once again, enclosing Borchard's latest article responding to Will-
ing. See Edwin M. Borchard, The Supreme Court and the Declaratory Judg-
ment, 14 A.B.A. J. 633 (1928). Borchard wrote,
Justice Brandeis has, on numerous occasions, praised the function of
the Law Journals in exercising a critical function upon the work of
the Court. I trust he still adheres to that view. At all events, I en-
deavored to indicate in the article the utmost respect for the Court
and its judges, but to suggest that the random remarks made
concerning the declaratory judgment, being unnecessary in each of
the three cases in which such remarks were uttered, were not
necessarily as well considered as they might have been.
Letter from Edwin M. Borchard to Harlan Fiske Stone (Dec. 21, 1928) (Stone
Papers). Borchard noted that he had not sent a copy of his article "to any
member of the Court," and he asked Stone whether it would "hurt the cause of
the declaratory judgment if I sent it to [Brandeis]. Or would you hand it to
him if I sent it to you?" Id. Stone advised Borchard that "[bly all means I
would send a marked copy of your article to each member of the Court without
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Borchard so incensed the Court because he inadvertently
violated the boundary separating reason from action. He not
only criticized the Court's logic in Grannis, but he also had the
impertinence to suggest that the Court might act on the force of
superior reasoning. He assumed that action ought to be guided
by expert knowledge. He evidenced no appreciation that the
Court's unique institutional authority to declare law lay pre-
cisely in its power to decide regardless of reasons, and he was
heedless of the many ways in which a claim of expert knowl-
edge might implicitly challenge that authority. The indigna-
tion aroused by Borchard's letter demonstrates, however, that
Justices of the Taft Court were keen to perceive this threat.
Stone was oblivious to the incendiary potential of Borchard's
letter because he also believed that the Court's authority
largely depended upon the "scientific quality" of its opinions.
That is why Stone could so casually cite to Taft the reasoning of
legal academics as grounds for guiding Court policy, without
seeming to realize just how potentially explosive such a citation
could be.
It was a realization that conservative members of the
Court were determined to bring home to Stone. When Stone
circulated a draft opinion in Louis Pizitz Dry Goods Co. v.
Yeldell,336 which concerned the constitutionality of an Alabama
statute authorizing recovery of punitive damages against an
employer for wrongful deaths caused by the negligent acts of
employees, he cited in support of his argument an article by his
former Columbia colleague Young B. Smith.337 Butler immedi-
ately pounced.
I have hastily examined this article. You cite it generally, I think it is
not helpful-certainly it is not necessary. Some having axes to grind
write for Law Reviews in the attitude of advocates or propagandists.
I do not suggest anything of the sort as to Mr. Scott [sic], but the fact
that others do make it at least doubtful whether this Court ought to
cite such writings-At least so it seems to me.338
any comment." Letter from Harlan Fiske Stone to Edwin M. Borchard (De-
cember 24, 1928) (Stone Papers) (emphasis added).
336. 274 U.S. 112 (1927). The draft opinion is located in the Stone Papers.
It seems to have circulated April 11, 1927.
337. See Young B. Smith, Frolic and Detour, 23 COLUM. L. REV. 444, 716
(1923). As it happens, Stone wrote the frontpiece of the issue in which Smith's
article appeared. See Harlan F. Stone, Charles Thaddeus Terry, 23 COLUM. L.
REV. 415 (1923).
338. Stone Papers. For a subsequent and very public attack on the Court's
consideration of "unknown, unrecognized and nonauthoritative text books,
Law Review articles, and other writings of propaganda artists and lobbyists"
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Van Devanter agreed. "To me it seems quite inappropriate to
cite law journals."339 Taft also piled on. "I doubt the wisdom of
reference to a Law Review." 340 Stone conceded, withdrawing
the reference and writing to Smith, "Confidentially, I cited your
article.., in the Pizitz case, but some of the brethren are so
opposed to citing Law Review articles that I finally took it
out."
34 1
Today, of course, the Court routinely cites law review lit-
erature.342 Figure 24 compares the rate of citations to law re-
in the field of antitrust law, see the remarks of Representative Wright Pat-
man, 103 CONG. REc. 16159, 16160 (Aug. 27, 1957).
339. Stone Papers.
340. Id.
341. Letter from Harlan Fiske Stone to Y.B. Smith (Apr. 15, 1927) (Stone
Papers). Eventually Stone got the message. In 1928, he wrote his friend Hes-
sel Yntema, about the latter's project to organize academic inquiry in a way
that would be useful to courts, that "[t]he problem of how to make use of your
studies in the most effective way so that they will be of assistance to courts is
not as easy as might first appear." Letter from Harlan Fiske Stone to Hessel
E. Yntema (Oct. 24, 1928) (Stone Papers).
Ordinarily, where a brief is filed amicus curiae, it is filed in behalf of
someone who has a similar case and who will therefore be directly af-
fected by the determination of the court. The fact that there are those
who have a scientific interest in the law would seem to me to be
equally good ground for getting their idea before the court, and for the
court's welcoming any assistance which they will be able to give. As a
matter of fact, I am bound to say that I think there are many judges
who distrust all such assistance, and hesitate to use or cite it. This is
based partly on the kind of self confidence which leads a certain type
of mind to reject ideas that it has not evolved itself, or which do not
fall within the range of its own experience, and partly on the fact that
in recent years there have been some rather unpleasant examples of
men who have written what purported to be scientifically inspired ar-
ticles in law journals who were actually secretly serving the interests
of clients. There are also judges who firmly believe that "academic"
persons who have devoted their talents to research in the investiga-
tion of particular fields cannot possibly know as much about a subject
as those who have had a lifelong judicial and professional experience.
Of course, there are some courts which know better. The Court of
Appeals, headed by Judge Cardozo, and possibly some other courts,
have reached that happy stage, but that attitude is, I am convinced,
not a general one among judges the country over, despite the fact that
because of faulty presentation, pressure of work, etc., they have little
opportunity to go into questions as thoroughly and as scientifically as
can those engaged in research in the universities.
Id.
342. Wes Daniels, "Far Beyond the Law Reports". Secondary Source Cita-
tions in United States Supreme Court Opinions, October Terms 1900, 1940,
and 1978, 76 LAW LIBR. J. 1, 4 (1983). For a sampling of the very large litera-
ture studying this phenomenon, see, e.g., Michael D. McClintock, The Declin-
ing Use of Legal Scholarship by Courts: An Empirical Study, 51 OKLA. L. REV.
659 (1998); Louis J. Sirico, Jr. & Jeffrey B. Margulies, The Citing of Law Re-
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view articles in Court opinions during the Taft Court era with
the rate of such citations in opinions during the 1997 Term.343










Taft Court 1997 Term
Figure 24 shows that the rate of citations to law reviews
has increased more than twenty-fold, from .03 citations per ma-
jority opinion to .59.344 Brandeis is sometimes identified as the
views by the Supreme Court: An Empirical Study, 34 UCLA L. REV. 131
(1986); Neil N. Bernstein, The Supreme Court and Secondary Source Material:
1965 Term, 57 GEO. L.J. 55 (1968); Chester A. Newland, Legal Periodicals and
the United States Supreme Court, 7 U. KAN. L. REV. 477 (1959); Douglas B.
Maggs, Concerning the Extent to Which the Law Review Contributes to the De-
velopment of the Law, 3 S. CAL. L. REV. 181 (1929); cf. Friedman et al., supra
note 52; Michael I. Swygert & Jon W. Bruce, The Historical Origins, Found-
ing, and Early Development of Student-Edited Law Reviews, 36 HASTINGS L.J.
739 (1985); William H. Manz, The Citation Practices of the New York Court of
Appeals, 1850-1993, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 121 (1995) (reviewing citation in New
York state cases).
343. Michael McClintock argues that "t]he number of judicial citations of
law reviews.., declined dramatically from 1975 to 1996." McClintock, supra
note 342 at 684. The decrease in the Supreme Court was 58.6 percent. Id. at
685. Given this decline, the contrast with the Taft Court revealed by Figure
24 is all the more stark.
344. There were 41 citations to law review articles in the 1,554 court opin-
ions published in the Terms between 1921 and 1928. By contrast, there were
57 such citations in the 96 court opinions in the 1997 Term. A study of state
supreme courts has found a similar change in citation practices. In the decade
between 1915 and 1925, .5 percent of state supreme court opinions cited law
review articles, a figure that had increased by more than twentyfold by the
decade between 1960 and 1970, when 11.9 percent of state supreme court
opinions cited law review articles. Friedman et al., supra note 52, at 811. In
the New York Court of Appeals, the number of citations to legal periodicals
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Justice who broke the barrier against citing law reviews in Su-
preme Court opinions.3 45 Figure 25 does indicate that of all the
Taft Court Justices, only Brandeis and Stone were likely to cite
law reviews in their opinions for the Court. But a close inspec-
tion of Figures 26-27 also suggests that Brandeis primarily re-
ferred to law reviews in his dissents, 346 and that it was Stone
who most systematically began to incorporate references to law
review articles into his opinions for the Court.
Figure 25: Number of Citations in Majority Opinions,
1921-1928 Terms
60
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increased about tenfold in the period between 1920 and 1990. Manz, supra
note 342, at 157.
345. See, e.g., John W. Johnson, Adaptive Jurisprudence: Some Dimensions
of Early Twentieth-Century American Legal Culture, 40 HISTORIAN 16, 24
(November 1977); Chester A. Newland, Innovation in Judicial Technique: The
Brandeis Opinion, 42 Sw. SOC. SCI. Q. 22, 24-26 (1961).
346. Cf. JOHN W. JOHNSON, AMERICAN LEGAL CULTURE: 1908-1940, at 41
(1981) (observing that Brandeis referred to social scientific studies in his dis-
sents, but not his opinions).
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Figure 27: Citations to Law Reviews in Court Opinions
and Dissents, by Justice, 1921-1928 Terms
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This means that while Brandeis was primarily content to
invoke the prestige of legal academia to cast doubt on the
Court's resolution of a legal question, it was Stone who sensed
that the Court's institutional prestige to declare law required
the supplementation of expertise, even as the Court was in very
the act of deciding a question of law. It was Stone who began to
create opinions that in their very composition interrogated the
extent to which the Court's institutional authority could plau-
sibly be deemed "ultra-academic."
Cardozo very quickly recognized the profound implications
of this transformation. Not only did the Court's increasing cita-
tion of law review articles signal a "change of leadership" from
"the benches of the courts to the chairs of universities,"347 but it
also signified "a recognition of the truth that an opinion derives
its authority, just as law derives its existence, from all the facts
of life. The judge is free to draw upon these facts wherever he
can find them, if only they are helpful. No longer is his mate-
rial confined to precedents in sheepskin."348 Cardozo saw, in
other words, that the struggle to open up Court opinions to le-
gal scholarship was not merely a competition for status be-
tween judges and scholars, but it was also a reflection of chang-
ing perceptions of the nature of judicial authority.
We can perhaps sharpen our apprehension of this shift by
noting that, as Figure 28 indicates, Justices in the Taft Court
era were in fact more willing to cite legal treatises and encyclo-
pedias in their opinions than they were to cite law review arti-
cles.3 49
347. Cardozo, supra note 294, at ix.
348. Id. at x. Cardozo continued, "Under the drive of this impulse, the law
teacher and the law reviews are coming to their own." Id.
349. During the 1921-1928 Terms, the Taft Court cited treatises and ency-
clopedias at the rate of .16 citations per majority opinion, as compared to a
rate of .03 citations per majority opinion for law review articles. See, e.g., Max
Radin, Sources of Law-New and Old, 1 S. CAL. L. REv. 411, 416 (1928) ("If
we place the authorities cited in the order of apparent importance, we should
find the following series: first, reported cases of the same jurisdiction; second,
reported cases of outside jurisdictions; third, cyclopedias and repertories;
fourth recent treatises; fifth, old treatises; and sixth and last, articles in legal
periodicals. Citations of the last class are very few indeed, although they are
increasingly slightly."). Figure M illustrates that during the Taft Court era
law review articles were more than twice as likely to be cited in dissents than
in Court opinions, while legal treatises and encyclopedias predominated in
Court opinions. If the 1997 Term is at all representative, Figure N indicates
that law review articles have lost their distinctive association with dissent,
while legal treatises and encyclopedias have remained somewhat more likely
to be cited in Court opinions than in dissents. Between the Taft Court and the
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While the reasons for this distinction are not entirely clear,
we should note that law reviews were the more or less exclusive
domain of "the academic scholar,"350 whereas legal treatises
had long been associated with practitioners and judges like
Story, Kent, and Cooley.351 Law review articles accordingly
tended to be imbued with a distinct scholarly orientation.
Whereas treatises and encyclopedias strove to present "an ac-
curate account of the law"352 as judges had constructed the
1997 Term, the rate of citations to legal treatises and encyclopedias in Court
opinions has increased almost sevenfold, from .16 to 1.1 citations per majority
opinion. By contrast, a study of state supreme court opinions found a decrease
in the citation of legal treatises and encyclopedias; in the period 1915-1925,
44.1 percent of state supreme court opinions cited these sources, whereas in
the decade between 1960 and 1970, these sources were cited in only 39.2 per-
cent of opinions. Friedman et al., supra note 52, at 811. In the New York
Court of Appeals, William H. Manz has counted 73 references to legal treatises
in 1920, which modestly increased to 98 citations in 1990. Manz, supra note
342, at 157.
350. Cardozo, supra note 294, at viii.
351. But see Simpson, supra note 304, at 670 ("From Story's time onwards,
the production of treatises was associated with organized, systematic legal
education .... This does not mean that the typical treatise writer was a clois-
tered academic, as the law schools until Langdell's time employed practitio-
ners as professors.").
352. PAUL D. CARRINGTON, STEWARDS OF DEMOCRACY: LAW AS A PUBLIC
PROFESSION 184 (1999). Treatises and encyclopedias tended to perform the
function that Harvard President Eliot imagined would be served by law pro-
fessors; they would, he said, function "as expounders, systematizers, and his-
torians" of the law. Quoted in ARTHUR E. SUTHERLAND, THE LAW AT
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law,353 law reviews articles were more nearly associated with
the view that law was "an instrument of social engineering,"354
requiring "a scientific apprehension of the relations of law to
society and of the needs and interests and opinions of society of
to-day."355 Not only did this orientation tend to displace judge-
centered law, but it also sought to subsume legal reasoning into
more general policy analysis.356
From this perspective, we can interpret the contemporary
Court's routine citation to law review articles as both express-
ing and sustaining the view that judicial decisions have the re-
sponsibility of arranging human affairs in a manner designed
to fulfill the purposes of the law. To the extent that these pur-
poses have become self-conscious, the authority of the courts
has in part come to depend upon their competence in achieving
legal objectives, and not merely upon judicial fidelity to the in-
ternal demands of a self-enclosed system of legal precedents.
The struggle in the Taft Court over the citation of legal scholar-
ship illuminates the beginnings of this profound shift.
V.
The decisionmaking practices of the Court can thus tell us
a good deal about how the Court regards important but other-
wise implicit tensions within the law. The nature of these
practices sheds light, for example, on the question of whether
the virtue of law is conceived to lie in its finality or in its capac-
ity to serve social purposes, or whether law is seen as distinct
from politics or as a product of popular will, or whether the au-
thority of the Supreme Court is understood as lying in its raw
power to declare law or in its capacity competently to achieve
legal objectives.
HARVARD: A HISTORY OF IDEAS AND MEN, 1817-1967, at 184 (1967).
353. See JOHNSON, supra note 346, at 19, 55-58; Friedman et al., supra
note 52, at 811 ("[Mlost older treatises did no more than compile cases; they
wrapped the confusion of prior case law into a convenient package, usually in
the form of black letter rules.").
354. AUERBACH, supra note 293, at 76.
355. Roscoe Pound, The Need of a Sociological Jurisprudence, 19 GREEN
BAG 611 (1907); see also Law as a Social Instrument, NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 27,
1929, at 158 (highlighting the importance of understanding the impact of law
on society).
356. See WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE LEGALIST REFORMATION: LAW,
POLITICS, AND IDEOLOGY IN NEW YORK, 1920-1980, at 143-44 (2000); LAURA
KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 16 (1996).
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Of course these tensions are ultimately irresolvable. No
sane view of law could entirely abandon either the value of cer-
tainty or that of adaptability;357 the question is instead how a
court will mediate the perennial tension between these two
equally indispensable ideals.3 58 The same can be said of the
boundary between law and politics. It is as implausible to draw
an impermeable barrier between law and popular will, 359 as it
is to collapse law entirely into the domain of popular contesta-
tion. Similarly, the authority of the Court can wholly subsist
neither in its control over the disposition of state legal power
nor in its competence to serve legal purposes. The Court's ac-
tual legitimacy must always rest somewhere between these two
extreme versions of its institutional position.
The demonstrable differences between the decisionmaking
practices of the Taft Court and those of the contemporary Court
indicate that the Court has substantially altered its approach
to these questions from that which it pursued in the 1920s.
The direction of the change roughly corresponds to the transi-
tion from what Philippe Nonet and Philip Selznick have called
"autonomous" law to what they have termed "responsive
law."360 In a system of "autonomous law," the "consolidation
and defense of institutional autonomy are the central preoccu-
pation of legal officials,"361 who accordingly take pains to draw
"a sharp line between legislative and judicial functions."36 2 The
task of the judiciary is to maintain fidelity to a system of cer-
tain and definite rules, even at the cost of "the adaptation of
law to social facts."363 By emphasizing procedural regularity
357. For a discussion, see Robert Post, Theories of Constitutional Interpre-
tation, REPRESENTATIONS, Spring 1990, at 13, 19-21, 27-28.
358. Courts will undoubtedly mediate these tensions differently in different
substantive areas of law. And, if the radically dissimilar rates of unanimity as
between the United States Supreme Court and state supreme courts remains
true, see supra note 132, different courts will also resolve these tensions differ-
ently, depending upon their distinct conceptions of the roles they are to per-
form in the legal system.
359. See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, Constitutional Authorship, in
CONSTITUTIONALISM: PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS 64 (Larry Alexander ed.,
1998).
360. PHILIPPE NONET & PHILIP SELZNICK, LAW AND SOCIETY IN
TRANSITION: TOWARD RESPONSIVE LAW 15 (1978).
361. Id. at 54.
362. Id.
363. Id. at 64.
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above all else, autonomous law stresses "authority and obedi-
ence"364 to the positive institutional authority of courts.
"Responsive law," by contrast, conceives the authority of
legal institutions to lie in their ability competently to achieve
the law's purposes. This requires the law to assume an "open-
ness and flexibility"365 that is incompatible with strict rule-
bound decisionmaking. "[L]egal advocacy takes on a political
dimension,"36 6 and it accordingly becomes "more difficult to dis-
tinguish legal analysis from policy analysis, legal rationality
from other forms of systematic decisionmaking."367 Rulemak-
ing recedes in importance, as judicial legitimacy comes to de-
pend upon "a union of legal authority and political will."368
The norm of acquiescence reflected and sustained a world
in which the authority of the Court depended upon its capacity
to maintain a domain of fixed and certain rules, a domain rig-
orously separated from the legislative realm of political will.
The Court's refusal to cite law review articles reflected and sus-
tained a world in which the authority of the Court depended
upon its fidelity to a self-referential system of precedent. But
as American law increasingly began to submit to what Nonet
and Selznick call "the [s]overeignty of [p]urpose," 369 which is to
say that as the legitimacy of our legal system came increasingly
to be measured by its ability to achieve social ends, neither the
norm of acquiescence nor the isolation of legal authority from
policy expertise could be maintained. The collapse of the norm
of acquiescence both expresses and facilitates an emphasis on
the law's role as a flexible instrument for the accomplishment
of political purposes. Similarly, the contemporary Court's fre-
quent citation to law review articles positions the Court as an
institution whose authority derives in considerable measure
from its capacity competently to fulfill the policies of the law.
These are subtle and largely silent changes. They reside in
the interstices of consciousness. They are pervasive, but rarely
explicit; fundamental, but rarely deliberate. They implicitly
shape the way the Court perceives and engages its mission.
They are readily compatible with, although not logically en-
tailed by, the shift in the Court's role promoted by the Judiciary
364. Id. at 68.
365. Id. at 78.
366. Id.
367. Id. at 83.
368. Id. at 86.
369. Id. at 78.
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Act of 1925. When we seek to grasp the nature of the Taft
Court, in the full flush of its historical difference, we must
bring these implicit transformations to mind. It has been my
hope that recognizing their trace in the material substrate of
the Court's decisionmaking practices can aid us in this project
of imaginative reconstruction.
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Figure A: Supreme Court Appellate Docket 1910-1928
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Figure C: Average Number of Days from Argument to
















Figure D: Average Number of Footnotes For Each
Majority Opinion, 1921-1928 Terms
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Figure E: Use of Footnotes in Majority and Dissenting
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Figure G: Percentage of All Opinions in Which Clarke
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Figure I: The Willingness of Justices to Switch Their
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Figure K: Success in Achieving Unanimous Opinions
v El
M Per Cent of a Justice's Unanimous Opinions that were Unanimous in Conference















HeinOnline -- 85 Minn. L. Rev. 1389 2000-2001
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Figure M: Citations to Legal Scholarship, 1921-1928
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